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Summary 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between weather shocks, climate change and development.  
The research constituting this work thus lies at the intersection between environmental and 
development economics. 
Although it is by now generally acknowledged that it is the poor who will suffer most from the 
negative impacts of climate change, the literature on the relationship between climate change and 
development is still far from reaching definitive conclusions.  
In particular, from a macro point of view, the debate on the potential impacts of global warming on 
the growth rate of the economy, and not just on the level of output, is still unsettled. At the same time, 
research on the links between climate change and micro welfare dynamics, especially in developing 
countries, is scarce. 
Drawing from both the new climate-economy literature and the development literature on household 
growth and poverty traps, we address, at multiple scales of analysis, the research question of whether 
there is a causal relationship between weather shocks and economic growth. 
We specifically focus our attention on temperature shocks, because the ultimate aim is to provide 
policy guidelines on the future impacts of climate change. Although we cannot capture in our analysis 
long-run phenomena such as intensification effects and adaptation, we employ robust empirical 
methods and panel data so to infer from short-run elasticities and inform thinking about the impacts 
of long-run, permanent changes in climate.  
The main contribution of this thesis lies in its integrated, multi-level framework, able to provide 
empirical evidence and insights on the crucial links, still not well understood, between weather 
shocks, climate change, poverty and economic growth. More broadly, this work contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the much-debated historical relationship between climate and development. 
 
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays. 
Essay 1 investigates the relationship between weather shocks and the growth rate of total factor 
productivity (TFP), the key driver of long-run development, at the macro level. We look at TFP 
growth to shed light on whether climate change will affect the growth rate of the economy, as recently 
hypothesized in influential theoretical studies. If true, this would imply a radical upward revision of 
                                                 
 I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another university for the 
award of any other degree. Material included in Essays 1 and 2 has been incorporated in two working papers co-authored 
with my advisors. However, I hereby state that the bulk of the original research presented in this thesis, including all the 
empirical applications in each of the following essays, is my own work. 
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current impact estimates. Using a sample of 60 countries covering the time span 1960-2006, we show 
that temperature shocks affected TFP growth significantly and negatively only in poor countries. This 
finding provides direct evidence of the dynamic effects of temperature shocks in poor countries. If 
such causal relationship between temperature, poverty and TFP growth will persist in the long-run, 
climate change in poor countries will affect not only the level of output, but also its growth rate 
through the TFP channel, thus further increasing concerns over inequality of future impacts. 
Essay 2 is a shift of perspective from the macro to the micro point of view. Specifically, the aim is to 
understand if the pattern of inequality of impacts observed at the macro level also holds within-
country, other than between-country. Here, using LSMS-ISA World Bank household panel data, we 
explore the short-run elasticities between weather shocks and consumption growth in rural Tanzania 
during the period 2008-2013. The core results are: i) temperature shocks slowed the convergence 
process among households and ii) the existence of critical poverty thresholds above which households 
are immune to temperature shocks. Furthermore, we also provide empirical evidence on the 
transmission channels (labour productivity and crop yields) responsible for the heterogeneity of 
impacts. 
Essay 3 is partially an extension of this approach, to make up for the short-run nature of the analysis 
in Essay 2. Research on micro growth dynamics in developing countries, in fact, is hampered by the 
lack of long household panels. Thanks to the creation of synthetic panels, we obtain a longitudinal 
panel of cohorts for rural Tanzania from 2000 to 2013. Using an ad hoc measure of household 
resilience to food insecurity developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), we provide 
evidence that, despite the convergence process among households in rural Tanzania also holds in the 
long-run, temperature shocks still have a diverging effect for the least resilient households. We then 
show the existence of resilience thresholds that entail a bifurcation of impacts from temperature 
shocks on food consumption growth, which is particularly meaningful for adaptation policies in 
developing countries. 
 
On the whole, the core result of this work is a sharp and remarkable pattern of heterogeneity of 
impacts: temperature shocks only affect poorest households and countries. 
This finding, although consistent with most previous studies, goes beyond them by showing how the 
causal relationship between temperature, poverty and economic growth is deeper, more persistent and 
more extensive than previously thought, and may even be ubiquitous. This points to the paramount 
role played by development in dampening the effects of weather shocks on human welfare dynamics.  
Extrapolating from weather to climate, but also acknowledging the issue of external validity in doing 
so, our research suggests that climate change will cause, first and foremost, a fractal increase in 
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inequality, both between- and within-country: worse-off countries and households will be 
disproportionately affected by the negative impacts of global warming.  
Such a conclusion points to the importance of poverty reduction as a complementary strategy to 
greenhouse gas emission reduction and as a fundamental element of climate policy. 
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Essay 1 
 
Weather, climate and total factor productivity
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recently it has been hypothesized that climate change will affect total factor productivity growth. 
Given the importance of TFP for long-run economic growth, if true this would entail a substantial 
upward revision of current impact estimates. Using macro TFP data from a recently developed 
dataset in Penn World Tables, we test this hypothesis by directly examining the nature of the 
relationship between annual temperature shocks and TFP growth rates in the period 1960-2006. The 
results show a negative relationship only exists in poor countries, where a 1°C annual increase in 
temperature decreases TFP growth rates by about 1.1-1.5 percentage points, compared to an impact 
indistinguishable from zero in rich countries. Extrapolating from weather to climate, the possibility 
of dynamic effects of climate change in poor countries increases concerns over the distributional 
issues of future impacts and, from a policy perspective, restates the case for complementarity between 
climate policy and poverty reduction. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the path-breaking work of Nordhaus (1991), economists have argued in favour of a modest 
carbon tax. Although frequently challenged in favour of more stringent climate policy, estimates of 
the social cost of carbon have not increased over the years (Tol, 2015). Three independent author 
teams (Moore & Diaz, 2015; Dietz & Stern 2015; Moyer, Woolley, Matteson, Glotter & Weisbach, 
2014) have recently hypothesized that, should climate change negatively affect total factor 
productivity, then the estimate of the Pigou tax increases drastically. In this essay, we present 
econometric evidence of the impact of weather and climate on total factor productivity growth. While 
not disputing the sign of the hypothesized effect, we show the effect size is small. 
 
Most impact studies of climate change have taken the form of comparative statics impact estimates. 
These studies show that climate change would have a modest negative impact of human welfare, i.e., 
a few percent over a century (Tol, 2015), but they have been criticized because they could not fully 
capture the potential damage by future climate change (Pindyck, 2012 & 2013; Stern, 2013; 
Weitzman, 2009 & 2011). 
 
Besides static impacts on welfare, there are also dynamic ones: climate change affects the growth rate 
of the economy (Fankhauser & Tol, 2005; Hallegatte, 2005). The distinction between static, or “level” 
effects, and dynamic, or “growth” effects of climate change on economic activity is of first order 
importance in terms of the magnitude of future impacts. While the so-called level effects are 
temporary and intrinsically reversible, growth effects compound over time and permanently reduce 
output. An impact of hot temperatures on a given year’s agricultural yields would represent a level 
effect, while an impact on investments or institutions would affect the economy’s ability to grow, 
altering its future path. Fankhauser and Tol (2005) argue that climate change may affect labour supply, 
capital depreciation and productivity (rather than productivity growth). They find that, if these effects 
are negative, economic growth would be suppressed. The resulting welfare loss would be similar in 
size to the estimates of the static welfare losses. 
 
Since the onset of growth economics and the pioneering Solow model (Solow, 1956) TFP has been 
considered a key element to explain long-run development. TFP, as is widely known, represents a 
combination of labour and capital productivity, which accounts for increase in total output not due to 
labour or capital inputs, and traditionally has been seen as a rough measure of technological progress. 
Recently, a number of theoretical studies have hypothesized a future impact of global warming on 
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TFP growth (Stern, 2013; Moore & Diaz, 2015; Dietz & Stern 2015; Moyer et al., 2014). Given the 
preeminent importance of TFP for long-run economic growth, if climate change will really harm TFP 
growth rates, this would entail a radical revision of impact estimates. 
 
Dietz and Stern (2015) change the workings of DICE1, one of the most used Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAMs), to allow climate impacts to affect TFP growth2. They find a much stronger case for 
stringent emission abatement. 
Similarly, Moyer et al. (2014) argue that the IAMs used by the US federal Interagency Working 
Group (IWG)3 on the Social Cost of Carbon may not capture the full range of consequences of climate 
change, and contest the fact that “(IAMs) implicitly assume that society will grow far wealthier in the 
future even if temperatures increase by amounts that many scientists believe may cause substantial 
hardships”. Consequently they change DICE and allow climate impacts to directly affect TFP growth, 
finding, consistently with Dietz and Stern (2015) large effects on future growth and a much higher 
value of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) than the IWG one4. 
 
However, these works do not provide any empirical evidence for this claim and the consequent 
simulations  (Tol, 2015). In fact, while these calibrated models are very sensitive to assumptions 
about the impact of climate change on TFP growth, the assumptions are just that: they are not 
grounded in observations. The current essay estimates the impact of weather variability and climate 
change on total factor productivity growth.  
 
There is a large and growing body of empirical literature which focuses on the relationship between 
climate and economic activity. Jared Diamond (Diamond, 1999) revived the spirit of Ellsworth 
Huntington (Huntington, 1922), arguing that geography and climate are the fundamental drivers of 
economic development. Olsson and Hibbs (2005) provide empirical support. Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1999) argue that geography and climate are important, but that their impact can be 
modified by technology. In sharp contrast to this environmental determinism, (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
& Robinson, 2000; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004) argue for 
institutional determinism and find that, in a direct statistical contest, institutional variables have 
                                                 
1 DICE stands for “Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy Model”, and is a computer-based Integrated Assessment Model 
developed by Professor William Nordhaus of Yale University. See Nordhaus (2008). 
2 Further changes to the DICE framework they undertake are allowing for convexity of the damage function (Weitzman, 
2010) and for high values of the climate sensitivity parameter (Weitzman, 2009 & 2011). 
3 DICE (Nordhaus, 2008), FUND (Anthoff, Tol, & Yohe, 2009) and PAGE (Hope, 2006). 
4 Also, they notice how impacts on growth would contribute to settle the debate on the discount rate sparked after the 
publication of the Stern Review (Stern, 2007). See also Nordhaus (2007), Stern (2013) and Tol et al. (2006). 
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predictive power but climate and geography variables do not. The institutional view has been 
challenged by Alsan (2014) and Andersen, Dalgaard and Selaya (2016). Alsan (2014) shows that the 
tse-tse fly is a major factor in the underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Andersen, Dalgaard and 
Selaya (2016) show that UV radiation (but not climate) plays a role in explaining the pattern of 
development across the world. 
These cross-section analyses of the climate-income relationship suffer from a range of endogeneity 
and confounders problems. A literature has emerged that uses robust panel studies that try to isolate 
the effect of temperature or other meteorological variables on economic activity and growth.5 A 
comprehensive review is carried out in Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014). 
 
As far as climate change is concerned, though, this literature is problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, as emphasized by Tol (2015), weather impacts are assumed to be informative about climate 
impacts; put differently, short-term elasticities are used to assess long-term effects. Second, since the 
Industrial Revolution global temperature has risen of almost 1°C (IPCC, 2013) while increases in 
temperature during the 21st century will very likely be of 2°C or more (IPCC, 2013) which means 
these studies extrapolate far beyond historical experience. Third, it is by no means guaranteed that 
historical relationships will continue to hold in the future as technologies and institutions evolve. 
However, while external validity is debatable, there are techniques, as for example long differences, 
that can alleviate these concerns. Thus, these caveats notwithstanding, recently panel methods have 
been employed to disentangle level effects from growth effects. 
 
For example, in a global sample from 1950-2003, Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) find temperature 
shocks have significant negative effects on GDP growth of poor countries, but not of rich ones. 
Interestingly, using weather lags and long differences, they find evidence for persistence of impacts, 
which suggests temperature shocks are only slowly absorbed by the economy and have long-lasting 
effects in poor countries, leading them to conclude that temperature also affects the growth rate of 
GDP in poor countries, other, or rather, than output level. Bansal and Ochoa (2011) do not exploit 
country-specific temperature shocks, but global average temperature shocks, and find tropical 
countries are the most vulnerable and that on average a 1°C global increase reduces growth by 0.9%.  
A study on windstorms by Hsiang and Jina (2014) for 28 Caribbean countries over the 1970-2006 
period shows similar results. Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015), studying 166 countries between 1960 
and 2010, find that productivity peaks at about 13°C and declines non-linearly thereafter, leading 
                                                 
5As they explain: “panel data exploit the exogeneity of cross-time weather variation, allowing for causative identification”. 
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them to predict impacts much larger than previously estimated. 
These studies focus on the recent past, which saw only limited climate change. This could, on the one 
hand, lead one to speculate that these impacts could be exacerbated by further increases or non-linear 
effects which lie outside historical experience and, on the other, that weather impacts must be 
interpreted with caution given both the difference between a 1°C shock in a given year and place and 
a permanent 1°C global increase, and the fact that in the long-run adaptation may take place and 
substantially mitigate negative impacts. It is the controversial but ultimately difficult to solve 
“intensification vs adaptation” debate over which of these two long-term effects will eventually 
outweigh the other (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014).  
 
A first consequence of this new wave of empirical studies on climate and growth has been to induce 
practitioners to use these new estimates to derive empirically-based projections and implement them 
in IAMs to see how these respond to the relaxation of assumptions about exogenous economic growth. 
Moore and Diaz (2015) show that if DICE is modified and calibrated on Dell, Jones and Olken (2012), 
the predicted impacts go up, and so the consequent SCC, compared to the baseline scenario in which 
climate change does not affect growth. Lemoine and Kapnick (2015) convert estimates of past 
economic costs of regional warming into projections of the economic costs of future global warming. 
They do recognize, though, that this is mostly relevant only for relatively small changes in climate. 
 
Using TFP data from the most recent version of the Penn World Table, we use a panel dataset for 60 
countries, covering the period 1960 – 2006, to test the hypothesis of a causal relationship between 
temperature shocks and annual TFP growth rates. What emerges from our analysis is that temperature 
shocks affect annual TFP growth rates only in poor countries. Of course, this conclusion is subjected 
to caveats and must be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, it basically confirms the results of Dell, 
Jones and Olken (2012) and rejects the conclusions of  Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015). We also 
show that the assumptions of  Dietz and Stern (2015), Moore and Diaz (2015) and Moyer et al. (2014) 
have no empirical grounding. 
 
The contributions of this essay are the following: first, it provides a useful empirical test for the 
plausibility of the recent hypothesis of an impact of climate change on TFP growth. Second, to our 
knowledge this is the first study to examine the macro relationship between temperature shocks and 
TFP growth. Third, unlike other previous works on temperature and economic growth, this analysis 
can provide direct, and not just indirect, evidence on the persistence of weather impacts on economic 
activity in the medium or long-run, since it focuses on TFP, and not GDP, growth rate. 
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Fourth, we show the main reason behind the impact on TFP growth in poor countries is labour 
productivity, thus linking the existing macro literature with the recent micro studies on the 
relationship between temperature and human physiology. 
 
The outline of the rest of this essay is as follows. Section 1 provides a theoretical background on the 
potential TFP-climate change relationship. Section 2 presents data and descriptive statistics. Section 
3 describes the identification strategy. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 performs 
robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the implications of the results with regard to climate change. 
Section 7 sums up, illustrates some caveats and concludes. 
 
Section 1 
 Background on the TFP impact channel 
 
We follow Dietz and Stern (2015) to show how climate change could affect technological progress.  
Consider the standard DICE model: a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model with an added climate 
externality and emission abatement costs: 
 
Yt   =  (1 - Ω𝑡
Y) (1 - Ʌt) [At Nt1-α Ktα]                                     (1) 
 
where  At  and  Nt  are specified exogenously, Kt  evolves according to the standard equation: 
 
Kt+1   =  Kt  (1-δ) + sYt                                                                                (2) 
 
Ʌt are emission abatement costs and  Ω𝑡
Y is a quadratic damage function of the change in global 
temperature relative to the global mean in 19006: 
 
Ω𝑡
Y
  = 1  –  
1
1+π1△T𝑡+π2△Tt
2                                               (3) 
 
Equation (1) represents the impact function in case of only level effects: in this model, a portion of 
output in each time period is simply “thrown away” due to the impacts of climate change  Ω𝑡
Y . 
 
                                                 
6 The damage function is usually calibrated ad hoc on the basis of impact studies of climate change. The quadratic form 
has been criticized because it does not allow for convexity of damages [sic] (Stern, 2013; Weitzman, 2010). 
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In this framework, climate impacts affect long-run economic growth as climate change reduces 
current output, and hence savings and investment, which in turn reduce future capital and future 
output. The savings rate may also be affected, as the returns to investment fall. Both effects have been 
shown to be quantitatively small (Fankhauser & Tol, 2005; Moyer et al., 2014). 
 
If, instead, climate change also affects TFP, things change substantially. Specifically, TFP is 
endogenous and grows according to the following law of motion: 
 
                            At + 1  =  (1 – Ω𝑡
A) (1 - 𝛿𝑡
A ) At   + α(It )                                                                     (4) 
 
where 𝛿𝑡
A  is the net depreciation rate for productivity, α(It ) is a “spillover function” that converts the 
flow of capital investment in each period into a flow of capital externalities, and  Ω𝑡
A  are the impacts 
of climate change on TFP, while the remaining share of damages still affects output level. 
Damages are then partitioned between output and TFP: 
 
                                 Ω𝑡
A  =  fA · Ω𝑡                                                               (5) 
 
                                 Ω𝑡
Y  =  1 –   
(1−Ω𝑡)
(1− Ω𝑡
A)
                                                           (6) 
 
where fA is the fraction of impacts of climate change that harms TFP growth. 
 
The effects of this modification depend on the share of impacts directly affecting TFP, but even a 
small share leads to a radically different consumption growth path:  Dietz and Stern (2015) assume 
that fA  = 0.05 and find that consumption per capita in year 2205 is reduced from more than 15 times 
the 2005 level to 11.4 times higher.  
Moyer et al. (2014) explore the consequences of different values of  fA between 1% and 100%. They 
show that fA = 0.05 leads to a 70% drop in consumption per capita in 2300 relative to the no climate 
change case.  
Similar qualitative results are obtained by Moore and Diaz (2015) when they alter the DICE model 
to let climate change affect TFP growth on the basis of parameters calibrated on the estimates of  Dell, 
Jones and Olken (2012). As Dietz and Stern (2015) sum up: “in this formulation some part of the 
instantaneous impacts of climate change falls on TFP, permanently reducing future output 
possibilities”. 
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Section 2 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
A. Data 
 
Data for this study are taken from a range of different sources. 
 
TFP Data 
 
Data on total factor productivity of countries come from the most recent version of the Penn World 
Table, PWT 8.1 (PWT 8.1, 2016). In particular, in our study we use RTFPNA data7. RTFPNA, where 
the prefix R stays for “real”, is a country-specific index of TFP where in the benchmark year, 2005, 
RTFPNA is 1 for all countries. RTFPNA can be used to study within-country productivity growth over 
time. In our specifications, we use the natural logarithm of the RTFPNA index. This means that the 
2005 benchmark value is 0 for all countries in the logarithmic specification. We calculate annual 
RTFPNA growth rates by first-differencing, and check for stationarity8. Henceforth, from now on, 
“TFP growth rate” it is intended as the annual growth rate of the natural logarithm of the RTFPNA 
index as taken from PWT 8.1. For further information on the RTFPNA index and data, see Appendix 
(1). 
 
Temperature and Precipitation Data 
 
These data are taken from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900 – 2006 Monthly 
Time Series (Matsuura & Willmott, 2007), from the University of Delaware (UDEL), as aggregated 
to the country-year level by (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2012), using population weights, where the weights 
are constructed from 1990 population data at 30 arc second resolution from the Global Rural Urban 
Mapping Project (Balk et al., 2004). Importantly, given temperature levels are trend-stationary, in 
order to exclude potentially spurious results and ensure stationary residuals in our regressions, we 
transform data by first-differencing and check for stationarity. We do the same with precipitation data. 
 
GDP Data 
 
We use per capita GDP data to distinguish between impacts in rich and poor countries. These data 
come from the Maddison Project (‘Maddison Project’, 2016.).  
 
                                                 
7 Note that this series has only recently become available. Previous studies of the impact of climate change on economic 
growth, reviewed above, therefore did not have access to these data. 
8 For the panel unit root tests for annual TFP growth, temperature change and precipitation change, see Appendix (2), 
Table A.1 – A.6. 
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B. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The main dataset is composed of 60 countries9 and covers the period 1960 – 2006. Figure 1 is a 
scatterplot of TFP and temperature levels in 2006, and the linear prediction.  As can be seen, there is 
a negative correlation between the two. This correlation is not a causal relationship, but could be due 
to confounding factors such as institutions. There is no reverse causality. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the main variables. There is a huge variation both in 
the annual growth rates of TFP, with an average of about 5% annual increase but a minimum and a 
maximum that are respectively -56% and 27%, and in terms of temperature changes as well, where 
the mean annual change in temperature is very small but the extremes are between 2°C and 3°C.  
Finally, precipitation exhibits even greater variability. 
 
Section 3 
Empirical Strategy 
 
We use a fixed-effect panel as the estimation method to isolate the impact of weather shocks on the 
growth rate of total factor productivity10. Our identification strategy is straightforward and follows 
Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012). The baseline specification of our model is the following: 
 
                  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (7) 
 
Where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡  represents the annual growth rate of TFP, and  ∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡  is annual temperature change. 
𝛥𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  represents annual change in precipitation levels, which is used only as a control variable 
following the recommendation in Auffhammer, Hsiang, Schlenker and Sobel (2013). By excluding 
precipitation we would run the risk of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, in order to investigate for 
heterogeneous effects of temperature shocks, we follow Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) and interact 
the vector of temperature changes with dummies that capture the heterogeneity of interest, in 
particular dummies for being a “poor” or a “hot” country. 
 
As for the other elements in the equation, 𝜇𝑖 are country fixed effects, 𝜃𝑟𝑡 are region x time fixed 
effects, where this interaction allows for differentiated trends in different regions, as recommended 
by Dell, Jones and Olken (2014), in order to isolate idiosyncratic local shocks11. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are error 
                                                 
9 The choice of the countries has been made on the basis of data availability. For the list of countries, see Appendix (5). 
10 For the appropriateness of the FE approach compared to a random effects (RE) specification, see Appendix (2), Table 
A.7. 
11 For the list of regions, see Appendix (6). 
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terms adjusted for clustering at the country level. 
 
There is no reason to be concerned about reverse causality. Confounding variables are a minor worry. 
TFP is constructed rather than observed. If weather variations would cause mismeasurement in the 
size of the labour force or the capital stock, then we would wrongly attribute this to TFP. We are not 
aware of a way to test this for our data. 
 
TFP is total factor productivity. By construction, when measured at a national, annual resolution, TFP 
is a mix of a wide range of factors. Changes in TFP can be due to technological change, the standard 
but flawed interpretation. Changes in TFP can also be due to managerial or behavioural change, 
changes in the structure of the economy or company entry and exit within sectors, changes in 
regulation or taxation, changes in the provision of public goods, changes in market power, or changes 
in international trade. The results below show that temperature variations affect TFP growth, but our 
data do not allow us to precisely identify the channel through which TFP is affected. That said, our 
approach is a step forward compared to previous studies which looked at economic growth, an even 
more convoluted measure. 
 
Section 4 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 reports the results for the baseline specification of equation (7). Column (1) only includes 
annual changes in temperature and precipitation levels. A first inspection shows that the coefficient 
for the annual change in temperatures, △Temp, is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting 
that a 1°C annual increase in temperature would lower TFP growth rates of countries by 0.49%. 
Column (2), however, reveals that adding an interaction between temperature change and a dummy 
for being poor – with “poor” being defined as having a below median GDP per capita in the initial 
year of our panel, 1960 – substantially changes the picture: this interaction in fact is negative and 
strongly significant, while the coefficient for temperature changes is now negative but statistically 
insignificant, which suggests the negative effects of temperature on TFP growth rates are 
concentrated in poor countries.  
 
This is confirmed by looking at the net impact of temperature change in poor countries, at the bottom 
of Column (2), which suggests a 1°C annual increase in temperature in poor countries would decrease 
TFP growth rates by about 1.5 percentage points, with a significance at the 1% level. 
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This finding is somewhat weakened when we add an interaction between temperature changes and a 
dummy for being hot, with “hot” being defined as having an above median average temperature in 
the 1960s. The results are shown in Column (3): the coefficient of the Poor x △Temp interaction is 
now -1.2 %, and significant at 5%, while the “hot” interaction turns out to be insignificant, and so its 
net effect. Importantly, the total effect of temperature in poor countries is also diminished both in 
terms of magnitude and significance12. The fact that the negative effect of temperature changes in 
poor countries is somewhat weakened could be explained in two different ways: the first is that the 
negative effect of temperature on TFP growth rates comes not only through being poor, but also, 
partially, through being hot, and the second is that the definitions of “hot” and “poor” overlap to a 
good extent and thus the inclusion of an “hot” interaction partially offsets the results for poor countries. 
The distinction matters a great deal when it comes to conclusions with regard to future climate change: 
it is a completely different picture whether the negative effects of temperature shocks appear only in 
poor countries or also, even if slightly, in hot countries regardless whether rich or poor. 
 
In order to shed light on the issue, in Column (4) we use an alternative definition of poor, with “poor” 
being now defined as having a below median GDP per capita, where median GDP per capita is now 
calculated over the whole 1960 – 2006 period and not just in 1960 as above. The “poor” interaction 
is again strongly significant, with the coefficient of Poor_2 x △Temp again very similar, with a value 
of -1.43 percentage points, the “hot” interaction again negative but statistically insignificant (and so 
its net total impact), and the total impact in poor countries again significant at the 1% level. Therefore, 
this variation suggests that only TFP growth rates of poor countries are affected by temperature 
shocks. 
 
Finally, to enhance confidence in this finding, in Column (5) and (6) we consider a different definition 
of “hot” country, with the dummy for hot that has value 1 for countries with an average temperature 
in the 1960s above the 75% percentile, and repeat our specifications.  The results, while confirming 
the negative impact of temperature shocks on the TFP growth rate of poor countries, also show that 
there is a negative and 5% significant impact of temperature shocks in hot countries, with a net effect 
of about -1 percentage point on the annual TFP growth. In other words, even though the negative 
effect of annual temperature comes through being poor, there also seems to be weak evidence of an 
                                                 
12
 Incidentally, it is also worth remarking how precipitation change has a negative and significant effect, but this control 
variable has proved to be very sensitive to specifications throughout the entire empirical analysis and its results should 
therefore be interpreted with caution and are no further discussed here. 
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impact in hot countries. Given the importance of this distinction, in Section V we investigate more 
closely the relationship between temperature shocks and TFP growth, by performing a variety of 
robustness checks. 
 
Section 5 
Robustness Checks 
 
Thirteen robustness checks are performed: the repetition of the baseline specification for a different 
dataset, comprising 68 countries and covering the period 1970–2006; the repetition of the main 
specification in both datasets using different weather data; the repetition of the regressions without 
the precipitation variable; regressions including interactions with poor and hot dummies for 
precipitation as well; a specification including an interaction between temperature shocks and a 
dummy for being rich; an investigation of the poor subsample of our dataset; a specification using a 
joint interaction term for countries which are both poor and hot; two alternative specifications which 
include respectively an interaction with GDP per capita and one with a measure of institutional quality; 
a repetition of the main specification in which we use labour productivity growth as the dependent 
variable in place of TFP growth;  regressions on changes in the number of persons employed and 
capital stock; the use of Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors in place of clustered standard errors 
for the baseline analysis in both samples. 
 
A. Different sample 
 
We run the same regressions using a different sample of the same dataset, changing the composition 
of countries and the time period. In particular, we add 8 countries to the main sample: Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Kuwait, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Some of these countries are 
hot and rich, increasing the statistical power to distinguish between heat and affluence. The new time 
period is 1970 – 2006. Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics for the new dataset, Table 4 the 
results for the main specification. 
 
As for the impact in poor countries, the results are very similar: the previous findings are confirmed 
in terms of magnitude, sign and significance, and if anything reinforced. This is probably due to the 
fact that some of the added countries, such as the Arab oil states, are very rich, very hot and with high 
TFP growth (although concentrated in one sector). The robustness check conducted on Sample B 
reinforces the main thesis of this work: a negative causal relationship between annual TFP growth 
rates and temperature shocks only exists in poor countries, while the TFP growth rates of rich 
countries, regardless whether they are hot or cold, do not appear to suffer from temperature changes.  
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In other words, the impacts of temperature on total factor productivity are conditional on the level of 
GDP per capita. 
 
B. Different weather data 
 
Since both TFP and weather data are notably affected by measurement errors, to partially alleviate 
these concerns we perform exactly the same analysis, in both samples, but using another weather 
dataset, the CRUCY Version 3.23 by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East 
Anglia (CRU, 2016) . Furthermore, this dataset uses a different weighting scheme with respect to our 
main source of weather data: the CRU data are aggregated at the country levels using area weights, 
rather than population weights as in the first case, which means that the aggregated data now represent 
the average weather experienced by a place, as opposed to the average weather experienced by a 
person  (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014).  This is not a trivial difference: in countries like United States, 
Australia, Canada, China, large and scarcely populated areas will dominate the national average 
temperature when using area weights. This double difference, both of source and aggregation method, 
takes to weather data that are quite different from those used in our main specification13, and thus we 
reckon this constitutes a useful and reliable check for the robustness of our findings14. Table 5 
replicates the specification of Table 2 for the main dataset using the CRU data. 
   
The results are remarkably consistent with those emerged from the baseline analysis: the negative 
effect of temperature shocks on TFP growth rates only comes through being poor, not through being 
hot, and there is no such causal relationship in rich countries. This consistency is further confirmed 
when repeating the same exercise but using Sample B. The table for this check can be found in 
Appendix (3), Table A.9: results are similar. 
 
C. Excluding precipitation 
 
Even though we highlighted how the risk of omitted variable bias is a concrete one when dealing with 
weather variables, one could also make the case against including precipitation in our specification. 
Therefore, in Table 6 we show what happens if we exclude precipitation from the regressions: the 
coefficients for temperature, and their significance, remain almost unchanged. 
 
                                                 
13 See the Appendix (3), Table A.8 for descriptive statistics of the CRU weather variables. 
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D. Heterogeneity with respect to precipitation impacts 
 
Dell, Jones & Olken (2012) also include control variables which interact precipitation with “poor” 
and “hot” dummies. We do not do this in our main specification, because we are primarily interested 
in temperature. However, one could suspect that adding interactions for precipitation as well could 
change the results. To make sure this is not the case, and also to investigate whether there is 
heterogeneity of precipitation impacts with regard to poor or hot countries, in Table 7 we add these 
precipitation interactions in Table 7, but with do not find any significant evidence supporting this 
heterogeneity. In addition, the impacts from temperature shocks in poor countries are not diminished, 
but actually slightly larger. 
 
E. Using temperature and precipitation levels 
 
In our main specification, we regress annual TFP growth rate and annual temperature and 
precipitation changes. Dell, Jones & Olken (2012), instead, regress their dependent variable, GDP 
growth, on temperature and precipitation levels. We argue above that we choose to using annual 
changes for our weather regressors because of the trend-stationary nature of temperature data. 
However, to ensure our results are not driven by the choice of first-differencing weather data, in Table 
8 we regress TFP growth on temperature and precipitation levels, and check for the heterogeneity of 
temperature impacts as in our main specification reported in Table 2. 
Our core findings are not altered by the use of levels instead of first differences. 
 
F. Non-linearity of temperature impacts 
 
One might object that we fail to account for non-linearity of temperature impacts. 
Indeed, this is what Burke, Miguel and Hsiang (2015) results seem to suggest: “with most poor 
countries on the downward slope of the response function [between the temperature level and the 
GDP growth rate] but rich countries distributed almost symmetrically around the optimum, a linear 
regression for the effect of temperature would recover a steep negative in poor countries but 
ambiguous (and closer to zero) slope for rich countries”15. 
To take this possibility into account, in Table 9 we present a different specification in which we 
include the square of annual temperature change as an additional independent variable in the 
regressions, and we also interact it with the “poor” and “hot” dummies like we do for annual 
temperature change in the main specification. 
                                                 
15 Supplementary Information, page 20. 
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As Columns (1) – (6) show, the square of annual temperature change is almost always insignificant, 
even in poor countries. The only effect its inclusion seems to have on the estimates is to make all the 
cumulative impacts slightly bigger. 
Anyway, what the results suggest is the we can rule out the possibility of meaningful non-linear 
effects of temperature shocks, and that a linear function is the best approximation of the TFP-
temperature relationship for this dataset, in line with Dell, Jones & Olken (2012). 
 
G. Exploring the “rich” interaction 
 
We first check whether or not only in poor countries TFP growth is affected by temperature by 
inspecting its complement. We therefore run exactly the same specification of Table 2, but substitute 
the “poor” interaction with an interaction between annual temperature changes and a dummy for 
being rich, with “rich” being defined as having an above average GDP per capita in 1960. 
Additionally, we also include the alternative definition of “rich”, Rich_2, defined as having an above 
average GDP per capita, and interact it with temperature shocks. 
 
The results are shown in Table 10. Column (1) shows results for the baseline specification which only 
includes annual temperature and precipitation shocks and the “rich” interaction. Although at a first 
inspection the coefficient for △Temp and Rich*△Temp being both strongly significant, but of 
opposite sign, their linear combination at the bottom of Column (2) makes clear that the total effect 
of temperature on the TFP growth rate of rich countries is small and statistically insignificant. When 
we add the “hot” interaction in Column (2), the total effect of shocks in rich countries is again very 
small and insignificant. We repeat the same exercise in Columns (3) and (4), using the alternative 
definition of “hot”, with analogous results. Finally, in Column (5) and (6), we run two specifications 
with the different definition of “hot” as having above 75% percentile average temperature in the 1960s. 
Once again, the net effect in rich countries is again close to zero and insignificant. 
 
H. Investigating the subsample of poor countries    
  
In Table 11 we run a specification using only the subsample of poor countries, “poor” defined as 
having a below median GDP per capita in 1960.  The coefficient for △Temp is negative and 
significant, predicting a -1.8 percentage point decrease in the TFP growth rate for a 1°C increase. 
This confirms again the negative causal relationship in poor countries, which is shown graphically in 
Figure 2. 
 
I. Joint interactions with poor and hot dummies   
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Finally, we run two specifications in which we add in the regressions a double interaction term, 
namely between temperature changes, a dummy for being poor and a dummy for being hot, and we 
repeat these for both our definitions of poor and hot countries. Table 12 shows the results. With the 
joint interaction included, temperature shocks significantly affect TFP growth not only in poor 
countries but also in hot countries. The effect is larger in poor countries than in hot countries, but the 
difference is not significant. The joint effect is similar in size as above. 
 
J. Interactions with GDP / per capita and Polity2                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Additionally, we investigate two specifications which could affect the interpretation and validity of 
our findings. First, we run a specification in which we substitute the “poor” interaction with an 
interaction between temperature shocks and GDP per capita. The previous definitions of poor, in fact, 
are all based on a fixed classification between who is rich and who is poor. This is fine for estimation, 
but not for simulation. In almost fifty years countries that were poor in the beginning grew out of 
poverty, with the notable examples of South Korea, Malaysia and China. We would hope for other 
countries to follow their lead in the next fifty years. Interacting annual temperature changes with GDP 
per capita can overcome this, and provide evidence on whether the negative impact of temperature 
shocks on the growth rate of TFP gets smaller or disappears as countries grow richer. 
 
As Column (1) in Table 13 shows, this is the case. The interaction with GDP per capita is positive 
and significant at the 1% level: solving the first derivative with respect to △Temp, and re-
transforming the natural logarithm of GDP in dollars, suggests that the marginal effect of a 1°C annual 
increase becomes zero when income is approximately $34,400 per person per year for countries 
classified as “hot”16, approximately $14,900 per person per year for countries not classified as “hot”17, 
and approximately $25,600 per person per year for the sample as a whole18 (see Figures 3, 4 and 5 
for a graphical representation of the marginal effects, at different GDP per capita levels, for the three 
cases).  
This indicates that, even though the estimates are inevitably imprecise, and the GDP level where the 
marginal effect of △Temp turns zero depends on the initial temperature level, development always 
means reduced vulnerability and, ultimately, immunity from the impact of temperature shocks on 
TFP growth rate. 
                                                 
16 In natural logarithm: 10.447 (SE = 1.234). 
17 In natural logarithm: 9.609 (SE = 0.351). 
18 In natural logarithm: 10.150 (SE = 0.283). 
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The second alternative specification includes an interaction between temperature changes and a 
measure of institutional quality, Polity2  (‘Polity IV Project', 2014). We added this interaction because 
it could be the case that negative impacts come not through being a poor country, but through poor 
institutions, i.e. through low institutional quality. In the context of the well-known debate on the 
determinants of long-run development (Acemoglu, Jonson & Robinson, 2000; Diamond, 1999; 
Easterly & Levine, 2003; Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999), the institution hypothesis is one of the 
two main currents (the other being the geography hypothesis). Institutions are considered by many 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 
2003; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004) as the fundamental cause of economic growth in the 
long-run. This specification thus constitutes a way of testing once again the relationship between 
climate, institutions and development. 
 
We use Polity2 as a measure of institutions. Polity2 ranges from -10 to 10 and combines the 
democracy and autocracy scores from the Polity IV dataset. In order to investigate whether or not the 
impact of temperature appears also, or exclusively, through the institutional channel, we interact it 
with annual temperature changes and add this interaction to the baseline specification with the “poor” 
interaction.  
 
Column (2) in Table 13 shows our finding is not altered: the negative impact of temperature still 
appears through being poor, and the coefficient for the total effect in poor countries is analogous both 
in significance and magnitude to the previous ones. There is some weak evidence that the interaction 
between temperature shocks and Polity2 has a positive effect on the TFP growth rate, but this is not 
enough to justify a rethinking of our main conclusion. 
 
K. Labour productivity growth as the dependent variable   
                                                                                                    
We find a negative effect of weather shocks on total factor productivity growth, but only in poor 
countries. This is probably due to the fact that poor countries have a much larger share of their GDP 
in the agricultural sector, much more outdoor work and lower adaptive capacity, which suggests that 
one of the channels could be an impact on (outdoor) labour productivity. 
 
Labour productivity is one of the components of total factor productivity. We use labour productivity 
growth in place of TFP growth as an alternative dependent variable for two reasons: first, it represents 
an additional and useful to check the robustness for our core findings; and second, it could provide 
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insights on the channels through which temperature affects TFP growth and on the reasons why this 
is only the case for poor countries. Hence, we repeat our basic specification, replacing annual TFP 
growth with annual labour productivity growth, where labour productivity is defined as annual output 
per person employed. Data on labour productivity have been obtained by Penn World Tables, PWT 
8.1 (PWT 8.1, 2016), by dividing real GDP at constant national prices by the annual number of 
persons employed. 
  
Table 14 shows the results for the baseline sample, Table A.10 for the alternative sample: the impact 
of temperature shocks on labour productivity growth is negative and significant only in poor countries, 
and the coefficients are remarkably consistent and very similar in magnitude and significance to those 
of the TFP regressions, which suggests, as discussed in further detail in Section 6, that this is indeed 
a key channel responsible for the temperature-TFP relationship in poor countries. This has also been 
shown in studies of microdata (Cachon, Gallino, & Olivares, 2012; Heal & Park, 2015; Niemelä, 
Hannula, Rautio, Reijula, & Railio, 2002; Sudarshan & Tewari, 2013). 
 
L. Labour force and capital stock   
 
Dell, Jones and Olken (2012) studied the impact of temperature variations on the growth rate of per 
capita income. Their results are qualitatively similar to ours: unusually hot years negatively affect 
growth, but only in poor countries. We investigate the growth rate of total factor productivity, and 
hypothesize that this explains Dell, Jones and Olken’s results. However, their result could also be 
explained, at least partly, by changes in the labour force or capital stock. 
 
Table 15 shows the results for regressions of the annual growth rate of the number of persons 
employed19 and the annual growth rate of real capital stock on temperature and precipitation change. 
The explanatory variables are both statistically insignificant in the main specification, and only the 
total effect of temperature change on the growth rate of the capital stock in poor countries is positive 
and weakly significant at the 10% level. In other words, Dell, Jones and Olken’s temperature impact 
on income growth is due to the effect of temperature on total factor productivity growth, perhaps 
dampened by an effect of temperature on capital deepening. 
 
M. Regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors  
 
                                                 
19 Data on the size of the labour force were incomplete in PWT 8.1. 
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Countries are not independent from each other. In the specifications above, we do not check or correct 
for spatial autocorrelation. As Dell, Jones & Olken (2014) notice, in the weather-economy literature 
this is usually accomplished by making use of Conley (1999) standard errors which allow correlation 
to decay smoothly with distance. However, the use of Conley (1999) standard errors would make 
little sense in our sample, given that the choice of common distance cut-off points would be equally 
applied to countries as different in geographical size as China and Trinidad and Tobago. Hence, we 
opted for the use of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are robust to cross-sectional / 
spatial and temporal dependence. 
 
Table 16 reports the results of the baseline FE regressions for the main sample, Table A.11 for the 
alternative sample. The significance of the coefficients is slightly diminished in some of the 
specifications, but the overall picture is that our core findings are not altered when taking into account 
the possibility of spatial dependence between countries. 
 
Section 6 
Implications of climate change 
 
What do these results mean for future climate change? The temperature in poor countries in the almost 
half century of our sample saw an increase of approximately 0.6°C, or on average 0.012°C per year. 
There were positive and negative shocks to the annual temperature but the positive shocks were, on 
average, 0.012°C larger. This means that, on average, negative shocks to the annual TFP growth rate 
were 0.012°C/year * 1.762%/°C (cf. Table 7) = 0.021% (SE = 0.006%) per year larger than positive 
shocks. The 21st century could see an additional global warming of 0.3-4.8°C20 relative to the period 
1986-2005 (IPCC 2013). If past relationships will continue to hold, and excluding both intensification 
and adaptation, annual TFP growth rate could be reduced by 0.005-0.085% per year. Over a hundred 
years, total factor productivity would be 0.5-8.2% below where it would be without climate change. 
This is an upper bound, as we estimated the short-run semi-elasticity rather than the long-run one. 
This extrapolation is not immune to concerns about external validity. 
 
In the worst case scenario of a further 4.8°C warming, annual TFP growth in poor countries would 
be lowered by about 0.085% during this century. This is not trivial, considering that it would be an 
                                                 
20 Given that the standard deviation for annual temperature change is 0.56°C (cf. Table 1), interannual variability is quite 
large relative to the projected trend, so while this extrapolation should be interpreted with the usual caution, its 
implications should not be a priori dismissed. 
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additional dynamic effect to be added to the current impact estimates, but it is much smaller than 
hypothesized and simulated in recent literature. In the simulation using DICE 2010 run by Dietz and 
Stern (2015), and in particular in their endogenous TFP model with standard assumptions about the 
damage function and climate sensitivity, annual global TFP growth rate is reduced by about 0.20 
percentage points, for the period 2005-2205 and with a temperature increase of  5.7°C above pre-
industrial levels. Using our estimates and their scenario, we find a value of 1.762*(4.9/200) = 0.04%21, 
roughly five times lower and, importantly, only for poor countries. 
 
Similarly, Moyer et al. (2014) alter the growth path of TFP in DICE, allowing for a reduction in the 
annual global growth rate by more than 0.20%, over a 300-year period and under a predicted 
temperature increase of 5.9°C above pre-industrial. Under these conditions, we would predict an 
annual decrease by 0.03%, but again only for poor countries. 
 
In Moore and Diaz (2015), who endogenize TFP in a two-region (rich and poor) version of DICE 
2013R, using parameters calibrated on the empirical findings of Dell, Jones & Olken (2012), the 
decrease in annual TFP growth rate in poor countries is approximately 0.52%, over the period 2015-
2105, with a temperature increase over the century of about 3°C. Conversely, our derived calculations 
for this simulation point to a reduction in the annual growth rate of TFP in poor countries by about 
0.06%, almost an order of magnitude lower that their projection.  
 
Unlike the papers above, we stress that once a certain income per capita threshold is reached, these 
negative impacts would disappear altogether. Our estimates point to an upper threshold of $34,400 
income per capita (for hot countries), a value which, according to global projections, will be largely 
surpassed during this century. 
 
These results further increase concerns over distributional issues of future impacts. As Tol (2015) 
shows, it is widely accepted that poor countries will be the ones who will suffer the most from climate 
change impacts. This work confirms and reinforces this view. Additionally, as explained in Inklaar 
and Timmer (2013), Keller (2004), Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004), TFP growth as a 
determinant of long-run economic growth is more important in poor countries than in rich ones. 
 
Finally, given that, as noted by Gillingham et al. (2015): “uncertainty in the growth of productivity 
                                                 
21 In the DICE model, temperature in 2005 is already 0.83 °C above pre-industrial. 
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(or output per capita) is known to be a critical parameter in determining all elements of climate 
change”, all this calls for complementarity between climate policy and poverty reduction (Schelling, 
1992). 
 
Section 7 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
We test the recently advanced hypothesis that climate change harms TFP growth by looking at the 
past relationship between TFP growth rates and temperature shocks. We find a negative relationship 
only in poor countries. The relationship is robust to alternative samples, alternative data, alternative 
specifications, and to spatial autocorrelation. There is some evidence that temperature shocks may 
have a negative effect in hot countries too. The estimated temperature effect on TFP growth probably 
explains the effect on economic growth found in previous papers, and is probably explained by 
temperature effects on labour productivity. While statistically significant, our upper bound estimate 
suggest that climate change would reduce TFP growth by less than 0.1%. 
 
The findings of this work confirm the results of Dell, Jones and Olken (2012), who also found a 
statistically significant but modestly sized relationship between temperature levels and economic 
growth only in poor countries, and that showed using lags and long differences a persistence of 
weather impacts in the medium run which is likely to mean the presence of growth effects other, or 
rather, than level output effects. Our results contradict the conclusions of Burke, Miguel and Hsiang 
(2015), who found large impacts of temperature on productivity. 
 
This work represents an advancement compared to previous literature because, using the first 
differences of TFP and temperature levels, not only it alleviates the issue of non-stationarity in panel 
analysis which may tend to produce spurious results, but also directly addresses the issue of potential 
long-run growth effects, since its main dependent variable is notably one of the main drivers of long-
run economic growth (Solow, 1956). In this different perspective, an impact on annual TFP growth 
is already, per se a long-term impact. There is no need to use first differences, since in this scenario 
temperature shocks affects economic activity not through Equation (1), but directly through Equation 
(4). Conversely, Dell, Jones and Olken (2012) focused on GDP growth as the dependent variable of 
interest, and thus could not explicitly test for the presence of growth effects. 
 
However, a number of limits and caveats for this work also need to be made clear. First: sample size 
and data quality. Both our samples only include less than 70 countries (60 and 68, respectively). 
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Although together they account for a large share of world GDP and population, sample size is indeed 
reduced. As for data quality, TFP data represent the so-called Solow residual, and in fact this is the 
way they are calculated in PWT 8.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2013 & 2015; Inklaar & Timmer, 
2013). Therefore, the estimates are potentially affected by measurement error and a whole host of 
errors in the specification and the estimation of the production function used to derive TFP. 
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge there is no availability of other TFP datasets at the country 
level covering such a long timespan. Weather data as well notably suffer from measurement error and 
different data quality in different countries. However, the issue of measurement error is at least 
partially alleviated here since the results appear to be robust to sample choices, to different 
specifications of key explanatory variables, and to different weather data with different aggregation 
methods. 
 
Second, as already mentioned in the introduction, external validity with respect to future climate 
change. Again, weather variations are not climate variations: the first are random shorter-run temporal 
variations, the second are averages over several decades (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014). In other words 
climate, as emphasized by Auffhammer et al. (2013), is a long average of weather at a given location. 
It is thus key to always keep in mind that a 1°C shock in a given year and place is not equivalent to a 
permanent 1°C global increase, and that projections like the simple extrapolation with regard to global 
warming we performed above typically suffer from this drawback. In other words, we only estimated 
the short-run semi-elasticity, whereas we need to know the long-run semi-elasticity. 
 
Third, future climate change, especially if pronounced as it is projected in some extreme emission 
scenarios (IPCC, 2013) may well entail consequences and effects which lie outside historical 
experience. Substantial sea level rise, a thermohaline circulation slowdown, the release of methane 
from melting permafrost are all potential intensifying effects which are indeed not captured by this 
analysis, based on a period in which there was only limited climatic variability and limited warming. 
Such an intensification of impacts may well change the picture we depicted, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. 
 
Fourth, every forecast or projection based on this study implies the assumption that past historical 
relationship will continue to hold in the future. As argued in Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) and Tol 
(2015), this could indeed not be the case, either due to intensification of negative impacts or to 
adaptation through development in the long run. 
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Fifth, total factor productivity is an aggregate measure, and changes in total factor productivity are 
due to a variety of changes in underlying economic phenomena. With our data it is impossible to open 
this black box, but future research should attempt this using micro-data and natural experiments. 
 
The central finding of this work is that TFP growth rates of poor countries are affected by temperature 
shocks in recent past. Once again, poverty means vulnerability. However, this causal relationship 
between temperature, poverty and productivity growth is subjected to caveats and should be 
interpreted with caution. What this analysis suggests is the fact that weather shocks affect economic 
growth through the TFP channel only when coupled with poverty, not that climate change will harm 
future economic growth by affecting technological progress, as hypothesized in literature. Hence, 
given the preeminent importance of TFP growth for long-run development, and under the assumption 
that weather impacts have at least some external validity with regard to climate change, the main 
conclusions that stem from this study are an increase of concerns over the inequality of future impacts, 
a policy guideline which considers poverty reduction as a crucial and paramount element of climate 
policy and, at the research level, a call for further studies on the potential dynamic effects of future 
climate change. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
       
 Mean Var sd Min Max Obs 
 
 
TFP growth rate 
 
  0.481 
 
15.49 
 
3.935 
 
-56.05 
 
26.76 
 
2760 
 
△Temp 0.0121 0.318 0.564 -2.952 2.442 2760 
 
△Pre -0.0142 5.942 2.438 -35.40 37.64 2760 
 
GDP_percap 8.480 1.022 1.011 6.084 10.35 2820 
 
TFP growth rate is the annual percentage change and expressed in natural logarithm. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
GDP per capita is in natural logarithm of 1990 international Geary - Khamis dollars. 
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Table 2 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
 
 (1) 
 
 
  (2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
        
 
△Temp 
 
 -0.485** 
 
 -0.029 
 
0.057 
 
0.098 
 
0.008 
 
0.051 
 (0.216)  (0.136) (0.143) (0.123) (0.134) (0.120) 
       
△Pre    -0.033  -0.042*  -0.047**  -0.048**  -0.049**  -0.051** 
 (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Poor x △Temp      -1.493***   -1.195**     -1.315***  
   (0.404) (0.468)  (0.437)  
       
Hot x △Temp   -0.684       -0.612   
   (0.452) (0.429)   
       
Poor_2 x △Temp      -1.425***     -1.513*** 
    (0.420)  (0.410) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp      -1.048**  -0.979** 
     (0.484) (0.481) 
       
_cons     1.416***       1.338***     1.280***     1.271***     1.284***     1.273*** 
 (0.327)   (0.331) (0.322) (0.324) (0.318) (0.319) 
N 2760  2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.208  0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.121  0.128 0.129 0.131 0.130 0.131 
AIC          14749.211 14727.177 14725.510  14720.275  14723.930  14718.702 
 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.523***    
(0.406) 
  
 
-1.139**                 
(0.515) 
-0.627   
(0.402)                                      
                                                                                            
-1.327***             -1.307***             -1.462***                                              
(0.456)                (0.453)               (0.420) 
-0.515                 -1.040**              -0.928*         
(0.388)                (0.473)               (0.477)   
 Notes:  
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                  
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                     
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                    
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with average temperature in the 1960s above the 75%.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                       
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 35 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics – Sample B 
 
       
 Mean Var Sd Min Max Obs 
 
 
TFP growth rate 
 
0.0475 
 
18.07 
 
4.251 
 
-57.82 
 
37.10 
 
2448 
 
△Temp 0.0220 0.327 0.572 -2.952 2.442 2448 
 
△Pre -0.0198 5.890 2.427 -35.40 37.64 2448 
 
GDP_percap 8.619 0.945 0.972 6.084 10.67 2516 
 
TFP growth rate is the annual percentage change and expressed in natural logarithm. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
GDP per capita is in natural logarithm of 1990 international Geary - Khamis dollars. 
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Table 4 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes – Sample B 
 
 Dependent 
variable:  
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
        
  
△Temp 
 
-0.345* 
 
0.053 
 
0.087 
 
0.071 
 
0.077 
 
0.075 
  (0.193) (0.111) (0.114) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) 
        
 △Pre -0.033   -0.041**   -0.043**   -0.046**   -0.043**   -0.046** 
   (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
        
 Poor x △Temp     -1.200***    -1.125***     -1.198***  
   (0.318) (0.328)  (0.318)  
        
 Hot x △Temp   -0.230 -0.093   
    (0.334) (0.323)   
        
 Poor_2 x 
△Temp 
      -1.308***     -1.337*** 
     (0.314)  (0.314) 
        
 Hot_2 x △Temp     -0.244 -0.196 
      (0.316) (0.319) 
        
 _cons    1.362***     1.295***     1.282***     1.283***     1.290***     1.284*** 
  (0.307) (0.304) (0.302) (0.303) (0.302) (0.303) 
 N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
 R2 0.198 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.202 0.203 
 adj. R2 0.121 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.127 
 AIC 13476.708 13464.522 13466.184 13463.170 13466.210 13463.021 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
 -1.147***    
(0.351) 
  
 
-1.037***               
(0.370) 
-0.143   
(0.318)                                      
                                                                              
-1.237***                 -1.121***            -1.262***                                              
(0.354)                   (0.355)              (0.354) 
-0.022                    -0.166                -0.120                       
(0.314)                   (0.309)              (0.313)   
 Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                              
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                                    
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                          
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                                        
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes – CRU Data 
 
 Dependent 
variable:              
Annual TFP 
growth rates 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
  
△Temp 
 
-0.288 
 
0.100 
 
0.145 
 
0.136 
 
0.104 
 
0.124 
  (0.198) (0.108) (0.114) (0.111) (0.113) (0.108) 
        
 △Pre -0.034 -0.043 -0.046 -0.046 -0.043 -0.045 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
        
 Poor x △Temp     -1.411***    -1.297***     -1.400***  
   (0.396) (0.435)  (0.428)  
        
 Hot x △Temp   -0.337 -0.113   
    (0.383) (0.402)   
        
 Poor_2 X △Temp       -1.553***     -1.599*** 
     (0.446)  (0.416) 
        
 Hot_2 x △Temp     -0.076 -0.015 
      (0.406) (0.404) 
        
 _cons     1.409***  1.352***     1.333***     1.331***     1.350***     1.337*** 
  (0.329)     (0.330) (0.334) (0.335) (0.328) (0.330) 
 N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
 R2 0.206 0.212 0.212 0.213 0.212 0.213 
 adj. R2 0.119 0.125 0.125 0.126 0.125 0.126 
 AIC 14755.501 14737.214 14738.333 14734.320 14739.186 14734.410 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.311***    
(0.401) 
  
 
 -1.152**               
(0.470) 
-0.192   
(0.343)                                      
                                                                                           
-1.416***              -1.296***             -1.475***                                              
(0.478)                 (0.449)               (0.434) 
 0.023                    0.028                  0.109         
(0.371)                 (0.381)               (0.385)   
 Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                   
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                                   
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                    
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                   
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                              
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 
Omitting precipitation 
 
 Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                         
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                        
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                          
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
      
 
∆Temp 
 
 -0.480** 
 
-0.031 
 
0.049 
 
0.089 
 
0.003 
 
0.045 
 (0.215) (0.135) (0.143) (0.123) (0.133) (0.119) 
       
Poor x ∆Temp    -1.464***  -1.183**    -1.295***  
  (0.401) (0.465)  (0.433)  
       
Hot x ∆Temp   -0.639       -0.568   
   (0.450) (0.428)   
       
Poor_2 x ∆Temp      -1.407***    -1.488*** 
    (0.417)  (0.406) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Temp      -0.969** -0.899* 
     (0.477) (0.475) 
       
_cons     1.400***     1.320***     1.264***     1.254***    1.267***    1.255*** 
 (0.326) (0.329) (0.321) (0.322) (0.317) (0.318) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.207 0.214 0.215 0.216 0.215 0.217 
adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.129 0.131 
AIC 14748.538 14727.353 14726.134 14721.090 14724.826 14719.796 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
       
 
                
    
  -1.496***                  
(0.402) 
 
 
 -1.134**   
(0.511) 
-0.590  
(0.399)                                      
 
  -1.318***               
(0.454) 
-0.480    
(0.386)
 
 -1.292***              -1.444***                                   
(0.449)                (0.416) 
-0.966**                -0.854*                   
(0.468)                  (0.472) 
 39 
 
Table 7 
Including precipitation interactions 
 
Dependent variable: 
Annual TFP growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
∆Temp 
 
 -0.485** 
 
-0.031 
 
0.055 
 
0.096 
 
0.007 
 
0.050 
 (0.216) (0.136) (0.143) (0.123) (0.134) (0.120) 
 
Poor x ∆Temp     -1.506***  -1.199**     -1.335***  
  (0.404) (0.463)  (0.437) 
 
 
Hot x ∆Temp   -0.690 -0.618   
   (0.452) (0.429) 
 
  
Poor_2 x ∆Temp      -1.427***     -1.534*** 
    (0.413)  (0.410) 
 
Hot_2 x ∆Temp      -1.035** -0.958* 
     (0.483) (0.481) 
       
∆Pre -0.033 -0.025 -0.002 -0.012 -0.042 -0.047 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.036) 
       
Poor x ∆Pre  -0.036 -0.030  -0.045  
  (0.046) (0.044)  (0.049)  
       
Hot x ∆Pre   -0.038 -0.030   
    (0.056)  (0.059)   
       
Poor _2 x ∆Pre             -0.027          -0.044 
    (0.050)  (0.052) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Pre     0.029 0.033 
     (0.049) (0.049) 
       
_cons    1.416***     1.333***     1.269***     1.262***     1.281***     1.272*** 
 (0.327) (0.331) (0.323) (0.324) (0.319) (0.320) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.129 0.131 
AIC 14749.211 14728.774 14724.777 14719.715 14723.171 14717.971 
Total temperature effect 
in poor countries 
 
Total temperature effect 
in hot countries 
 
 
 
 -1.537***                  
(0.405) 
 
-1.144**   
(0.509) 
 
-0.636    
(0.402) 
 -1.331***                  
(0.450) 
 
-0.523            
(0.387) 
     -1.328***                -1.484***                                                                 
    (0.453)                   (0.419) 
 
-1.028**                  -0.908*                               
(0.473)                   (0.480)            
 
Total precipitation effect 
in poor countries 
 
Total precipitation effect 
in hot countries 
 
 
 
 
-0.061                  
(0.040) 
 
-0.032     
(0.056) 
 
-0.040    
(0.029) 
-0.039               
(0.066) 
 
-0.042            
(0.031) 
-0.087*                   -0.091*                                          
(0.047)                  (0.052) 
 
-0.013                    -0.014                    
(0.040)                   (0.040) 
 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita 
in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s. Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 
for countries with below median GDP per capita. Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8 
Using temperature and precipitation levels 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Temp 
 
-0.254 
 
0.284 
 
0.270 
 
 0.286* 
 
 0.283* 
 
  0.304** 
 (0.212) (0.171) (0.169) (0.147) (0.166) (0.147) 
       
Pre 0.015 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
       
Poor x Temp    -1.529***   -1.570***    -1.534***  
  (0.377) (0.438)  (0.379)  
       
Hot x Temp   0.081 0.108   
   (0.402) (0.385)   
       
Poor_2 x Temp      -1.686***    -1.644*** 
    (0.419)  (0.371) 
       
Hot_2 x Temp     0.030 0.062 
     (0.648) (0.650) 
       
_cons 5.638    13.008***   12.741***    13.485***   12.880**   13.577** 
 (3.691) (4.271) (4.533) (4.597) (5.648) (5.676) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.205 0.211 0.211 0.212 0.211 0.212 
adj. R2 0.118 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.124 0.125 
AIC 14757.567 14738.273 14740.227 14737.313 14740.269 14737.379 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.245***   
(0.359) 
  
 
 -1.300***               
(0.440) 
  0.351    
(0.406)                                      
                                                                                               
-1.399***            -1.251***             -1.339***                                               
(0.421)               (0.349)                (0.351) 
 0.395                  0.313                   0.367             
(0.390)          (0.694)                (0.692)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                               
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                      
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                        
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9 
Checking for non-linearity of temperature impacts 
 
Dependent 
variable: Annual 
TFP growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
∆Temp 
 
 -0.490** 
 
-0.037 
 
0.050 
 
0.092 
 
0.001 
 
0.045 
 (0.215) (0.134) (0.140) (0.120) (0.132) (0.117) 
       
(∆Temp)2 -0.110 -0.143* -0.151* -0.135** -0.151* -0.131* 
 (0.101) (0.077) (0.076) (0.067) (0.076) (0.066) 
       
∆Pre -0.033 -0.042* -0.046** -0.048** -0.049** -0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Poor x ∆Temp     -1.484***   -1.181**     -1.306***  
  (0.403) (0.451)  (0.434)  
       
Poor x (∆Temp)2  0.182 0.207  0.175  
  (0.343) (0.323)  (0.340)  
       
Hot x ∆Temp   -0.694 -0.611   
   (0.447) (0.425)   
       
Hot x (∆Temp)2   0.017 0.090   
   (0.430) (0.440)   
       
Poor_2 x ∆Temp       -1.421***     -1.507*** 
    (0.407)  (0.407) 
       
Poor_2 x (∆Temp)2    0.094  0.088 
    (0.346)  (0.353) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Temp      -1.051** -0.980** 
     (0.479) (0.473) 
       
Hot_2 x (∆Temp)2     0.081 0.127 
     (0.621) (0.629) 
       
_cons     1.439***     1.355***     1.294***    1.284***     1.298***     1.287*** 
 (0.324) (0.325) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.128 0.130 0.129 0.130 
AIC 14750.611 14728.335 14724.544 14719.561 14722.997 14717.998 
 
Total effect in 
poor countries 
 
Total effect in 
hot countries                          
 
    
     
 
                
    
 
-1.523***   
(0.406) 
  
 
 -1.132**                
(0.497) 
 
-0.648  
(0.400)                                      
                                         
-1.332***           -1.307***            -1.464***                                              
(0.443)              (0.452)              (0.420) 
 
-0.522               -1.048**             -0.929**          
(0.387)   (0.465)              (0.464)  
  
Notes: All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per 
capita in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s. Poor_2 is a dummy with value 
1 for countries with below median GDP per capita. Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 10 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes in rich countries 
 
Dependent          
variable: 
Annual TFP 
growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
△Temp 
 
   -1.523*** 
 
 -1.139** 
 
   -1.667*** 
  
   -1.327*** 
 
  -1.307*** 
 
  -1.462*** 
 (0.406) (0.515) (0.369) (0.456) (0.453) (0.420) 
       
△Pre -0.042*  -0.047** -0.045*  -0.048**  -0.049**  -0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Rich x △Temp     1.493***    1.195**      1.315***  
 (0.404) (0.468)   (0.437)  
       
Hot x △Temp  -0.684  -0.612   
  (0.452)  (0.429)   
       
Rich_2 x △Temp       1.683***     1.425***      1.513*** 
   (0.375) (0.420)  (0.410) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp      -1.048**  -0.979** 
     (0.484) (0.481) 
       
_cons     1.338***     1.280***     1.323***     1.271***     1.284***     1.273*** 
 (0.331) (0.322) (0.333) (0.324) (0.318) (0.319) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.215 0.216 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.131 0.130 0.131 
AIC 14727.177 14725.510 14721.291 14720.275 14723.930 14718.702 
 
 
Total effect in rich  
countries 
 
-0.029  
(0.136)   
    
 
 0.057    
(0.143)                   
 
  0.016                 
(0.125) 
                                                                             
‘0.098                  0.008                         0.051                                         
(0.123)               (0.134)                (0.120)          
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                   
Rich is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                            
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                                   
Rich_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median GDP per capita.                                                                                                    
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                                            
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11 
Annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes in poor countries 
 
 
                                                                      Annual TFP growth rate 
 
 
△Temp 
 
-1.762*** 
 (0.459) 
  
△Pre -0.067 
 (0.044) 
  
_cons   1.745*** 
 (0.378) 
N   1380 
R2   0.226 
adj. R2   0.073 
AIC 7863.372 
 
 
Notes 
The specification includes country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                        
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 12 
Specification with a double interaction term 
 
Dependent variable: annual TFP growth rate (1) (2) 
 
△Temp 
 
0.126 
 
0.066 
 (0.131) (0.122) 
   
△Pre  -0.047**  -0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
   
Poor x △Temp  -1.576**  
 (0.765)  
   
Hot x △Temp   -1.170***  
 (0.252)  
   
Poor x Hot x △Temp 0.919  
 (0.896)  
   
Poor_2 x △Temp     -1.570*** 
  (0.455) 
   
Hot_2 x △Temp     -1.412*** 
  (0.427) 
   
Poor_2 x Hot_2 x △Temp  0.571 
  (0.814) 
   
_cons     1.274***    1.258*** 
 (0.316) (0.320) 
N 2760 2760 
R2 0.216 0.218 
adj. R2 0.129 0.131 
AIC 14723.706 14718.412 
Total effect in hot and poor countries    -1.701***     -2.344*** 
    (0.449)     (0.515) 
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE. 
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960. 
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s. 
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita. 
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature. 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 13 
Specifications with GDP per capita and Polity2 
 
 
Dependent  
variable:  
annual TFP growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
   
 
ΔTemp 
 
 -5.065** 
 
-0.518 
 (1.921) (0.318) 
   
ΔPre  -0.046**  -0.050** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
   
Poor x ΔTemp   -0.823** 
  (0.328) 
   
Polity2 x ΔTemp   0.062* 
  (0.032) 
   
Polity2  -0.012 
  (0.034) 
   
GDP_percap -0.216  
 (0.689)  
   
GDP x ΔTemp     0.532***  
 (0.195)  
   
Hot x ΔTemp -0.675  
 (0.454)  
   
_cons 3.158    1.441*** 
 (6.143) (0.404) 
N 2760 2705 
R2 0.214 0.224 
adj. R2 0.127 0.136 
AIC 14355.504 6698.196 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
 
  
   -1.342*** 
(0.336) 
Notes 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                                           
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 
1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average 
temperature in the 1960s. Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree 
Celsius. Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year.                                                                  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                       
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 14 
Relationship between annual labour productivity growth rates and temperature changes 
 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
  
 
-1.627***    
(0.405) 
  
 
 -1.160** 
(0.526) 
-0.794*                                     
(0.416)                               
                                                                       
-1.427***             -1.394***              -1.607***                                              
(0.455)               (0.457)                (0.414) 
-0.621                -1.161**               -0.999*         
(0.395)               (0.501)                (0.503)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                   
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                                                                 
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                     
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                           
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
Dependent  
Variable: 
 
 
       (1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
Annual labour 
productivity growth 
      
 
△Temp 
 
 -0.543** 
 
-0.068 
 
0.037 
 
0.095 
 
       -0.027 
 
0.037 
 (0.227) (0.159) (0.164) (0.131) (0.155) (0.131) 
       
△Pre -0.037 -0.047*  -0.052**  -0.054**  -0.054**   -0.056** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
       
Poor x △Temp    -1.559*** -1.197**    -1.366***  
  (0.412) (0.481)  (0.448)  
       
Hot x △Temp   -0.831*      -0.717   
   (0.466) (0.434)   
       
Poor_2 x △Temp 
 
     -1.522***   -1.644*** 
    (0.421)  (0.411) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp 
 
      -1.133**  -1.036** 
     (0.503) (0.498) 
       
_cons     2.535***     2.454***     2.383***      2.374***      2.395***     2.381*** 
 (0.515) (0.518) (0.511) (0.514) (0.507) (0.508) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.211 0.218 0.219 0.221 0.219 0.221 
adj. R2 0.125 0.132 0.133 0.135 0.133 0.135 
AIC 15259.399 15239.634 15237.136 15230.769 15236.537 15229.933 
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Table 15 
Regressions with number of persons employed and capital stock as dependent variables 
 
     
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 Growth rate 
in the number of 
persons employed 
Growth rate 
in the number of 
persons employed 
Capital stock 
growth rate 
 
Capital stock 
growth rate 
     
 
△Temp 
 
0.068 
 
0.016 
 
3.610 
 
0.663 
 (0.079) (0.096) (2.335) (0.560) 
     
Poor x △Temp   0.172  9.661* 
        (0.152)       (5.465) 
     
△Pre 0.004 0.005       -0.174 -0.114 
 (0.014)       (0.014) (0.322) (0.338) 
     
     
_cons     2.533***     2.542*** 4.106 4.608 
 (0.439) (0.437) (4.347) (4.338) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 
R2 0.171 0.172 0.129 0.132 
adj. R2 0.080 0.081 0.034 0.037 
AIC 10968.569 10969.314 27815.168 27808.350 
 
 
Total effect in 
poor countries 
  
0.188 
(0.126) 
 
 
10.323* 
(5.866) 
 
   
 
 
  
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                                    
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                             
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 16 
Baseline specification with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 
Dependent 
variable: annual 
TFP growth rate 
 
   (1) 
 
      (2) 
 
      (3) 
 
      (4) 
 
        (5) 
 
      (6) 
 
△Temp 
 
 -0.485** 
 
-0.029 
 
0.057 
 
0.098 
 
0.008 
 
0.051 
 (0.200) (0.130) (0.164) (0.164) (0.134) (0.142) 
       
△Pre   -0.033 -0.042* -0.047* -0.048* -0.049* -0.051* 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
       
Poor x △Temp    -1.493***  -1.195**    -1.315***  
  (0.432) (0.566)  (0.448)  
       
Hot x △Temp       -0.684 -0.612   
   (0.487) (0.470)   
       
Poor_2 x 
△Temp 
    -1.425**    -1.513*** 
    (0.565)  (0.443) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp      -1.048**  -0.979** 
     (0.457) (0.431) 
       
_cons 0.184  0.402*   0.429**   0.480**   0.470**   0.519** 
 (0.166) (0.212) (0.200) (0.204) (0.204) (0.208) 
N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 
Within R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218 
       
 
  
Total effect in 
poor countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
              
    -1.523***   
(0.462) 
  
-1.139*                
(0.660) 
-0.627  
(0.383)                                      
-1.327**        -1.307***         -1.462***                                                
(0.644)         (0.487)           (0.472) 
-0.515          -1.040**          -0.928**         
(0.390) (0.412)           (0.383)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                         
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1960.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1960s.                                            
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                              
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses, and allow up to two lags of autocorrelation.                                                                                                               
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1 
TFP levels and average temperatures in 2006 
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Figure 2 
TFP growth rates and temperature shocks in poor countries 
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Figure 3 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp at different GDP per capita levels – hot = 1 
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Figure 4 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp at different GDP per capita levels – hot =  0 
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Figure 5 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp at different GDP per capita levels 
 – whole sample 
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Appendices 
 
(1) Construction of the RTFPNA Index in PWT 8.1 
 
 
Since version 8.0, the Penn World Tables include data on TFP at the country level (Feenstra, Inklaar 
& Timmer, 2013). In particular, there are two measures of TFP in PWT 8.1. The first one is CTFP, 
where the prefix C stays for “current year”: this is a measure of TFP levels of countries in a given 
year compared to the US, whose TFP levels are 1 in each year. It is thus a measure of relative TFP 
levels which allows for comparisons among countries (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer, 2015), and can 
be seen as an index of technological catch-up or as the distance from the technological frontier 
(represented by the US). 
The other, and the one used in this study is RTFPNA. This index is calculated using the growth rate of 
real GDP from national accounts data, in conjunction with the growth rates of capital stock at constant 
national prices and of the labour force (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer, 2013). This is a standard process 
in TFP estimation since, as a residual representing a combination of labour and capital productivity, 
TFP is obviously dependent on the estimates of the other components. As discussed above, RTFPNA 
is normalized to 1 in 2005 for all countries, and since we use natural logarithms in our specification, 
the normalized value for 2005 is 0. 
More specifically, Inklaar and Timmer (2013) describe how the productivity measurement starts from 
the following general production function: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐴𝐾𝛼(𝐸ℎ𝑐1−𝛼)                                     (A.1) 
 
where, in the second equality, labour input is defined as the product of the number of workers in the 
economy E times their average human capital hc and α is the output elasticity of capital. 
A second-order approximation to the production function f  is represented by the Tӧrnqvist quantity 
index of factor inputs 𝑄𝑇, which can be used to compare inputs between  t-1  and t for a given country 
as follows: 
 
ln𝑄𝑡,𝑡−1
𝑇 =
1
2
(𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡−1)ln
𝐾𝑡
𝐾𝑡−1
+ [1 −  
1
2
(𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡−1)] ln
𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡−1
                 (A.2) 
 
In order to implement this equation, they make the assumption that the output elasticity of capital is 
approximated by the country’s share of GDP that is not earned by labour. They assume a common 
labour share neither across countries nor over time, i.e., the input index in equation (A.2) is the more 
flexible Tӧrnqvist index rather than the more common Cobb-Douglas function. 
Finally, growth of productivity over time is given by: 
 55 
 
 
𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡,𝑡−1
𝑁𝐴 =  
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐴
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
𝑁𝐴 𝑄𝑡,𝑡−1
𝑇⁄                                      (A.3) 
 
where 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴 stands for real GDP at constant national prices. 
For further information with regard to the construction of the RTFPNA index, see Feenstra, Inklaar 
and Timmer (2013), Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015) and Inklaar and Timmer (2013). 
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(2) Statistical tests 
 
A. Panel unit root tests 
 
In order to check that our main variables are stationary, we performed panel unit root tests for 
annual TFP growth, annual temperature change and annual precipitation change. In particular, we 
used two unit root tests which are both1 fit when N > T, as it is the case in our sample: the Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test and the Harris and Tzavalis (1999) test. The results, reported in 
Tables A.1-A.6, confirm that the tested variables are stationary. 
 
Table A.1 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for annual TFP growth 
 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                                                Number of panels  =     60                   
Ha: Some panels are stationary                                                Number of periods =     46                 
AR parameter: Panel-specific                                            Asymptotics: T,N →Infinity               
Panel means:  Included                                                                                   sequentially                 
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed                
ADF regressions: No lags included 
 
                                                                             Fixed-N exact critical values 
                           Statistic         p-value                        1%      5%      10% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                        
t-bar                  -5.8532                                            -2.360  -2.310  -2.280 
t-tilde-bar         -4.3796 
Z-t-tilde-bar     -27.9582          0.0000 
 
  
                                                 
1 The Im-Pesaran-Shit (2003) test is fit when N > T if a time trend is included. 
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Table A.2 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for △Temp 
 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                                                Number of panels  =     60                    
Ha: Some panels are stationary                                                Number of periods =     46                  
AR parameter: Panel-specific                                              Asymptotics: T,N→Infinity             
Panel means:  Included                                                                                   sequentially                  
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed               
ADF regressions: No lags included 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                             Fixed-N exact critical values 
                           Statistic         p-value                        1%      5%      10% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                       
t-bar                  -9.7663                                            -2.360  -2.310  -2.280 
t-tilde-bar         -5.4829 
Z-t-tilde-bar     -38.5654          0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.3 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for △Pre 
 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                                                Number of panels  =     60                   
Ha: Some panels are stationary                                                Number of periods =     46                  
AR parameter: Panel-specific                                              Asymptotics: T,N →Infinity 
Panel means:  Included                                                                                   sequentially                   
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed                   
ADF regressions: No lags included 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                             Fixed-N exact critical values 
                           Statistic         p-value                        1%      5%      10% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                               
t-bar                 -10.2704                                           -2.360  -2.310  -2.280 
t-tilde-bar         -5.5661 
Z-t-tilde-bar     -39.3644          0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.4  
 Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for annual TFP growth 
 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots                                                              Number of panels  =     60 
Ha: Panels are stationary                                                              Number of periods =     46               
AR parameter: Common                                                           Asymptotics: N → Infinity,                          
Panel means:  Included                                                                                            T fixed                
Time trend:   Included                                                     Cross-sectional means removed  
                        Statistic                                         z                               p-value         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
rho                   0.1823                                     -50.3642                        0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.5  
 Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for △Temp 
 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots                                                              Number of panels  =     60                    
Ha: Panels are stationary                                                              Number of periods =     46              
AR parameter: Common                                                        Asymptotics: N → Infinity,             
Panel means:  Included                                                                                           T fixed              
Time trend:   Included                                                     Cross-sectional means removed  
                        Statistic                                              z                                p-value         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
rho                   -0.3900                                        -93.9377                          0.0000 
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Table A.6  
 Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for △Pre 
 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots                                                              Number of panels  =     60          
Ha: Panels are stationary                                                              Number of periods =     46                 
AR parameter: Common                                                           Asymptotics: N → Infinity,          
Panel means:  Included                                                                                            T fixed                  
Time trend:   Included                                                    Cross-sectional means removed 
                        Statistic                                              z                                p-value         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
rho                   -0.4215                                        -96.3329                          0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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B. FE vs RE 
 
To test the appropriateness of a fixed effects - panel approach rather than a random effects (RE) 
specification, we performed a test using the approach suggested by Mundlak (1978). The traditional 
Hausman test, in fact, is not recommended when time fixed effects are included in the regressions, 
and is based on the assumption of homoskedasticity, which is very unlikely to hold in our sample. 
The Mundlak test, in contrast, allows for heteroskedastic errors and serial intracorrelation. 
Essentially, we performed a RE regression including panel-level means of our time-varying variables 
– in the specification we used, temperature change, precipitation change and the interaction between 
and the poor dummy – and then tested for the joint significance of the coefficients for the means time 
varying variables. The results, reported in Table A.7, are strongly in favour of a FE approach. 
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Table A.7 
Mundlak test – Random Effects GLS regression with added panel-level means 
 
  
Dependent variable: 
Annual TFP growth 
rate 
  
  (1) 
 
△Temp 
 
-0.029 
 (0.136) 
  
Poor x △Temp -1.493*** 
 (0.405) 
  
△Pre -0.042* 
 (0.023) 
  
Mean_△Temp -3.160 
 (6.413) 
  
Mean_ Poor x △Temp  29.436*** 
 (10.984) 
  
Mean_△Pre  2.456** 
 (1.138) 
  
_cons  2.575*** 
 (0.723) 
N  2760 
R2  0.226 
  
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Test on the joint significance of the panel-level means for the time varying variables: 
 
 
(1)  Mean_△Temp = 0 
(2)  Mean_△Pre = 0 
(3)  Mean_ Poor x △Temp 
 
chi2( 3) = 9.40 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0245 
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(3) Additional results 
 
Table A.8 
CRU Weather Data – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
       
 Mean Var sd Min Max Obs 
 
 
△Temp_2 
 
0.0147 
 
0.303 
 
0.550 
 
-3 
 
2.700 
 
2760 
 
△Pre_2 0.00164 4.877 2.208 -16.36 16.61 2760 
 
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
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Table A.9 
Relationship between annual TFP growth rates and temperature changes - 
 Sample B & CRU Data 
 
 Dependent 
variable:        
Annual TFP growth 
rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
        
  
△Temp_2 
 
-0.155 
 
0.141 
 
0.139 
 
0.118 
 
0.112 
 
0.104 
  (0.158) (0.101) (0.106) (0.105) (0.103) (0.104) 
        
 △Pre_2 -0.043 -0.053* -0.052* -0.053* -0.050* -0.051* 
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
        
 Poor x △Temp_2     -1.001***    -1.005***     -1.010***  
   (0.279) (0.279)  (0.278)  
        
 Hot x △Temp_2   0.014 0.109   
    (0.321) (0.315)   
        
 Poor_2 x △Temp_2       -1.126***     -1.108*** 
     (0.273)  (0.278) 
        
 Hot_2 x △Temp_2     0.322 0.368 
      (0.312) (0.311) 
        
 _cons     1.344***     1.310***     1.310***     1.313***     1.311***         1.310*** 
  (0.304) (0.304) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.306) 
 N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
 R2 0.197 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 
 adj. R2 0.121 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.123 0.124 
 AIC 13479.345 13472.425 13474.424 13472.862 13473.928 13472.283 
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-0.860***    
(0.301) 
  
 
-0.866***               
(0.306) 
  0.153   
(0.302)                                      
                                                                                      
-1.007***              -0.898***              -1.004***                                              
(0.300)                 (0.304)                (0.307) 
 0.228                    0.434                   0.472          
(0.299)                 (0.305)                (0.304)   
 Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                 
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                                 
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                              
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                               
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.10 
Relationship between annual labour productivity growth rates 
 and temperature changes – Sample B 
 
Dependent variable: 
annual labour 
productivity 
growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
∆Temp 
 
-0.382* 
 
0.115 
 
0.106 
 
0.064 
 
0.104 
 
0.076 
 (0.215) (0.133) (0.134) (0.135) (0.131) (0.136) 
       
∆Pre -0.042*  -0.053**   -0.053***   -0.055***  -0.052**  -0.055** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
       
Poor x ∆Temp    -1.498***   -1.519***    -1.499***  
  (0.377) (0.409)  (0.377)  
       
Hot x ∆Temp   0.064 0.195   
   (0.429) (0.417)   
       
Poor_2 x ∆Temp      -1.655***    -1.588*** 
    (0.403)  (0.380) 
       
Hot_2 x ∆Temp     0.117 0.173 
     (0.398) (0.398) 
 
_cons 
 
     2.512*** 
    
    2.428*** 
    
    2.431*** 
   
   2.434*** 
   
    2.430*** 
   
    2.427*** 
    (0.480) (0.475) (0.475) (0.477) (0.474) (0.476) 
N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
R2 0.181 0.186 0.186 0.187 0.186 0.187 
adj. R2 0.103 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 
AIC 14034.284 14018.674 14020.654 14018.717 14020.617 14018.779 
 
Total effect in 
poor countries 
Total effect in 
hot countries                          
 
       
 
                
     
-1.383***            
(0.399) 
  
 
-1.413***                                         
(0.444) 
  0.169   
(0.414)                                      
                                                                                                                       
-1.591*** -1.396***            -1.512***                                              
(0.425)               (0.408)              (0.407) 
 0.259                  0.221                0.249                                                   
(0.415)          (0.403)             (0.406)   
 Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                     
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                                         
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                                
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level.                                                                                                                               
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A.11 
Baseline specification with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors – Sample B 
 
Dependent 
variable: annual 
TFP growth rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
       
 
△Temp 
 
  -0.345*** 
 
0.053 
 
0.087 
 
0.071 
 
0.077 
 
0.075 
 (0.128) (0.172) (0.150) (0.138) (0.154) (0.141) 
       
△Pre -0.033 -0.041*  -0.043**  -0.046**  -0.043**  -0.046** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) 
       
Poor x △Temp    -1.200***  -1.125**    -1.198***  
  (0.354) (0.479)  (0.360)  
       
Hot x △Temp   -0.230 -0.093   
   (0.522) (0.564)   
       
Poor_2 x △Temp     -1.308**    -1.337*** 
    (0.568)  (0.392) 
       
Hot_2 x △Temp           -0.244     -0.196 
     (0.724) (0.710) 
       
_cons    -0.543*** 0.158 0.127     0.747***       -0.037     0.796*** 
 (0.084) (0.120) (0.135) (0.137) (0.064) (0.115) 
N 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 
Within R2 0.198 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.202 0.203 
       
       
 
Total effect in poor 
countries 
Total effect in hot 
countries                          
 
       
 
                
    
 
-1.147*** 
(0.281)             
            
  
 
-1.037**               
(0.451) 
-0.143  
(0.552)                                      
                                                                
-1.237**             -1.121***          -1.262***                                              
(0.546)               (0.335)            (0.401) 
-0.022                -0.166               -0.120          
(0.589)    (0.825)             (0.765)   
Notes: 
All specifications include country FE and Region x Time FE.                                                                                                                                    
Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita in 1970.                                                                                                                                           
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature in the 1970s.                                                                           
Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.                                                                                                     
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature.                                                                                                                                           
Temperature change is annual and expressed in degree Celsius. 
Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses, and allow up to two lags of autocorrelation.                                                                                                                                                         
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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(4) List of countries in the sample 
 
Main Dataset: 
 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
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Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Norway 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Senegal 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zimbabwe 
 
Countries added in Sample B 
 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Kuwait 
Panama 
Paraguay 
 70 
 
Poland 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
 
List of regions 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Middle East and North Africa 
South and East Asia and the Pacific 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Western Europe and offshoots 
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Essay 2 
 
Temperature shocks, growth and poverty thresholds:  
evidence from rural Tanzania 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Growing interest in the impacts of climate change in poor countries has sparked attention on the 
relationship between temperature and micro growth dynamics. Using the LSMS-ISA Tanzania 
National Panel Survey by the World Bank, we study the relationship between rural household 
consumption growth and temperature shocks over the period 2008 – 2013.  
The main finding is a sharp heterogeneity: temperature shocks have a negative and significant impact 
on household growth only if their initial consumption lies below a critical threshold, i.e. they slow 
the convergence process among households. The main transmission channels appear to be 
agricultural yields and labour productivity. Extrapolating from weather to climate, these findings 
support the Schelling Conjecture: economic development would be the best solution to cope with 
climate change for poor farming households in rural areas, and closing the yield gap and 
modernizing agriculture remains crucial for adaptation to the negative impacts of global warming in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Poorer countries are generally found to be more vulnerable to climate change and weather variability, 
but research is concentrated in richer countries. Many would suspect that poorer people are more 
vulnerable too, but research is scarce. We here estimate the impact of weather shocks in a poor 
country, Tanzania, and differentiate that impact across the income spectrum.  
 
We use the empirical tools and models of development economics to examine the link between short-
term household welfare dynamics and temperature shocks in rural Tanzania, to provide an empirical 
answer to the following questions: what is the micro relationship between temperature shocks, 
poverty and economic growth? Is the idea of a climate-induced poverty trap plausible to describe the 
growth dynamics of farmer households in a rural developing context? 
The justification for such an exercise stems from the lack of within-country works on the relationship 
between temperature and economic growth, as emphasized by Tol (2016): “The pattern of 
vulnerability that is seen between countries, is likely to hold within countries as well. This would 
strengthen the worries about climate change, but there has hardly been any research on the 
quantification of the intra-country distributional implications of the impacts of climate change.” 
 
This article thus speaks to two well distinct strands of research: the development literature on poverty 
traps, that investigates the issues of poverty persistence, growth divergence and multiple equilibria; 
and the emerging climate-economy literature that studies short-run elasticities of weather shocks 
impacts on growth to infer about future impacts of climate change.  
 
Tanzania is an appropriate setting for such a study for a number of reasons. It is by now commonly 
accepted that the future impacts of climate change will disproportionately affect poorer and hotter 
countries (Tol, 2015), and especially people living in rural, remote and scarcely populated areas, 
whose main source of income is agriculture. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, has been identified as 
one of the most vulnerable parts of the world to the threats posed by climate change (IPCC, 2014). 
Tanzania is a poor and hot Sub-Saharan country, where in 2015 68% of the population lived in rural 
areas1. It is constantly classified as a country under high risk from the impacts of future climate 
change: temperatures in the country are predicted to rise 2–4 °C by 2100, “with warming more 
concentrated during the dry season and in the interior regions of the country” (Rowhani, Lobell, 
Linderman & Ramankutty, 2011). Ahmed et al. (2011) underline the importance of agriculture for 
                                                 
1 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=TZ 
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the Tanzanian economy: “The importance of agriculture to the poor is particularly true for Tanzania, 
where agriculture accounts for about half of gross production, and employs about 80 percent of the 
labour force. Agriculture in Tanzania is also primarily rain-fed, with only two percent of arable land 
having irrigation facilities—far below the potentially irrigable share”.  
Tanzania is also a country which exhibits quite large climatic diversity, as noted by Rowhani et al. 
(2011): “on the Indian Ocean, the United Republic of Tanzania possesses a complex landscape, 
formed by the western and eastern branches of the East African Rift, resulting in substantial spatial 
variability in climate within the nation. The country’s climate varies from tropical at the coast to 
temperate in the highlands”. 
Last but not least, data availability: we use the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) – 
Integrated Survey on Agriculture (ISA) Tanzania National Panel Survey by the World Bank, a three-
wave household longitudinal dataset covering the period 2008 – 2013.  
 
We employ a micro-growth model borrowed from the standard growth literature, and test for 
convergence among households and for the significance of weather shocks as determinants of growth, 
while controlling for heterogeneity. Then, we test for the presence of consumption thresholds with 
regard to the impacts of temperature shocks. Finally, guided by previous theoretical and empirical 
literature, we test for a set of transmission channels that can justify potential heterogeneity of impacts 
and explain the lack of consumption smoothing behaviours, namely: health expenditure, labour 
productivity, average crop yields and asset growth.  
 
However, let us be clear at the outset.  
Obviously, given the short-run nature of this dataset, our capacity to assess convergence is limited, 
and we can only cautiously infer about long-run convergence. Also, we do not directly test for the 
presence of multiple equilibria and hence for the existence of a poverty trap. Under a classic ‘poverty 
trap’ threshold, households are trapped in an equilibrium with permanently low income, while here 
we only check whether there is a consumption threshold above which temperature impacts turn 
insignificant, i.e. whether impacts disappear as households grow richer. Deceleration is not 
bifurcation, as noted by Dercon (2004) and Jalan and Ravallion (2002).  
 
What emerges is a sharp and striking heterogeneity: temperature-induced consumption shocks only 
affect the poorest households. The observed growth of rural households suffers from a negative and 
significant contemporaneous impact of temperature shocks only if their initial consumption level lies 
below a critical threshold. In other words, positive temperature shocks slow convergence among 
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households, and enhance inequalities. The main transmission channels responsible for this 
heterogeneity appear to be agricultural yields and labour productivity, due to the fact that agricultural 
yields, technologies and assets, as well as income sources, differ substantially across consumption 
quartiles. Additionally, no impact on asset growth is found, suggesting asset smoothing is probably 
taking place and that poorest households choose to voluntarily destabilize their consumption in order 
not to sell their assets, or that more simply they do not have enough assets to sell to cope with the 
income reduction caused by temperature shocks.  
 
The contributions of this essay are the following. First, it complements aggregate growth - climate 
empirics with available micro panel data, by providing evidence on the (short-run) micro causal 
relationship between weather anomalies, poverty and growth. Second, it links the weather-economic 
growth literature with the development literature on poverty traps, by applying the tools and models 
of the latter to the research questions of the former. Third, it contributes to the development literature, 
by testing for consumption vs asset smoothing, which has been rarely been done according to Carter 
and Lybbert (2012)2; and by showing that, when controlling for temperature shocks (often ignored in 
development literature), precipitation impacts are insignificant and close to zero. 
 
The rest of this essay is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
illustrates the empirical framework and the identification strategy. Section 4 describes data and 
provides introductory descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows and comments the results of the empirical 
analysis. Section 6 conducts a host of robustness checks. Section 7 investigates the channels of the 
heterogeneity of impacts. Section 8 wraps up, illustrates the policy implications of the analysis with 
regard to climate change, reminds some caveats and concludes. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
The recent and growing body of empirical works focusing on the climate-economy relationship and 
its channels stems from the interest to try to understand and quantify the future impacts of climate 
change on human welfare.  
Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) review this literature and notice how old cross-sectional works (Dell, 
Jones, & Olken, 2009; Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1999; Nordhaus, 2006), whose validity is 
challenged by the risk of endogeneity and omitted variable bias, have recently been replaced by more 
appropriate and robust panel methods, both at the macro (Bansal & Ochoa, 2011; Burke, Hsiang, & 
                                                 
2 “Unfortunately, much of the empirical literature has not tested consumption smoothing against a theoretically well-
defined alternative”. 
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Miguel, 2015; Dell, Jones, & Olken, 2012; Hsiang, 2010; Hsiang & Jina, 2014)  and micro (Cachon, 
Gallino, & Olivares, 2012; Cachon et al., 2012; Graff Zivin & Neidell, 2014; Heal & Park, 2015; 
Niemelä, Hannula, Rautio, Reijula, & Railio, 2002; Sudarshan & Tewari, 2013) level, which isolate 
the exogenous effect of weather variables on the economic outcome of interest.  
The main findings of this emerging literature are that weather affects economic activity and growth 
through a wide range of channels (agriculture, health and mortality, labour productivity, energy, 
conflict and political stability, among the others) and that these impacts are substantially bigger and 
significant in poor countries.  
These panel estimates have then been employed and calibrated ad hoc in simulation studies on the 
impacts of future climate change (Lemoine & Kapnick, 2015; Moore & Diaz, 2015) to provide 
empirically-grounded impact estimates to be used in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), and 
overcome the critiques about the arbitrary choice of crucial parameters like the damage function and 
climate sensitivity (Pindyck, 2012, 2013; Stern, 2013; Weitzman, 2009, 2010).  
However, these works only estimate short-run elasticities, whereas climate change is by definition a 
long-run phenomenon, which cannot be captured by empirical works because of the intrinsic 
difference between ‘climate’ and ‘weather’: a 1°C shock in a given year and place is not the same of 
a permanent 1°C global increase. 
Furthermore, short-run panels can capture neither the possibility of adaptation, since responses from 
economic agents to year-to-year variations may well be different from responses to gradual and long-
run changes, nor potential intensifying effects from phenomena which lie outside the range of 
historical experience (massive sea level rise, a thermohaline circulation slowdown, the release of 
methane from melting permafrost, etc.), both of which could eventually take place in the long-run 
and drastically change not just the magnitude, but even the nature of the current short-run elasticities. 
On the other hand, as noted by Dell, Jones and Olken (2014), since climate change is not a sudden 
shock, but a stochastic warming process along an upward trend, recent historical experience is an 
appropriate setting to study warming effects. Furthermore, the use of econometric techniques such 
as, for instance, the inclusion of lags in the regressions, long differences and the analysis of 
persistence of impacts of past shocks, can alleviate these concerns and partially fill the conceptual 
gap between short- and long-run impacts.  
Thus, despite the external validity issue, it is reasonable to assume that this empirical literature can 
be informative about the structure of the damage function for climate change. 
 
In the development literature, however, the econometric identification of the impacts of weather 
shocks (especially rainfall) on human welfare is standard practice. Weather shocks, in fact, represent 
the exogenous shock par excellence, and many development studies have employed them both as 
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independent regressors, in the context of the search for the determinants of growth, and as instruments 
for the estimation of impacts of other variables of interest. In her pioneering work, Paxson (1992) 
used rainfall shocks to construct estimates of transitory income, and found that unexpected income 
shocks did not have serious welfare consequences for Thai farm households, because they used 
savings and dissavings to buffer consumption from income shocks. The partial insurance strategies 
adopted by poor farmers against a temporary shock could indeed imply a reduction in crop yields 
with potentially negative impacts on consumption growth. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that 
self-insurance mechanisms only partially succeed (Morduch, 1995; Townsend, 1995), that 
households might not be able to smooth their consumption in response to income fluctuations due to 
credit or liquidity constraints  (Hirvonen, 2016; Morduch, 1995; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993), and 
that uninsured risk may well be a cause of poverty, due to two distinct mechanisms, one ex ante or 
behavioural and one ex post (Dercon, 2004). The first can be explained as follows: since poorer 
farmers are generally risk-averse, uninsured risk determines ex-ante changing in behaviour that 
implies precautionary saving and/or other optimal strategies to avoid profitable but risky 
opportunities at the expenses of mean returns (Dercon, 1996, 2004; Elbers, Gunning, & Kinsey, 
2007). To this end, Ligon and Schechter (2003) provide a micro-founded household level 
vulnerability measure by applying the so-called Jensen inequality. Dercon (1996), analysing, through 
a theoretical model of risk-taking behaviours, the relationship between risk, crop choice and savings 
in rural Tanzania, finds that wealthier households engage in more risky but higher return activities 
than households with a poor asset base, and notes that “this evidence is to some extent disconcerting 
if one is interested in rural growth without exacerbating rural inequality, since it shows the existence 
and the mechanisms of a ‘poverty trap’”. The ex post impact, instead, is the one that materializes after 
a ‘bad’ state (Dercon, 2004): in this respect weather shocks are shown to have an impact on ex-post 
poverty too. In such a context, several theoretical models underline the issues of persistence to 
highlight that temporary shocks can affect long-term outcomes such as the process of income 
convergence among households (Carter, Little, Mogues & Negatu; Little, Mogues & Negatu, 2007; 
Reis, 2009). This permanent effect of temporary shocks has been typically explained by asset 
smoothing (Barrett & Carter, 2013; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter Little, Mogues & Negatu, 2007) 
or by the conservative behaviour of risk-averse households that shy away from investing in profitable 
but risky technologies (Reis, 2009).  
Indeed, this is what has emerged from many empirical studies on household welfare dynamics: 
Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas (1998), using panel data for farming households in Burkina Faso, test 
the hypothesis that households keep livestock as a buffer stock to insulate their consumption from 
income fluctuations, but only find evidence for very limited consumption smoothing. Dercon (2004) 
himself, using panel data from Ethiopia during the period 1989 – 1997, finds that rainfall shocks had 
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a substantial contemporaneous impact on food consumption growth, and also shows persistence of 
impacts, suggesting that rainfall shocks may have a long-lasting effect which goes beyond the welfare 
cost of short-term consumption fluctuations. His subsequent works in the same setting confirmed 
these results (Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011; Dercon, Hoddinott, & Woldehanna, 2005; Dercon & 
Krishnan, 2000). Carter et al. (2007) explore the asset dynamics of Ethiopian and Honduran 
households in the wake of environmental shocks, and find that household growth can be hit not just 
in the immediate aftermaths but also in the long-run, and that coping strategies adopted are costly and 
can be a source of divergence among households. Hirvonen (2016), using the Kagera Health and 
Development Survey (KHDS), spanning the period 1991-2009, shows how household consumption 
co-moves with temperature, and then uses temperature shocks as a proxy for income shocks to study 
long-term migration decisions in Tanzania. 
 
Other studies have instead focused on the possibility of long-run impacts on household welfare from 
weather shocks. Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) first, reviewing literature on household responses to 
weather-related shocks, note how what emerges is that “[…] some, but not all households can smooth 
consumption. In particular, households facing liquidity constraints have limited smoothing ability. 
For these households, therefore, income fluctuations will generate a welfare loss”. Then, drawing on 
a panel dataset in Zimbabwe, they try to determine whether these shocks have only transitory or also 
permanent effects, by examining growth in the heights of young children. They discover droughts 
have a long-lasting impact on child growth, and that this impact is heterogeneous, i.e. greatest 
amongst children living in poor households. They notice how this points to the possibility of the 
intergenerational transmission of poorer health status resulting from drought shocks. Alderman, 
Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) follow this path and explore the long-term consequences of shocks on 
individuals, starting from the observation that where temporary shocks have long-lasting impacts, 
utility losses may be higher, and finding analogous results. 
 
The amount of evidence of both short-run and long-run impacts of weather shocks on household 
welfare, and the limited evidence for precautionary saving and consumption smoothing, has been the 
spark for the development of another strand of literature, based on the concept of “poverty traps”. 
The concept of poverty traps has been proposed both in macro- as well as in microeconomics and is 
closely related to the idea of convergence in neoclassical economics. The assumption of diminishing 
returns is a crucial one in neoclassical economic growth: essentially, it implies that the incomes of 
poorer countries (households) will eventually ‘catch up’ over time with those of richer countries 
(households). But, following empirical evidence on macro growth which contradicted the assumed 
convergence hypothesis between countries, as Carter and Barrett (2006) describe, “within the macro 
 78 
 
growth literature, two alternatives to the neoclassical growth model have emerged to account for the 
observed pattern of divergence”, namely the idea of club convergence (Baumol, 1986; De Long, 
1988; Quah, 1996, 1997) and the concepts of thresholds and multiple equilibria (Azariadis & Drazen, 
1990; Hansen, 2000; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989). 
At the micro level, as Carter and Barrett (2006) argue, it may be that “As with nations, individuals 
may also have intrinsic characteristics (skills, savings propensities, discount rates, and geographic 
locations) that condition their desired level of accumulation and ultimate equilibrium level of well-
being. However, there may also be analogues to the locally increasing returns to scale that generate 
multiple equilibria and thwart the ability of initially poor households to catch up and converge with 
their wealthier neighbours”. 
Starting from this hypothesis, an empirical literature has developed to try and detect the presence of 
thresholds and multiple equilibria at the micro level. The task is hard, as noticed by Barrett and Carter 
(2013), Carter and Barrett (2006) and Jalan and Ravallion (2002), due to the lack of sufficiently long 
panels at the household level in developing countries, which contrasts with the fact that convergence 
among households, as well as post-shock recovery, are long-run processes. 
While it is thus difficult to empirically detect the presence of multiple equilibria, several studies have 
attempted to do so, and have provided evidence of at least significant persistency of poverty. These 
works can be divided in two categories. The first has focused on income and consumption growth as 
indicators of household welfare (Dercon, 2004; Jalan & Ravallion, 2002, 2004). Dercon (2004) only 
tests for, and discovers, persistence of shocks, but he cannot assert the existence of a poverty trap, as 
he explicitly states: “This is not the same as testing for the existence of a ‘poverty trap’ in the sense 
of the investigation of the threshold, below which there is a tendency to be trapped in permanently 
low income, from which no escape is possible except for by large positive shocks. Persistence within 
the time period of the data does not exclude permanent effects, but does not imply them either”. Jalan 
and Ravallion (2002; 2004) draw from the standard growth literature to derive micro-based growth 
models and explicitly test for divergence due to spatial factors and geographic externalities, finding 
evidence which supports the notion of “geographic poverty traps”, i.e. the idea that, ceteris paribus, 
the welfare of a household living in a well-endowed area grows while the one of an otherwise identical 
household living in an unfavourable geographic area stagnates. 
The other, the so-called ‘asset-based’ approach, taking cue from the theoretical underpinnings 
provided by Barrett and Carter (2006; 2013), focuses on asset growth as the dependent variable of 
interest, arguing that looking at assets makes it possible to distinguish persistent structural poverty 
from poverty that passes naturally with time thanks to the growth process. This second empirical 
current is mainly represented by the works of Carter et al. (2007), who show that the idea of asset-
based poverty traps is consistent with the post-shock growth experience in Honduras after Hurricane 
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Mitch, and in Ethiopia after the drought of the late 1990s, while also providing empirical support for 
the concept of “asset smoothing” (opposed to the hypothesis of consumption smoothing), according 
to which poorer households with very low assets (typically, livestock), choose to voluntarily 
destabilize consumption not to sell assets and be caught in a poverty trap from which it would be 
almost impossible to recover; Carter and Lybbert (2012), who test the two alternative hypothesis of 
consumption and asset smoothing, and using a panel dataset from West Africa they apply threshold 
estimation techniques which provide support for asset, and not consumption, smoothing in response 
to external shocks; Barrett et al. (2006), who examine welfare dynamics in rural Kenya and 
Madagascar and again, mixing quantitative and qualitative evidence, find that poor households defend 
their critical asset levels through asset smoothing, even if this comes at the cost of an immediate 
reduction in consumption. 
Finally, Barrett and Swallow (2006) try to unify macro and micro literature on poverty traps by 
providing the theoretical framework of “fractal poverty traps”, in which multiple dynamic equilibria, 
caused by endogenous and / or exogenous conditions, exist simultaneously at multiple scales (micro, 
meso and macro) and are self-reinforcing through feedback effects. 
 
The idea of poverty traps has also been proposed and tested for in the context of the debate on the 
long-run determinants of growth and development. The two main currents in this literature are the 
geography hypothesis, which draws from the hypothesis of environmental determinism put forward 
in Diamond (1999) and Huntington (1922), namely that climate and geography are the fundamental 
drivers of development, and has found qualified empirical support in the works of Alsan (2014), 
Andersen, Dalgaard, and Selaya (2016), Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999), and Olsson and Hibbs 
(2005); and the institution hypothesis (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2000, 2001; Easterly & 
Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004), which conversely endorses institutional 
determinism and stresses the primacy of institutions over geography as a determinant of long-run 
growth. As Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) observe, the fact that geographic characteristics and 
institutional quality are highly correlated makes it challenging to definitely settle the debate. In this 
context, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003), Bonds, Keenan, Rohani, and Sachs (2010), and Strulik 
(2008) provide both theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence for the idea of ‘climate-
induced’ poverty traps, while Tol (2011) explores the long-run mechanisms (diseases, infant 
mortality, fertility, education) through which climate and climate change could widen or deepen 
poverty traps or even cause intergenerational poverty traps. This large body of literature 
notwithstanding, Tol (2015) notes: “The literature on the impact of climate (change) on development 
has yet to reach firm conclusions. Climate change could moderate the rate of economic growth, but 
estimates range from high to low. More people may be trapped in poverty because of climate, but this 
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effect could be large or small.” 
 
3 Empirical framework and identification strategy 
 
Our empirical framework belongs to the strand of the literature that looks at growth in developing 
countries by using micro-level data, drawing in particular on the works of Carter et al. (2007); Dercon 
(2004); Jalan and Ravallion (2002). We assess convergence by using a standard empirical growth 
model, in a framework borrowed from the macro literature Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1990; Solow, 
1956), where growth rates are assumed to be negatively related to the initial income levels: 
 
(1)    𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 =  𝛼𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑡 +  𝛺𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 +  𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
 
In this equation, the left-hand side variable is the annualised growth rate in annual household per 
adult-equivalent3  consumption between t and t-1, and 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1  is household per adult-equivalent 
lagged consumption4. The coefficient 𝛼, if negative and statistically significant, would indicate, on 
average, convergence among households.  
 
In all our specifications, Yit  either denotes food consumption or total consumption.  
The reason why we use two different dependent variables is that looking only at food consumption 
growth one may confound the impact of weather shocks with the effects of relative price changes. In 
fact, due to changes in the ratio between food vs non-food prices, food consumption may follow a 
different growth path from total consumption. While Dercon (2004), due to lack of data availability 
for non-food expenditure, had to largely limit his analysis to food consumption growth, we employ 
both to address this concern. 
The inclusion of lagged consumption level as an independent regressor may raise concerns about 
endogeneity. However, endogeneity tests, based on the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics – 
one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments, where lagged consumption is treated as 
endogenous and instrumented with asset and education levels at t-1, and one for the equation with the 
larger set of instruments, where lagged consumption is treated as exogenous – do not reject the 
assumption of exogeneity of this variable (see Table A.1). Furthermore, the core findings do not 
                                                 
3 We use an adult-equivalent scale that was already included in the dataset instead of a per capita measure, since per capita 
measures would underestimate the welfare of households with children with respect to families with no children, and the 
welfare of large households with respect to small households, as stressed in the Basic Information Document of the 
original LSMS-ISA surveys. Basic Information Documents for the surveys are available at the following link: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTLSMS/0,,contentMDK:23635561~
pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3358997,00.html 
4 Given the household fixed-effects model, we could not include initial consumption levels because they are time-invariant. 
Hence the choice of including lagged levels, which in a panel with only three waves is in practice very similar. 
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change when we use other estimation methods (see Section 6) which treat lagged consumption level 
as endogenous. 
 
This basic empirical growth model is augmented to investigate the potential impacts of weather 
shocks. 
∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡  and  ∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑡 are temperature and precipitation shocks, where ‘shocks’ mean ‘anomalies’ in 
the sense defined by Dell, Jones and Olken (2014), i.e. our weather variables are calculated as the 
level difference between their average values in the period between interviews and the long-run 
means, divided by the long-run standard deviation5. This means we assume that level changes matter 
not only in an absolute sense but also, more importantly, in terms of deviation from their long-run 
averages. Given we have a short-run panel and only limited climatic variation, this choice of the 
weather functional form suits better the nature of our data.  
A common practice in the development literature on the relationship between growth and shocks is 
the fact almost all these works only include rainfall shocks in the empirical analysis, neglecting the 
potential role of temperature as a determinant of household growth. 
Indeed, climate literature (Auffhammer, Hsiang, Schlenker & Sobel, 2013); Dell, Jones, & Olken, 
2014) has warned against the risk of omitted variable bias when dealing with the effects of weather 
regressors, and recommends to always include at least both temperature and precipitation as 
independent variables. Since the two are closely correlated, excluding temperature, as commonly 
done in many empirical development works, may mean attributing to precipitation shocks an impact 
which could be actually due to temperature. We avoid this risk by including both. 
To capture potential heterogeneity of impacts, we also interact weather shocks with dummies for 
being “poor” and for living in “hot” areas, as well as with dummies for consumption quartiles. 
 
Other than weather shocks, we include two sets of control variables. 
𝛺𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vegetation time series which includes variables providing data on the start of the wettest 
quarter, average changes in greenness, and onsets of greenness increase and decrease. 
These vegetation variables were already included in the original World Bank data as part of the 
Integrated Survey on Agriculture (ISA); we chose to add them in the regression following the advice 
in Auffhammer et al. (2013) and Dell, Jones and Olken (2014): it is important to include a rich set of 
climatic variables in the regression (when available), given the risk of omitted variable bias due to 
the fact climatic variables are always highly correlated. 
Household controls include household size, the square of household size, the age of the household 
                                                 
5 The subscript g indicates temperature and precipitation variabes are observed at the grid level. 
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head and its squared term, a dummy for the gender of the household head, average years of education 
among adults, the number of infants (i.e. less than 5-year old) and dummies capturing a variety of 
self-reported shocks, both idiosyncratic (illness and deaths of household members) and covariate (e.g. 
market) shocks. The inclusion of control variables reduces the risk of omitted variable bias and 
provides smaller standard errors in the estimates. 
 
As for the other elements in the equation, 𝜇𝑖 are household fixed effects; 𝑞𝑖𝑡  are quarter of year 
dummies to capture when the interview took place; 𝑤𝑡 are wave dummies; 𝜃𝑟𝑡 are region-year fixed 
effects, to allow for differentiated time trends in different regions and capture idiosyncratic local 
shocks, as suggested by Dell, Jones and Olken (2012); 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are error terms clustered simultaneously at 
the Enumeration Areas (EAs) and wave levels, following the two-way clustering recommended by 
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011). EAs are the main stratification level in the NPS surveys and 
also the closest unit to the grid level where temperature and precipitation are observed; furthermore, 
in most rural areas, EAs are defined by village boundaries6. 
 
After finding heterogeneity, we try to detect a critical consumption threshold for the significance of 
temperature impacts. In order to do so, we employed the Hansen (2000) threshold estimator following the 
approach by Carter et al. (2007). This model distinguishes two impact regimes conditional to a critical 
value of lagged (pre-shock) consumption level: 
 
(2)    𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 = {   
𝛼𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
𝑙∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑡 +  𝛺𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 ≤ 𝜎
𝛼𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
𝑢∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑡 +  𝛺𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 +  𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 > 𝜎
 
 
Where the superscripts l and u on the coefficient β indicate, respectively, the lower and upper regime 
of temperature impacts, conditional on lagged consumption level. 
 
4 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
A. Data 
 
The data used in this work are taken from two different sources. 
 
Household data 
 
                                                 
6 In their works on Tanzania, Hirvonen (2016) clusters standard errors at the village level, Bengtsson (2010) at the 
"cluster"-level, i.e. the main stratification unit and the level at which rainfall is observed. Given the absence of village 
location data due to confidentiality reasons, EA coordinates were the most appropriate choice for the clustering level. 
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Household data come from the Tanzania National Panel Surveys, part of the World Bank collection 
of household surveys known as Living Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Survey on 
Agriculture (LSMS – ISA). In particular, this panel consists of three surveys: 2008 – 2009; 2010-
2011; 2012-2013 7 . These three surveys have been cleaned and aggregated using household 
identification numbers to build a three-round panel. All the monetary values in the surveys have been 
deflated, in order to convert nominal values in real/constant values, using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for Tanzania by the World Bank8, and they are expressed in Tanzanian shillings at 2013 
monetary values. Importantly, we only selected rural households in building the panel, dropping 
urban households for which confounding factors would have been more likely. After cleaning the 
data, we are left with a balanced panel of 1,585 georeferenced households. This panel includes data 
on household and, as part of the ISA questionnaire, vegetation time series and geographic variables, 
as well as data on crops and agriculture.  
Finally, data on the monetary value of total crop production and other agricultural characteristics used 
in Section 5 have been developed by the FAO Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA) Team 
starting from the household data contained in the survey questionnaires. 
 
Weather data 
 
Weather data are taken from NASA’s Modern-Era Retrospective analysis for Research and 
Applications, Version 2 (MERRA-2), which is a global, gridded data set based on retrospective 
analysis of historical weather data obtained from satellite images and weather stations (Rienecker et 
al., 2011). The dataset provides daily temperature measures aggregated into grids that are 1/2° in 
latitude x 2/ 3° in longitude (which corresponds roughly to 55 km x 75 km at the equator). As with 
all re-analysis products, the data set is a combination of observed and imputed data points, using 
observation where and when available, and physics-based interpolation where and when needed. 
We aggregated in two ways. First, we computed long-run averages over the period 1980 – 2015. 
Second, we built average measures of weather variability during the period between interviews for 
each household. However, to better catch the weather conditions during the growing season, as 
suggested by Hirvonen (2016), we chose to exclude the summer months from the computations of 
both averages (namely, June, July, August and September)9. 
                                                 
7 These data are available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTLSMS/0,,contentMDK:23635561~
pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3358997,00.html 
8 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?page=1 
9  See http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/climate/projects/undp-cp/UNDP_reports/TanzaniaTanzania.lowres.report.pdf, 
where it is stated that “the ‘short’ rains [take place] in October to December and the long rains in March to May, whilst 
the southern, western and central parts of the country experience one wet season that continues October through April or 
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Hence, temperature at time t is average monthly growing season temperature in the period between t 
and t-1, expressed in degree Celsius. Precipitation at time t, instead, is calculated as average monthly 
growing season precipitation (in millimetres) in the period between t and t-1. Long-run average 
temperature and precipitation represent respectively long-run average monthly growing season 
temperature and long-run average monthly growing season precipitation. Finally, as already specified 
above, temperature and precipitation shocks (or anomalies) at time t are defined as the level difference 
between their values at t and their long-run averages, divided by the long-run standard deviation. 
We used latitude and longitude coordinates to link these gridded weather data to household data. 
Unfortunately, for confidentiality reasons we did not have access to the exact location of households, 
but only to the average of household GPS coordinates in each enumeration area (EA), for which a 
random offset within a 5-km range was applied for rural households. Such an offset range, anyway, 
is not an issue of concern for us given the medium resolution of our weather data. 
Furthermore, given the risk of incorrect inference when dealing with historical weather data, 
emphasized by Auffhammer et al. (2013), as a robustness check we also run a sensitivity analysis for 
our results by using a different source of weather data, where temperature data come from the CRUCY 
Version 3.23 by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia (CRU, 2016), 
and have a resolution of 1/2° in latitude x 1/2° in longitude, and rainfall data come from the same 
NPS Dataset as part of the ISA module, and they contain data on total rainfall in the wettest quarter 
within 12-month periods starting in July previous to each round. 
 
B. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables employed in the empirical analysis. 
Annualised average total and food consumption growth rates are both negative: they decreased on 
average by about 1.4 and 1.7 percentage points each year. However, the standard deviation is large 
for both variables, indicating heterogeneity in the growth paths experienced by rural households. Both 
temperature and precipitation anomalies were, on average, positive in the timespan considered, but 
for them as well it is worth noting the huge standard deviation, suggesting substantial heterogeneity 
in the weather conditions experienced by households living in different geographical areas. 
 
5 Baseline results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results from estimating Equation (1). First, the hypothesis of convergence 
among households is confirmed: growth rates are negatively related to ‘initial’ consumption levels, 
                                                 
May”. In this way, given the intrinsic difficulty in exactly identifying rainy seasons months for households scattered 
across the whole country, we excluded the summer months which are not part of any rainy season in Tanzania. 
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i.e. poorer household grow faster. As for the weather variables, Column 1 shows that, on average and 
ceteris paribus, temperature (precipitation) shocks have a slightly negative (positive) but not 
significant impact on growth. 
Column 2 controls for heterogeneity of impacts, by interacting both temperature and precipitation 
with a dummy for being “poor”, i.e. a dummy with value 1 for households with below median initial 
food (in Table 2) or total (in Table 3) consumption. Defining a household as “poor” is of course a 
relative concept in a context like rural Tanzania. We essentially check for heterogeneity of impacts 
with respect to the poorest amongst the poor. Including these interactions qualitatively changes the 
results: temperature shocks now have a positive and weakly significant impact for the “non-poor” 
households, but a large, negative and significant (at the 5 percent level) impact on household growth 
for “poor” households. Interpreting these results with respect to the within-standard deviation of 
temperature shocks (0.237), one standard deviation increase in temperature anomalies decreases 
household per-adult equivalent food consumption growth by about 2.76 %, and household per-adult 
equivalent total consumption growth by approximately 2.21 %, ceteris paribus, for households 
defined as “poor”. Rainfall impacts are insignificant.  
Given the presence of heterogeneity with respect to initial consumption, in Column 3 we also check 
for heterogeneity by interacting shocks with a dummy for living in “hot” areas, which takes value 1 
for households living in an area with above mean long-run average monthly growing season 
temperature. Although the interaction between temperature shocks and the dummy for “poor” 
households stays unchanged in sign, magnitude and significance, the total effect of temperature 
shocks on poorest households is now slightly smaller and less significant. The interaction between 
temperature shocks and a dummy for households living in hotter areas is small and negligible, and so 
the total effect. Living in a hot area has a positive (and significant, but only in Table 3) impact on 
growth, but this is very likely due to the fact the hottest areas in Tanzania (coastal regions and 
Zanzibar) are also the richest ones. 
Temperature impacts on growth are always larger on food consumption growth than on total 
consumption growth, consistently with the fact that most households are subsistence farming 
households. This will be additionally addressed in Section 7, where the channels of the heterogeneity 
will be investigated. 
Finally, Column 4 in both Tables 2 and 3 explores more in detail the relationship between 
consumption levels, temperature shocks and their impact on growth, by interacting the lagged 
consumption term (food consumption in Table 2, total consumption in Table 3) with temperature 
shocks. The results are consistent with the previous findings: the process of convergence is unaltered, 
the coefficient for temperature shocks is negative and statistically significant, the interaction between 
lagged consumption and temperature shocks is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
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level, suggesting that the impacts from temperature shocks tend to decrease as households grow 
richer. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the implications of the results in Column 4 for, respectively, Table 3 and 4. 
They show the marginal effect of temperature shocks at different lagged consumption levels. When 
households have a sufficiently high level of pre-shock consumption, impacts from temperature shocks 
turn first zero and then eventually positive. 
Tables 4 and 5 take a closer look, by interacting weather shocks not with a dummy for being “poor”, 
but with dummies for initial consumption quartiles10. The results, consistent between tables, reveal 
even further heterogeneity: as can be seen in Column 1 of both tables, households belonging to the 
poorest initial quartile suffer from a large, negative and statistically significant impact of temperature 
shocks, while the second and third quartiles do not, and growth for households in the upper initial 
quartile is positively and significantly affected, revealing heterogeneity in sign rather than size. 
This core finding is not altered when including the interaction for living in a “hot” area, as shown in 
Column 2 of both tables. Finally, impacts due to precipitation shocks are always insignificant. 
In sum, depending on initial conditions, the impacts of temperature shocks on household growth is 
sharply heterogeneous across quartiles, and poorest households are the only ones to be significantly 
and negatively affected. 
This contrasts with the implications of the negative and significant coefficient of the lagged 
consumption term: while there seems to be an ongoing process of convergence among households, 
temperature shocks go in the opposite direction, slowing growth of the poorest households while 
bolstering growth for the richest ones.  
 
However, we have not precisely identified thresholds of consumption that entail regime changes for 
temperature shocks. We just interacted shocks with dummies that capture heterogeneity, but these 
choices are arbitrary. They are not driven by the data. 
To overcome this drawback, on the wake of Carter et al. (2007), we present the results for a panel 
threshold model using the so-called Hansen (2000) estimator, as implemented in a fixed-effect setting 
by Wang (2015). 
Threshold models identify the jumping character or structural break in the relationship between 
variables. In our context, we are looking for thresholds of pre-shock consumption above or below 
which there is a structural break in the impact of temperature shocks, as illustrated in Equation (2). 
Temperature shocks are the regime-dependent variable. 
                                                 
10 Although we considered the possibility of a quantile regression model as an alternative specification, we ruled out this 
option because when quantile regression is combined with panel data and a fixed-effect setting, identification and 
estimation become complicated, since the quantiles of the difference are not equal to the difference in quantiles, and the 
issue gets even worse when the number of time periods is small (as in our case) (Ponomareva, 2010). 
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Looking at the previous regressions, it appears there is not just one threshold, but two separate and 
distinct thresholds. The first is the threshold above which impacts turn negative but statistically 
insignificant; the second the one above which impacts turn positive and significant. We are therefore 
looking for two, and not just one, consumption level thresholds. 
In Table 6 we present the results for this double threshold model using the Hansen estimator. 
In Column 1 the dependent variable is food consumption growth, in Column 2 total consumption 
growth. As hypothesized, we find two thresholds and three regimes: a first threshold below which 
impacts of temperature shocks are negative and strongly significant, and above which they turn 
insignificant; and a second threshold from which impacts turn to being positive and strongly 
significant. Although the positive impact above the upper threshold is much bigger than the negative 
impact below the lower threshold, the percentage of observations falling below the lower threshold 
is much higher (47 % and 24 % , respectively, for food and total consumption) than the percentage 
of observations above the upper threshold (around 13 % in both cases), revealing it is a smaller group 
of better-off households that drives the significance of the positive impact for the upper quartile. 
Both thresholds, for both dependent variables, are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as 
reported in the threshold tests. 
After re-converting logs into monetary values, for food consumption we find a lower threshold of 
approximately 483594 Tanzanian shillings or, expressed at 2013 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
values11, 803 dollars; and an upper threshold of approximately 917126 Tanzanian shillings, i.e. about 
1523 dollars; for total consumption, instead, the two thresholds are approximately 2434956 
Tanzanian shillings, approximately 723 dollars, and 1219559 Tanzanian shillings, or about 2026 
dollars. 
 
Temperature shocks, in sum, slow the convergence process, and are a source of divergence. This has 
strong distributional implications and raises the issue of which channels and transmission 
mechanisms could be responsible for such a sharp heterogeneity of impacts. These questions are 
addressed in Section 7 but, first, Section 6 conducts a number of tests to assess the robustness of our 
results to different sensitivity analyses, and make sure our findings are not driven by the chosen 
identification strategy or by properties of the data used. 
 
6 Robustness checks 
 
We explore the robustness of our results with respect to spatial autocorrelation, different weather data 
and different estimation strategies. 
                                                 
11 For the PPP conversion factor in 2013: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP?locations=TZ . 
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A. Conley (1999) standard errors 
 
It is well known that both economic growth and temperature are spatially autocorrelated. One could 
thus argue that confidence in our results are inflated because we fail to take this into account. We 
therefore re-run the quartile regressions from Tables 4 and 5 correcting for Conley (1999) standard 
errors, which are robust to both spatial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The computation of 
the Conley standard errors is based on a weighing matrix that places greater weight on observations 
that are closer to each other, and the weights decay to zero after a pre-specified distance cut-off is 
met. We use the following cut-off points: 50, 75 and 100 km. These regressions are reported in Table 
7: in Column 1 the dependent variable is food consumption growth, in Column 2 is total consumption 
growth. The core results are basically unchanged: our findings are not weakened when correcting for 
spatial autocorrelation and spatially-robust standard errors. 
 
B. Different weather data 
 
Results could be driven by properties of the weather data, the selection of weather stations, the 
homogenization of the data, and the imputation of missing observations. Auffhammer et al. (2013) 
highlight the risk of using reanalysis data, since reanalysis is conducted with models that, like 
economic models, are imperfect and contain systematic biases. Moreover, they recommend to always 
check that results also hold when using a different data source. 
For temperature data, we use the CRUCY Version 3.23 by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the 
University of East Anglia (CRU, 2016), a gridded dataset which has a resolution of 1/2° in latitude x 
1/2° in longitude. While the MERRA-2 Reanalysis data combine information from ground stations, 
satellites, and other sources with a physical climate model to create gridded weather data products, 
CRU data are gridded data, statistically interpolated from ground stations (Dell, Jones and Olken, 
2014). Table A.2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for the CRU temperature data. 
∆Temp is on average almost 5 times bigger compared to average temperature shocks in Table 1. 
Despite this, the correlation between the two temperature series is more than 90 %. 
As for rainfall, we use precipitation data that come from the NPS Dataset as part of the ISA module, 
and our variable is now average total rainfall in the wettest quarter before the interview. These data 
were taken from the NOAA datasets on African Rainfall Climatology (ARC) data. ARC data blend 
rain gauge measurements and InfraRed (IR) satellite information to render a daily, high resolution 
(0.1°x0.1°) gridded estimate covering the Africa continent.12 Since data on the long-run standard 
deviation are not included, we simply define rainfall shocks as level differences from the long-run 
                                                 
12 Data can be found at: ftp://ftp.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/fews/newalgo_est_dekad/ . 
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average. 
The results are in Table 8. The pattern of heterogeneity holds, and the effect size is similar, both for 
the negative impacts on households belonging to the poorest quartile and for the positive impacts for 
households belonging to the richest quartile. Precipitation shocks are now often significant, and seem 
to point to heterogeneity as well, but they are also quite sensitive to specification, and since we detect 
no significant precipitation impacts on crop yields using the same data source (see Section 7), we 
conclude their significance here is likely incidental. 
In sum, our main findings hold when using a different source of weather data.  
 
C. Hausman – Taylor regressions 
 
Following Dercon (2004), we repeat our empirical analysis using the Hausman - Taylor (1981) model, 
which involves partitioning the time-invariant and time-varying vector of variables in two groups 
each, of which one group of variables is assumed to be uncorrelated with the fixed effect.  
The Hausman-Taylor model, being a random-effect model for panel data allows us to include time-
invariant variables in our regressions. In particular, in addition to region dummies13, we add distance 
to the nearest major road and long-run averages for our weather variables. Given the strong 
partitioning assumptions implied by this estimation strategy, we adopt a cautious approach, following 
Dercon (2004): lagged consumption terms and all household controls (with the exception of self-
reported covariate shocks) are treated as time-varying endogenous variables; dummies for 
consumption quartiles are treated as time-invariant endogenous; all weather and geographic variables, 
both time-varying and time-invariant, are treated as exogenous. 
Results can be found in Table 9 for food consumption growth (Column 1) and total consumption 
growth (Column 2)14. Despite stark differences between estimation strategies, the overall picture is 
consistent with the results from the fixed-effect specification: the convergence process is confirmed, 
and temperature shocks only harm poorest households, although here also the second poorest quartile 
is negatively and significantly affected. Interestingly, while the coefficient for the upper quartile is 
still positive, its magnitude has decreased and its significance has disappeared in Column (1) and 
diminished in Column (2). This will be further addressed in the next robustness check. As above, 
there is no statistically discernible effect of rainfall shocks, while both long-run temperature and 
precipitation have a positive impact on both food and total consumption growth. 
 
                                                 
13 Region dummies were included separately from year dummies because the estimation of Hausman-Taylor regressions 
requires the presence of time-invariant exogenous variables. 
14 Incidentally, although not reported in Table 7, distance from the nearest major road always has a large and significant 
effect on growth, consistently with what found by Dercon (2004) in rural Ethiopia, hinting at public infrastructure as 
another source of divergence among households. 
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D. Two-Step Difference GMM 
 
As a third, and last, estimation strategy we employ the two-step difference GMM, first proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimation method is especially recommended for dynamic panels 
which exhibit the following characteristics (Roodman, 2006): “1) “small T, large N” panels, meaning 
few time periods and many individuals; 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) one left-hand-side 
variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) independent variables that are not 
strictly exogenous, meaning they are correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the 
error; 5) fixed individual effects; and 6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but 
not across them”. Arellano–Bond estimation transforms all regressors by differencing, and uses the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) as the estimation method. Importantly, it adjusts for the 
potential bias caused by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor. The Hansen-J 
tests reported ensure the specification is valid, and the standard errors are corrected using Windmeijer 
(2005) adjustment procedure. 
In distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous variables, we followed Dercon (2004) and 
Jalan and Ravallion (2002): lagged consumption terms and all household controls are treated as 
endogenous, and weather shocks and vegetation time series as exogenous. 
The results for the two-step Arellano-Bond GMM estimation are reported in Table 10. 
They are consistent with the fixed-effect and Hausman-Taylor regressions discussed above: 
heterogeneity of impacts from temperature shocks is confirmed, with a strong and significant impact 
only for households belonging to the poorest initial quartile.  
Similarly to the Hausman-Taylor model, temperature impacts for households in the richest quartiles 
are still positive, but much smaller and not significant anymore. This means that the significance of 
the positive impact detected using the fixed-effect model is not robust to different estimation 
strategies, and should be interpreted with extreme caution. Finally, precipitation is insignificant. 
 
7 Transmission channels and mechanisms 
 
Having demonstrated robustness, we now explore why there is such a sharp heterogeneity of impacts 
and indeed a change in sign of impacts on household growth depending on initial consumption. We 
shed light on this question by investigating three main channels: health expenditure, labour 
productivity and agricultural yields. These three transmission channels find their theoretical and 
empirical grounding in previous literature. Furthermore, to explain if and how households cope with 
impacts of temperature shocks, we investigate impacts on asset growth, to test for the potential 
presence of asset-smoothing in contrast to consumption smoothing behaviours. 
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A. Health expenditure channel 
 
As summarized by Dell, Jones and Olken (2014) and Heal and Park (2015), several studies have 
examined the impact temperature can have on morbidity and mortality, which in turn affect labour 
productivity and income (and vice versa).  
Empirical works such as, among the others, Barreca (2012), Burgess et al. (2011), Deschênes and 
Greenstone, (2011) and Goldberg et al. (2011) have documented the effects of temperature and heat 
waves on health, particularly mortality, using panel methods. From a theoretical point of view, 
instead, the long-run relationship between health, environment/climate and poverty traps has been 
explored by Raffin (2012), Strulik (2008) and  Tol (2011). 
In our framework, it could be temperature shocks on consumption growth appear, at least partially, 
through the health channel: temperature could affect health and hence productivity, and this in turns 
may affect income and subsequently consumption. 
We test this mechanism by using the baseline specification set out in Equation (1) with a different 
dependent variable: instead of consumption growth, we now use as 𝑌𝑖𝑡  the ratio between health 
expenditure and total expenditure15. The expected sign of the relationship is the opposite: in response 
to temperature shocks, the growth rate of the ratio should increase. Table 11, Column 1 partially 
supports our hypothesis: temperature shocks have a positive (but not significant) impact on the growth 
rate of the health expenditure / total expenditure ratio. Furthermore, to justify the pattern of 
heterogeneity, one would expect this ratio to increase significantly more for households belonging to 
the poorest quartile. As reported in Column 2, this is not the case: the impact is small and insignificant 
for all quartiles, and the sign is not the expected one. Hence, either the health channel is not 
responsible for the heterogeneity we find, or there is a transmission mechanism which is ongoing but 
cannot be caught given the limitations and short-run nature of our data. 
Column 3 shows that living in a hot area has a large, positive and significant effect on the growth rate 
of the ratio of health to total expenditure. In other words, if the weather is anomalously hot, people 
spend more on health care. 
 
B. Labour productivity channel 
 
A recent but already large micro literature (Cachon, Gallino, & Olivares, 2012; Cachon et al., 2012; 
Graff Zivin & Neidell, 2014; Heal & Park, 2015; Niemelä et al., 2002; Park, 2017; Sudarshan & 
Tewari, 2013) has found vast and significant effects of temperature increases on the productivity of 
workers, especially on those who work outdoor. 
                                                 
15 To calculate the growth rate of this ratio, we increased both per a.e. health and total expenditures by the same small 
increment (the equivalent of a US dollar) for all households. 
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In a context like rural Tanzania, a large share of workers is involved in outdoor work, primarily in 
farming. Outdoor work is more exposed to heat waves, and agriculture in Tanzania is still largely 
traditional and thus still involves a lot of manual labour. These characteristics make workers in rural 
areas vulnerable to stress from temperature shocks, but there could also be significant differences in 
farmers’ characteristics that entail heterogeneity. Labour productivity may thus help explaining the 
heterogeneous impacts on consumption growth. 
We created a rough measure of agricultural labour productivity by dividing the monetary value of 
household total crop production (taken from the FAO Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA) 
Team Database16) in the 12 months before the interview by the number of family members engaged 
in agricultural activities in the 12 months before the interview.  
We are aware this measure represents a rough and only approximate proxy of (agricultural) labour 
productivity, stemming from one of the more general definitions of labour productivity as the ratio 
between total output and number of employed persons, but it is also the only one that we could get17.  
Consequently, our left-hand side variable is the growth rate of (agricultural) labour productivity 
between t and t-118.  Analogously to Equation (1), we regress this dependent variable on lagged 
agricultural labour productivity, temperature and precipitation shocks as well as controls and fixed 
effects. 
Since preliminary endogeneity tests (see Table A.3) rejected the assumption of exogeneity of the 
lagged dependent variable, the model was estimated using two-step difference GMM. 
Results are reported in Table 12. Column 1 shows average impacts. Temperature anomalies have a 
large and significant at the 5 level impact on the growth rate agricultural labour productivity. One 
within-standard deviation increase in temperature shocks decreases agricultural labour productivity 
growth by approximately 5.61 %, on average, ceteris paribus. Column 2 disentangles this aggregate 
impact across initial consumption quartiles: there is a large and significant negative effect on the 
poorest quartile, while impacts are not significant for the other quartiles. Precipitation shocks are 
insignificant and close to zero. This overall picture is consistent with the consumption growth 
regressions, and confirms labour productivity as one of the transmission channels responsible for the 
heterogeneity of impacts, but not for the sign change. 
Why is there such a discrepancy of impacts on agricultural labour productivity growth across 
quartiles? Tables A.4 reports some descriptive statistics that can help clarifying this issue. It shows 
the average Agricultural Wealth Index for the four initial consumption quartiles. The Agricultural 
                                                 
16 The FAO-RIGA Database can be found at:  http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/. 
17 Another shortcoming is that we only investigate the aggregate impact, without disentangling the impacts between labour 
supply and labour demand. Unfortunately, such refinements go beyond the limitations of our data. 
18 We added a small amount (the equivalent of a US dollar) to labour productivity values of all households not to lose 
observations with zeros when calculating growth rates. 
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Wealth Index was again taken from the FAO-RIGA Database, and is a specific aggregated index 
based on a factor analysis of the agricultural assets and technologies used by rural households in the 
sample. In this context this is useful because it also proxies for the use of technologies that decrease 
the need for manual labour. The average index is more than three times higher for the upper quartile 
compared to the poorest quartile, although oddly very low for the third quartile. 
Additionally, Table A.5 reports the percentage of households, across quartiles, for which farming was 
not the main source of income in at least two waves. According to our hypothesis above, the less 
households depend on farming activities, the less they work outdoors, and the lower the impact on 
labour productivity. Farming was the main source of income for about 81% of households in the 
poorest quartile. This share falls and, for the richest quartile, two-thirds of households depend on 
farming as the main source of income. 
This further enhances the influence of weather variability on the labour productivity of poorest 
households compared to that of the wealthier households. 
Aware of the limitations of our labour productivity measure, we find heterogenous effects on the 
growth rate agricultural labour productivity, which partially explains heterogeneity of impacts on 
consumption growth.  
This impact on labour productivity may have directly affected income or also entailed an indirect 
effect through crop yields, as Sudarshan & Tewari (2013) hypothesize: “Observed productivity losses 
in agriculture that have been attributed by default to plant growth responses to high temperatures may 
in fact be partly driven by lower labor productivity”. Of course, the opposite may also be true: impacts 
on agricultural labour productivity may be actually driven by losses in crop yields. 
 
C. Agricultural yield channel 
 
Several studies have investigate the relationship between crop yields and weather variability, starting 
from the very plausible assumption that extreme temperatures and rainfall above or below a certain 
threshold may have damaging consequences on crop yields, especially in developing countries whose 
agriculture is less modernized (Challinor, Wheeler, Craufurd & Slingo., 2005; Feng, Krueger, & 
Oppenheimer, 2010; Guiteras, 2009; Levine & Yang, 2006; Li et al., 2010; Porter & Semenov, 2005; 
Rowhani et al., 2011; Schlenker & Lobell, 2010; Welch et al., 2010). 
Other works have provided theoretical underpinnings to explain how low crop yields and yield gaps 
could be one of the reasons why smallholder farmers are trapped in chronic poverty (Barrett & 
Swallow, 2006; Sachs, 2008; Tittonell & Giller, 2013). 
On the wake of this literature, we investigate the agricultural yield channel to explain heterogeneity 
of impacts on consumption growth. Crop yields are defined as quantity produced (in kilograms) 
divided per hectare of cultivated land. Thanks to the ISA module in the original dataset, we had access 
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to crop data for the two rainy seasons (long and short) preceding the interview month. In investigating 
the impacts of weather shocks on crops, we must also take into account the possibility of non-linear 
effects, given the apparent inverted-U and non-linear relationship between temperature and plant 
growth (Dell, Jones & Olken, 2014; Hirvonen, 2016; Schlenker & Roberts, 2009). In order to do so, 
we draw from Ahmed et al. (2011), Hirvonen (2016), and Rowhani et al. (2011) works on Tanzania 
and adopt a specific temperature measure, the number of growing degree days (GDDs) (Schlenker & 
Roberts, 2009) in the twelve months preceding the interview month. Following the procedure 
implemented by Hirvonen (2016), we took daily minimum and maximum temperatures from the 
MERRA-2 data and approximated the diurnal temperature distribution by interpolating between the 
minimum and maximum temperature values using a sinusoidal curve. Growing degree days are then 
measured by the time of exposure to a certain temperature range. As in Hirvonen (2016), we set the 
lower bound to 8°C and the upper bound to 34°C. Exposure to temperatures above 34°C is considered 
harmful for agricultural yields19. In our regressions we use a spline function of the GDD variable. 
The first part of this variable captures temperature exposure between 8-34°C and the second exposure 
to temperatures above 34°C. We included average total precipitation during the two wettest quarters 
before the interview and its squares, using the alternative ARC rainfall data (cf. Tables 8 and A2), 
because they use the actual household plot location. 
Table 13 reports the results for this specification. The dependent variable is average crop yield during 
the previous two rainy seasons. In Column 1 we only look at the aggregate impact. The estimates 
suggest that it is exposure to extreme temperatures (above 34°C) which is harmful for crop yields. , 
In Column 2 we check whether this negative effect mainly comes through maize and paddy, two of 
the most important crops in the country, as suggested by previous literature on the impacts of 
temperature on crop yields in Tanzania (Ahmed et al. 2011; Rowhani et al., 2011).  
Therefore, we include interactions with a dummy for ‘Maize & paddy non-specializers’, a dummy 
with value 1 for households in which maize and paddy account for less than 50% of total crop 
production in a given wave20. As expected, negative effects on crop yields from extreme temperatures 
are driven by impacts on maize and paddy, and disappear if households are not specialized in the 
cultivation of these two crops.  
In Column 3 we decompose the aggregate impact of GDDs by looking at impacts across initial 
consumption quartiles. Rainfall impacts are close to zero and insignificant. Impacts of GDDs between 
8-34°C is essentially zero for all four quartiles. Exposure to extreme temperatures (above 34°C) has 
negative and strongly significant impact on crop yields of households in the poorest quartile, a 
                                                 
19 Descriptive statistics on GDDs can be found in the Appendix, Table A.6. 
20 See Table A.7 for descriptive statistics of this dummy. 
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negative and insignificant impact on crop yields of households in the second and third quartiles, and 
a positive but insignificant impact on crop yields of households in the upper quartile. These results 
are consistent with the pattern of heterogeneity of temperature shocks on consumption growth.   
Why are there such big differences in the impacts from extreme temperatures on crop yields across 
quartiles?  
Table A.8 reveals that richer households produce more crops (Column 1) and have more productive 
plots (Column 2). The heterogeneity of impacts can thus be explained by the fact that richer 
households are advantaged by better agricultural assets, technologies and soil quality, which make 
them less vulnerable to the negative impacts entailed by temperature shocks, which conversely have 
serious welfare consequences for poorest households. 
We have yet to account for the sign change for the upper quartile. The use of irrigation is still very 
limited (Table A.9) and so the use of inorganic fertilizers (Table A.10), but richer households show 
better conditions. Tables A.11-A.14 in the Appendix show data taken from the ISA module on the 
use of ‘improved’ seeds for maize and paddy. Improved seeds are more drought-resistant and can 
mitigate the negative impacts of extreme temperatures. Tables A.11 and A.12 show that the use of 
improved maize seeds sharply differ across consumption quartiles. Tables A.13 and A.14 reveal the 
same pattern with regard to the use of improved paddy seeds. 
 
D. Testing for asset smoothing 
 
We have established that the main channels that account for the heterogeneity of impacts on 
consumption growth are agricultural yields and labour productivity.  
But we did not explain yet why households are not smoothing consumption by drawing on their assets. 
Drawing from previous theoretical and empirical literature (Barrett et al., 2006; Barrett & Carter, 
2013; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter et al., 2007; Carter & Lybbert, 2012), we test the two alternative 
hypothesis of consumption vs asset smoothing by repeating the baseline specification but using, as an 
alternative dependent variable, asset growth instead of consumption growth. Our measure of assets is 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLUs), again taken from the FAO-RIGA Dataset. Descriptive statistics for 
TLUs is reported in Table A.15: the gap in TLUs per adult-equivalent across quartiles is evident. 
The dependent variable, therefore, is now annualised percentage change in (ln) per a.e. household 
TLUs between t and t-1 21 . Table 14 reports the results. In Column 1 we can see that, while 
convergence among households is confirmed, temperature shocks have, on average, a negative but 
not significant impact on asset growth. In Column 2, where we decompose the impacts by 
                                                 
21 To calculate asset growth and use logarithms, since many households have no assets at all and this implied the presence 
of many zeroes in the data, we followed the method implemented in Carter et al. (2007) and increase all livestock assets 
per adult-equivalent by the same small increment (namely the minimum value in the sample above zero). 
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consumption quartiles, impacts are always negative but we do not find any significance. 
These findings imply several considerations. First, it was a good choice to look at consumption 
growth instead of asset growth, following the reasoning in Carter et al. (2007), who argued that in the 
context of weather shocks such as droughts, characterized by a gradual onset and a prolonged effect 
(differently from the immediate disruption entailed by environmental shocks such as hurricanes or 
typhoons), impacts on welfare growth could appear through consumption and not through assets. 
Indeed, had we chosen asset growth as the dependent variable, we would have found no impacts at 
all. Second, poorest households in our sample could be performing asset-smoothing, i.e. they might 
be choosing of voluntarily destabilize consumption and stubbornly hold on to their livestock, in order 
not to sell them and then fall in a poverty trap from which there could be no recovery. This is 
consistent with what Carter et al. (2007) find for Ethiopia, where they note that “poor households 
seek to defend their assets in the face of successive droughts rather than liquidate them and perhaps 
limit their subsequent chances of recovery.”. 
Therefore, we are prone to assert that, for the poorest households in our sample, asset smoothing is 
probably taking place, while the choice of using assets as buffer stocks, one of the main risk-coping 
strategy hypothesized in literature, was either not adopted or not effective during the survey period 
(Kazianga & Udry, 2006; Morduch, 1995).  
 
8 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Using the LSMS-ISA Tanzania Panel Surveys by the World Bank, we find a causal relationship 
between temperature shocks, household growth and poverty in rural Tanzania. There is heterogeneity 
of impacts from temperature shocks, which affect household consumption growth only if initial 
consumption levels lie below critical thresholds, explained by the impacts of temperature anomalies 
on two interrelated transmission channels: labour productivity and, more importantly, on crop yields. 
Richer and poorer households differ not only in that the former have more diversified income sources 
and are less engaged in outdoor farming activities, but especially to the existence of a ‘yield gap’ and 
differences in crucial agricultural characteristics. Such differences among households may also be 
related to ex-ante risk-managing behaviours (Dercon, 2004), e.g. the conservative behaviour of the 
poorer risk-averse households that shy away from investing in profitable but risky technologies (such 
as modern agricultural inputs) and stick to low-risk, low-return activities, as indeed Dercon (1996) 
himself argues it is the case in the context of rural Tanzania, or, more simply, they cannot have access 
to these technologies because of credit and liquidity constraints. 
Importantly, while the negative effect for households below the lower threshold has proved to be 
robust, the significance of the positive impact above the second upper threshold disappeared when 
using different estimation methods such as the Hausman-Taylor random-effect model and two-step 
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difference GMM, and the magnitude itself of such effect positive substantially decreased. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the transmission channels found no evidence whatsoever of a 
significantly positive impact. While it may be that richest households are indirectly taking advantage 
from the negative impacts on poorest households and earning more from their crop activities, this 
explanation only goes so far, and is not supported by sufficiently robust empirical evidence. 
In any case, temperature shocks have a heterogeneous ex-post impact which slows the process of 
convergence and enhances inequalities. These micro results are consistent with what found on the 
relationship between growth, temperature shocks and poverty by macro studies (Dell, Jones & Olken, 
2012; Letta and Tol, 2016) 
 
However, these findings must be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons, the first being the 
nature and limitations of the data. We use a six-year panel with only three rounds, so we are only 
estimating a short-run elasticity between temperature shocks and growth in a given time span. It may 
well be that our period of study saw relatively mild weather variability, which could explain the 
absence of a significant average impact. Severe droughts may well entail much more pervasive 
consequences. However, even such extreme scenarios are unlikely to overturn the core finding that it 
is the poorest households who suffer more from the negative impacts of temperature shocks.  
Second, convergence is a long-run process. Even though we observe convergence in this short-run 
panel, we can only infer about long-run convergence, but not directly test for it.  
In the future, the availability of longer household-level panels for developing countries could alleviate 
these issues, enabling further research to test whether these findings, emerged from short-run 
elasticities, also hold in the medium or long run. 
Third, the consumption thresholds we detected, other than being intrinsically relative and data-driven, 
are not thresholds in the sense of the existence ‘poverty traps’, below which households are 
permanently trapped in low income. Temperature shocks have a diverging effect which enhances 
inequalities and slows the convergence process, but does not reverse it. Making all households reach 
the critical threshold level above which impacts turn insignificant, would make this source of 
divergence disappear. There are no multiple equilibria, but rather different regimes of impacts 
separated by pre-shock consumption thresholds. Rather than a climate-induced poverty trap, whose 
potential existence was the research question at the heart of this work, if anything we could define 
this relationship a poverty-induced climate trap. 
 
Extrapolating from weather to climate, such a qualitative finding is particularly relevant to climate 
change policy. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most vulnerable parts of the world to the threats 
posed by climate change (IPCC, 2014). Climate change is a serious threat to crop productivity (Knox, 
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Hess, Daccache & Wheeler, 2012) and food security (Challinor, Wheeler, Garforth, Craufurd & 
Kassam, 2007)  in Africa, and Tanzania is no exception (Ahmed et al., 2011; Hirvonen, 2016; 
Rowhani et al., 2011) . 
The so-called Schelling Conjecture (Schelling, 1992 & 1995), i.e. that economic development would 
reduce vulnerability to climate change, and Schelling’s point that the need for greenhouse gas 
abatement cannot be separated from the developing world’s need for immediate development 
(Schelling, 1997), find empirical support in the results of this work. Tol (2015) illustrates the 
Schelling Conjecture with regard to Africa: “In the worst projections, climate change could cut crop 
yields in Africa by half (Porter et al., 2014). At present, subsistence farmers often get no more from 
their land than one-tenth what is achieved at model farms working the same soil in the same climate 
(Mueller et al., 2012). The immediate reason for the so-called yield gap is a lack of access to irrigation, 
high-quality seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, tools, and things like that. The underlying causes include a 
lack of access to capital and product markets due to poor roads and insecure land tenure (Dorward et 
al., 2004; Foley et al., 2011). […] Indeed, modernizing agriculture in Africa would also make it less 
vulnerable to climate change (Howden et al., 2007; Mendelsohn & Dinar, 1999).” More broadly, 
these results increase the concerns over the issue of the distributional implications of future impacts, 
because they show that inequalities of impacts hold at the micro level as they do at the macro level, 
as already guessed by Tol (2016). If the impacts of temperature shocks decrease as households grow 
richer, growth is the key for rural Tanzanian households: diversifying income sources, reducing 
outdoor work, modernizing agriculture, closing the yield gap and using drought-resistant seeds would 
all make households less vulnerable to the negative impacts of weather shocks, and less dependent 
on climate. 
However, a note of caution is in order with regard to these considerations. External validity is an 
issue: weather variations are not climate variations: climate change is a long-run phenomenon in 
which other factors, as intensification of impacts, global non-linear effects and adaptation, could 
completely alter the nature and magnitude of the current elasticities (Dell, Jones and Olken 2014). 
This is true for the Schelling Conjecture as well, which may overturn or break down in the tail for 
high warming above 3°C (Tol, 2016). 
These caveats notwithstanding, we reckon that development and poverty reduction should be key and 
paramount elements of any climate policy, especially in vulnerable contexts like rural Tanzania, and 
that inequality of impacts will be, within countries other than between countries, the first and foremost 
challenge posed by climate change. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Notes:  
 
Food consumption growth rate is the annualised percentage change in household per adult equivalent food consumption 
between t and t-1. Total consumption growth rate is the annualised percentage change in household per adult equivalent 
consumption between t and t-1. Food consumption is the natural logarithm of household per adult-equivalent food 
consumption, expressed in Tanzanian shillings. Total consumption is the natural logarithm of household per adult-
equivalent total consumption, expressed in Tanzanian shillings. ∆Temp is the difference between average monthly 
growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season 
temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference 
between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) 
average monthly growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. 
Temp is average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews. Pre is average monthly growing 
season precipitation in the period between interviews. Long-run average temperature is the average monthly growing 
season temperature over the period 1980-2015, expressed in degree Celsius. Long-run average precipitation represents 
average monthly growing season precipitation over the period 1980-2015, expressed in mm. Adult education level 
represents the average years of education among adults, where adult means > 15 year old.  
     
     
 Mean Var sd            Obs 
 
 
Food consumption growth rate 
 
 
-1.696 
 
992.409 
 
31.503 
 
3168 
Total consumption growth rate 
 
-1.441 901.549 30.026 3170 
Food consumption 13.117 0.318 0.564 4754 
     
Total consumption 13.384 0.334 0.578 4755 
     
△Temp 0.083 0.105 0.324 3170 
 
△Pre 0.051 0.023 0.153 3170 
 
Temp 23.755 7.260 2.694 3170 
 
Pre 117.998 589.714 24.284 3170 
 
Long-run average temperature  
 
23.658 6.924 2.631 4755 
 
Long-run average precipitation 
 
114.747 576.907 24.019 4755 
 
Household size 5.659 10.029 3.167 4755 
 
Number of infants (< 5 years) 
 
0.918 1.147 1.071 4755 
 
Adult education level 
 
4.593 8.338 2.888 4750 
 
Age of the household head 
 
49.615 241.137 15.529 4755 
 
Gender of the household head 
 
0.239 0.182 0.426 4755 
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Table 2 
FE regressions – Food consumption 
 
Dependent variable:                                   
food consumption growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
     
L1.Food       -72.965***      -75.796***      -75.808***      -74.281*** 
 (1.219) (1.299) (1.304) 
 
(1.326) 
∆Temp -1.895 
(4.750)                                   
  9.925* 
(5.332)
    11.093** 
(5.449) 
     -338.600*** 
(44.868) 
 
Poor x ∆Temp 
  
     -21.588*** 
(4.537) 
 
     -21.460*** 
(4.541) 
 
 
Hot x ∆Temp 
   
-2.653      
   (3.718) 
  
 
∆Pre 
0.839 
(6.673) 
3.259 
(8.386) 
2.113 
(9.339) 
 
-4.941 
(6.622) 
Poor x ∆Pre  -8.758 -8.482  
  (9.620) (9.673) 
 
 
Hot x ∆Pre   2.127  
 
 
Hot  
  (10.264) 
 
  4.032 
(3.689 
      
L1.Food x ∆Temp          25.713*** 
    (3.438) 
Obs 3,164 3,164 3,164 3,164 
Adj. R2 0.831 0.835 0.835 0.841 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Total temperature effect for poorest 
households 
 
Total temperature effect for 
households in hot areas 
 
Total temperature effect for poorest 
households in hot areas 
 
Total precipitation effect for poorest 
households 
 
Total precipitation effect for 
households in hot areas 
  
   -11.663** 
(5.091) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         -5.499 
(7.742) 
 
  -10.366* 
(5.308) 
 
 8.441 
(5.748) 
 
    -13.019** 
(5.482) 
 
-6.329 
 (8.387) 
 
4.240 
 (10.401) 
 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation time series includes 
data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. Household controls include household 
size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared age of the household head, gender of the household head, number of infants, 
adult education level and dummies for self-reported idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Food consumption growth rate is the annualised 
percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. food consumption between t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged household per a.e. (ln) food consumption. 
∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) 
average monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the 
difference between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly 
growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for 
households with below median initial food consumption. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for households living in an area with an above mean long-
run average monthly growing season temperature. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the EA and wave levels.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3 
FE regressions – Total consumption 
 
Dependent variable:                                   total 
consumption growth rate 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
   
  
 
L1.Cons      -71.193***       -73.532***      -73.618***      -72.671*** 
 (1.299) (1.380) (1.387) (1.338) 
 
∆Temp -0.328   8.494*   9.199*      -319.134*** 
 (4.198) (4.478) (4.736) (39.811) 
 
Poor x ∆Temp      -17.813***      -17.565***  
  (3.748) (3.739)  
 
Hot x ∆Temp   -1.645     
   (3.268)  
 
∆Pre 0.695 1.777 0.217 -6.080 
 (5.848) (7.452) (8.279) (5.597) 
 
Poor x ∆Pre  -5.771 -4.890  
  (8.412) (8.495)  
 
Hot x ∆Pre   2.370  
   (8.380)  
 
Hot          13.687***         
   (2.855) 
 
L1.Cons x ∆Temp          23.868*** 
    (2.988) 
Obs 3,166 3,166 3,166 3,166 
Adj. R2 0.830 0.833  0.833 0.840 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Total temperature effect for poorest 
households 
 
Total temperature effect for households in hot 
areas 
 
Total temperature effect for poorest 
households in hot areas 
 
Total precipitation effect for poorest 
households 
 
Total precipitation effect for households in hot 
areas 
 
  
   -9.319** 
(4.694) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.994 
(6.747) 
 
  -8.366* 
(4.897) 
 
7.553 
(4.846) 
 
       -10.012** 
           (5.117) 
 
-4.673 
(7.235) 
 
2.587 
(8.879) 
 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation time series 
includes data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. Household controls include 
household size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared age of the household head, gender of the household head, number 
of infants, adult education level and dummies for self-reported idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Total consumption growth rate is the 
annualised percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. total consumption between t and t-1. L1.Cons is lagged household per a.e. (ln) food 
consumption. ∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run 
(1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree 
Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-
2015) average monthly growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. Poor is a 
dummy with value 1 for households with below median initial consumption. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for households living in an area 
with an above mean long-run average monthly growing season temperature. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the EA 
and wave levels.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4 
FE initial quartile regressions – Food consumption 
 
 
                                                      
Dependent variable: 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Food consumption growth rate   
 
   
L1.Food       -77.172***       -77.224*** 
 (1.344) (1.351) 
 
q1 x ∆Temp      -19.847***       -19.157*** 
 (5.164) (5.338) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp -5.693 -4.985 
 (5.332) (5.403) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp 4.604 5.234 
 (5.659) (5.944) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp       16.115***       16.784*** 
 (5.844) (5.909) 
 
Hot x ∆Temp  -1.386 
  (3.677) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre -6.451 -8.752 
 (10.031) (10.497) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre -4.833 -7.239 
 (8.634) (9.354) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre 5.244 2.913 
 (9.904) (10.943) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre -2.776 -5.841 
 (10.418) (11.452) 
 
Hot x ∆Pre  7.024 
  (10.337) 
 
Hot   3.525 
  (3.702) 
Obs 3,164 3,164 
Adj. R2 0.837 0.837 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. 
Vegetation time series includes data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness 
increase and decrease. Household controls include household size, squared household size, age of the household 
head, squared age of the household head, gender of the household head, number of infants, adult education level 
and dummies for self-reported idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Food consumption growth rate is the annualised 
percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. food consumption between t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged household 
per a.e. (ln) food consumption.  q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial food consumption quartiles. ∆Temp is the difference 
between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) 
average monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed 
in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period 
between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season precipitation, divided by long-
run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm.  Hot is a dummy with value 1 for households living in an 
area with above mean long-run average monthly growing season temperature. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are clustered at the EA and wave levels. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5 
FE initial quartile regressions – Total consumption  
 
 
  
                                                  
Dependent variable: 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Total consumption growth rate 
 
  
   
L1.Cons      -75.155***       -75.297*** 
 (1.378) (1.387) 
 
q1 x ∆Temp      -14.965***      -15.279*** 
 (5.068) (5.098) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp -3.732 -3.738 
 (5.504) (5.666) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp 1.483 1.034 
 (4.734) (5.323) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp       18.664***       18.436*** 
 (5.565) (5.624) 
 
Hot x ∆Temp  0.780 
  (3.451) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre -3.016 -5.158 
 (9.118) (9.555) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre -6.526 -7.999 
 (8.921) (9.254) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre 3.671 0.846 
 (8.803) (9.925) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre -5.478 -8.184 
 (10.307) (10.928) 
 
Hot x ∆Pre  6.415 
  (8.563) 
 
Hot          14.725*** 
  (2.894) 
Obs 3,166 3,166 
Adj. R2 0.837 0.837 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. 
Vegetation time series includes data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase 
and decrease. Household controls include household size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared 
age of the household head, gender of the household head, number of infants, adult education level and dummies capturing 
self-reported idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Total consumption growth rate is the annualised percentage change in 
(ln) household per a.e. consumption between t and t-1. L1.Cons is lagged household per a.e. (ln) consumption.  q1, q2, 
q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. ∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature 
in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided by 
long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average 
monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly 
growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm.  Hot is a dummy 
with value 1 for households living in an area with above mean long-run average monthly growing season temperature. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the EA and wave levels. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6 
Double threshold model – Hansen Estimator 
 
 
 
Threshold Confidence intervals and effect tests 
Column (1) – Food consumption 
 
1) Threshold estimator (level = 95):  
Model    Threshold    Lower   Upper  
Th-1        13.089       13.086  13.093 
Th-21      13.089       13.084  13.093 
Th-22      13.729       13.709  13.733 
  
2) Threshold effect test (bootstrap = 300 300):  
Dependent (1) (2) 
variable: ∆Food ∆Cons 
   
L1.Food      -74.698***  
 (1.256)  
L1.Cons       -72.326*** 
  (1.295) 
 
∆Pre -2.645 -5.367 
 (6.709) (5.809) 
 
∆Temp_Lower regime     -14.682***      -18.347*** 
 (4.878) (4.863) 
 
∆Temp_Medium regime 5.340 1.383 
 (4.846) (4.386) 
 
∆Temp_Upper regime         29.135***        28.953*** 
 (6.811) (6.638) 
Obs 3,168 3,170 
Adj. R2 0.775 0.770 
Vegetation time series 
Household controls 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation 
time series includes data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. 
Household controls include household size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared age of the household 
head, gender of the household head, number of infants, adult education level and dummies capturing self-reported idiosyncratic 
and covariate shocks. ∆Food is the annualised percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. food consumption between t and t-
1. ∆Cons is the annualised percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. consumption between t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged 
household per a.e. (ln) food consumption. L1.Cons is lagged household per a.e. (ln) consumption. ∆Temp is the difference 
between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average 
monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. 
∆Pre is the difference between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run 
(1980-2015) average monthly growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in 
mm. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the EA and wave levels.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Threshold        RSS          MSE        Fstat  Prob  Crit10       Crit5 Crit1  
Single           5.12e+05   161.770     141.92 0.000  17.715     22.171       27.298 
Double         5.04e+05   159.234       50.43 0.000  20.140     22.664       26.723 
 
3) Percentage of observations in each regime: 
 
Lower regime: 47.16 % 
Medium regime: 39.90 % 
Upper regime: 12.94 % 
 
 
Column (2) – Total consumption 
 
1) Threshold estimator  (level = 95):  
Model     Threshold   Lower        Upper 
Th-1         13.297       13.285     13.300 
Th-21       12.983       12.979     12.991 
Th-22       14.014       14.005     14.024 
  
2) Threshold effect test (bootstrap = 300 300): 
     
Threshold        RSS            MSE        Fstat Prob  Crit10    Crit5       Crit1 
Single            4.72e+05    148.891    113.50 0.000 16.957   19.678    26.294 
Double          4.61e+05    145.622     73.09  0.000 18.415   22.431    29.031 
 
3) Percentage of observations in each regime: 
 
Lower regime: 23.56 % 
Medium regime: 63.47 % 
Upper regime: 12.97 % 
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Table 7 
FE regressions with spatially-robust SEs 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
Dependent variable: ∆Food 
 
∆Cons 
 
   
L1.Food -77.224  
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
      (0.911)*** 
      (0.914)*** 
      (0.943)*** 
 
L1.Cons                              -75.297 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
 
 
 
 (1.007)*** 
 (1.037)*** 
 (1.087)*** 
 
q1 x ∆Temp 
 
-19.157 
 
                            -15.279 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
       (3.679)*** 
       (3.744)*** 
       (3.823)*** 
   (3.246)*** 
   (3.255)*** 
   (3.252)*** 
 
q2 x ∆Temp -4.985 -3.738 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
   (3.473) 
   (3.392) 
   (3.370) 
(3.572) 
(3.485) 
(3.322) 
 
 
q3 x ∆Temp 5.324 1.034 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
 (3.704) 
 (3.658) 
 (3.632) 
(3.466) 
(3.427) 
(3.390) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp 16.784                                18.436 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
      (3.572)*** 
      (3.492)*** 
      (3.409)*** 
     (3.539)*** 
     (3.501)*** 
     (3.454)*** 
  
Hot x ∆Temp -1.386 0.780 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
(2.280) 
(2.293) 
(2.306) 
(2.118) 
(2.124) 
(2.080) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre -8.752 -5.158 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
(7.473) 
(7.185) 
(7.167) 
(6.665) 
(6.487) 
(6.459) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre -7.239 -7.999 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
(6.245) 
(6.116) 
(6.288) 
(5.942) 
(5.752) 
(5.596) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre 2.913 0.846 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off (6.898) (6.512) 
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  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
(6.956) 
(7.128) 
(6.436) 
(6.434) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre -5.841 -8.184 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
(7.080) 
(7.085) 
(7.023) 
(7.142) 
(6.999) 
(6.908) 
 
Hot x ∆Pre 7.024 6.415 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
 (6.520) 
(6.527) 
(6.686) 
(5.557) 
(5.616) 
(5.758) 
 
Hot  3.525 14.725 
  Conley(1999), 50 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 75 km cut-off 
  Conley(1999), 100 km cut-off 
 
 (6.588) 
(6.586) 
(6.513) 
    (5.201)*** 
    (5.207)*** 
    (5.244)*** 
Obs 3,164 3.166 
Adj. R2 0.768 0.765 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation time series 
includes data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. Household controls 
include household size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared age of the household head, gender of the household 
head, number of infants, adult education level and dummies for self-reported idiosyncratic and covariate shocks: ∆Food is the annualised 
percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. food consumption between t and t-1. ∆Cons is the annualised percentage change in (ln) 
household per a.e. consumption between t and t-1.. L1.Food is lagged household per a.e. (ln) food consumption. L1.Cons is lagged 
household per a.e. (ln) consumption. q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial food consumption quartiles in Column (1) and initial consumption quartiles 
in Column(2). ∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-
run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in 
degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long 
run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. 
Hot is a dummy with value 1 for households living in an area with above mean long-run average monthly growing season temperature. 
Conley (1999) standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to both spatial and temporal autocorrelation.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8 
 
FE initial quartile regressions - Alternative weather data 
 
 
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables: ∆Food ∆Food ∆Cons ∆Cons 
     
L1.Food      -76.191***       -76.234***   
 (1.343) (1.347) 
 
  
L1.Cons         -74.291***      -74.270*** 
   (1.392) (1.396) 
 
q1 x ∆Temp       -14.205***       -14.636***    -10.985**     -11.147** 
 (4.602) (4.736) (4.622) (4.786) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp -5.339 -5.963 -3.778 -3.964 
 (5.507) (5.559) (5.031) (5.073) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp -0.051 -0.649 -1.797 -2.111 
 (5.768) (5.838) (4.809) (4.931) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp     15.130** 
(5.897) 
      14.725** 
(5.906) 
      19.063*** 
(5.058) 
       18.940*** 
(5.155) 
 
Hot x ∆Temp  2.090  2.623 
  (2.453)  (2.342) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre -0.009 -0.002      -3.819*** -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.012) (1.295) (0.011) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre -0.001 0.007 1.124 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.763) (0.011) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre     0.019**     0.027** 0.407 0.017 
 (0.009) (0.011) (1.169) (0.011) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre     0.025**       0.036***       5.007***     0.030** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (1.250) (0.014) 
 
Hot x ∆Pre  -0.021*  -0.018 
  (0.012)  (0.011) 
 
Hot   2.193         10.960*** 
  (3.445)  (3.198) 
Obs 3,164 3,164 3,166 3,166 
Adj. R2 0.835 0.836 0.835 0.836 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation time series includes 
data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. Household controls include household 
size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared age of the household head, gender of the household head, number of infants, 
adult education level and dummies capturing self-reported idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. ∆Food is the annualised percentage change in 
(ln) household per a.e. food consumption between t and t-1. ∆Cons is the annualised percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. consumption 
between t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged household per a.e. (ln) food consumption. L1.Cons is lagged household per a.e. (ln) consumption. q1, q2, 
q3, q4 are initial food consumption quartiles in Column (1) and initial consumption quartiles in Column (2). ∆Temp is the difference between 
average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run (1983-2015) average monthly growing season 
temperature, divided by long-run (1983-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between total 
precipitation during the previous wettest quarter and long-run average (2001 – 2013 ) total precipitation during the wettest quarter, expressed 
in mm. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for households living in an area with above mean long-run average monthly growing season temperature. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the EA and wave levels.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 119 
 
 
Table 9 
Hausman – Taylor regressions 
 
Dependent variables: (1) (2) 
 ∆Food ∆Cons 
 
  
L1.Food      -75.877***  
 (1.302) 
 
 
L1.Cons       -74.520*** 
  (1.277) 
 
q1 x ∆Temp       -21.797***      -18.784*** 
 (3.888) (3.625) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp      -9.955***    -9.270** 
 (3.818) (4.064) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp -1.894 -4.931 
 (4.615) (3.942) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp 6.179     10.206** 
 (4.372) (4.248) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre -10.441 -7.986 
 (7.424) (7.642) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre -3.261 -7.862 
 (8.020) (7.216) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre 2.289 -0.584 
 (8.345) (7.064) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre -0.020 -1.665 
 (8.364) (8.918) 
 
Long-run average temperature   1.049*     1.246** 
 (0.557) (0.588) 
 
Long-run average precipitation     0.132**   0.129* 
 (0.067) (0.069) 
Obs 3,164 3,166 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications include wave, region, year and quarter of year dummies. All household controls 
are treated as time-varying endogenous variables with the exception of self-reported covariate shocks. 
Distance (in KMs) to nearest major road is included and treated as time-invariant exogenous. ∆Food is 
the between-wave percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. food consumption. ∆Food is the 
annualised percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. food consumption between t and t-1. L1.Food is 
lagged household per a.e. (ln) food consumption and is treated as endogenous. ∆Cons is the annualised 
percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. consumption between t and t-1. L1.Cons is lagged household 
per a.e. (ln) consumption and is treated as endogenous. q1, q2, q3, q4 are food consumption quartiles in 
Column (1) and total consumption quartiles in Column (2); they are all treated as time-invariant, 
endogenous variables. standard deviation, expressed in mm. ∆Temp is the difference between average 
monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average 
monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed 
in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average monthly growing season precipitation in the 
period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season precipitation, 
divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. All the weather variables are 
treated as exogenous. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the household level.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 10 
Two-step Difference GMM 
 
Dependent variables: (1) (2) 
 ∆Food ∆Cons 
   
L1.Food     -70.120***  
 (7.108) 
 
 
L1.Cons     -74.439*** 
  (5.701) 
 
q1 x ∆Temp     -19.993***      -20.437*** 
 (6.929) (6.065) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp -9.166 -7.303 
 (5.769) (5.928) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp -7.351 -1.323 
 (6.051) (6.254) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp 4.081 10.417 
 (8.389) (7.461) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre 0.806 -2.193 
 (9.327) (9.242) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre -3.949 -0.300 
 (10.617) (10.181) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre 8.584 12.033 
 (12.051) (10.431) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre 2.755 -3.414 
 (12.770) (12.652) 
Obs 1,581 1.533 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
Hansen – J test (p) 0.584 0.510 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, year FE and quarter of year dummies. Region x 
time FE are used as additional instruments. All household controls are treated as endogenous. ∆Food is the 
annualised percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. food consumption between t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged 
household per a.e. (ln) food consumption and is treated as endogenous. ∆Cons is the annualised percentage change 
in (ln) household per a.e. consumption between t and t-1. L1.Cons is lagged household per a.e. (ln) consumption 
and is treated as endogenous. q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial food consumption quartiles in Column (1) and initial total 
consumption quartiles in Column (2). ∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature 
in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided 
by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average 
monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly 
growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. Weather 
variables and the vegetation time series variables are treated as exogenous. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
and are corrected using Windmeijer’s procedure.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 11 
Health expenditure channel 
 
Dependent variable:    
Share of health expenditure growth rate (1) (2) (3) 
L1.Share of health expenditure      -73.730***      -73.599***       -73.531*** 
 (1.235) (1.232) (1.274) 
 
∆Temp 0.869   
 (20.100) 
 
  
∆Pre -0.248   
 (27.421) 
 
  
q1 x ∆Temp  -4.911 -8.074 
  (20.097) (21.462) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp  0.789 -1.778 
  (22.606) (23.226) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp  15.652 11.926 
  (23.579) (25.551) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp  -6.589 -9.452 
  (22.664) (23.241) 
 
Hot x ∆Temp     7.174 
   (14.605) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre  8.047 6.092 
  (36.340) (38.827) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre  -15.644 -16.615 
  (33.183) (34.962) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre  7.444 3.828 
  (36.515) (40.909) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre  9.122 7.140 
  (39.249) (41.776) 
 
Hot x ∆Pre   7.824 
   (43.651) 
 
Hot         23.312** 
   (2.153) 
Obs. 2,952 2,952 2,952 
Adj. R2 0.820 0.820 0.821 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation 
time series includes data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. 
Household controls include household size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared age of the household 
head, gender of the household head, number of infants, adult education level and dummies capturing self-reported idiosyncratic 
and covariate shocks. q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. Dependent variable is (ln) per a.e. between-wave 
percentage of the health expenditure / total expenditure ratio. L1.Share of health expenditure is lagged ln per a.e. health 
expenditure / total expenditure ratio. ∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the 
period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-
2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average monthly growing season 
precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season precipitation, divided 
by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for households living in an area 
with above mean long-run average monthly growing season temperature. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered 
at the EA and wave levels.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Dependent variable: (1) (2) 
 ∆ALP ∆ALP 
   
L1.ALP      -70.206***      -70.657*** 
 (4.677) (4.785) 
 
∆Temp    -23.658**  
 (11.942) 
 
 
∆Pre -14.961  
 (14.656)  
 
q1 x ∆Temp   -32.790** 
  (12.933) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp  -20.770 
  (13.975) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp  -18.107 
  (18.216) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp  -17.618 
  (14.574) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre  -30.274 
  (27.740) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre  1.864 
  (20.903) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre  -18.424 
  (27.794) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre  -14.348 
  (26.282) 
Obs 1,130 1,130 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
Hansen – J test (p) 0.235 0.247 
Notes:  All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, year FE and quarter of year dummies. Region 
x time FE and month of interview dummies are used as additional instruments. All household controls are 
treated as endogenous with the exception of self-reported covariate shocks. ∆ALP is agricultural labour 
productivity growth between t and t-1. L1.ALP is lagged (ln) agricultural labour productivity, instrumented 
using lagged assets and education levels at t-1.   q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial total consumption quartiles. ∆Temp 
is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and 
long-run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard 
deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average monthly growing season 
precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season 
precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. Weather variables and the 
vegetation time series variables are treated as exogenous. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are 
corrected using Windmeijer’s procedure.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 12 
Labour productivity channel – Two-step Difference GMM 
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Table 13 
Agricultural yield channel - Crop yields 
Dependent variable:  
Crop yield 
(1) (2) (3) 
Number of GDDs (8-34 °C) 0.000 0.000  
 (0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
 
Number of GDDs (34 + °C)    -0.020**    -0.022**  
 (0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
 
 Precipitation -0.000 -0.000  
 (0.002) 
 
(0.002)  
(Precipitation)2 0.000 0.000  
 (0.000) 
 
(0.000)  
Maize & paddy non-specializers x 
Number of GDDs (8-34 °C) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
 
  
  
Maize & paddy non-specializers x 
Number of GDDs (34 + °C) 
 0.026 
(0.021) 
 
 
Maize & paddy non-specializers  0.460 
 
  (1.099) 
 
q1 x Number of GDDs (34 + °C)       -0.052*** 
   (0.016) 
 
q2 x Number of GDDs (34 + °C)   -0.020 
   (0.015) 
 
q3 x Number of GDDs (34 + °C)   -0.017 
   (0.011) 
 
q4 x Number of GDDs (34 + °C)   0.011 
   (0.021) 
 
q1 x Precipitation   0.001 
   (0.003) 
 
q2 x Precipitation   -0.000 
   (0.004) 
 
q3 x Precipitation   -0.000 
   (0.002) 
 
q4 x Precipitation   -0.002 
   (0.004) 
 
q1 x (Precipitation)2   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
 
q2 x (Precipitation)2   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
 
q3 x (Precipitation)2   0.000 
   (0.000) 
 
q4 x (Precipitation)2   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Obs 3,537 3,537 3,537 
Adj. R2 0.595 0.599 0.599 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes Yes 
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Total effect of Number of GDDs (8-34 °C) 
for households not specialized in maize and paddy production 
 
Total effect of Number of GDDs (34 + °C) 
for households not specialized in maize and paddy production 
 
     -0.000 
(0.001) 
 
0.005 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation time series includes 
data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. Crop yield is average crop yield (kg / 
ha) during the previous two rainy seasons. ‘Maize & paddy non-specializers’ is a dummy with value 1 for households in which maize and paddy 
account for less than 50% of total crop production in a given wave.  q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial total consumption quartiles.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are clustered at the EA and wave levels. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 125 
 
 Table 14 
FE regressions – Asset growth as the dependent variable 
 
Notes: All specifications include households FE, wave dummies, region x year FE and quarter of year dummies. Vegetation time 
series includes data on changes in crop greenness within growing season and onset of greenness increase and decrease. Household 
controls include household size, squared household size, age of the household head, squared age of the household head, gender of 
the household head, number of infants, adult education level and dummies capturing self-reported idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. 
Asset growth is the annualised percentage change in (ln) household per a.e. household Tropical Livestock Units (TLUs) between t 
and t-1. L1.Assets is lagged household per a.e. (ln) asset level (TLUs). q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. ∆Temp is the 
difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average 
monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is 
the difference between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) 
average monthly growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the EA and wave levels.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  
Dependent variable: (1) (2) 
Asset growth   
   
L1.Assets      -74.762***      -75.053*** 
 (1.834) (1.832) 
 
∆Temp -5.823  
 (22.094) 
 
 
∆Pre -27.314  
 (32.146)  
q1 x ∆Temp   -2.823 
  (24.355) 
 
q2 x ∆Temp  -3.731 
  (25.099) 
 
q3 x ∆Temp  -16.042 
  (29.640) 
 
q4 x ∆Temp  -4.402 
  (28.642) 
 
q1 x ∆Pre  66.468 
  (44.547) 
 
q2 x ∆Pre  -75.504* 
  (42.217) 
 
q3 x ∆Pre  -80.426* 
  (48.702) 
 
q4 x ∆Pre  -29.418 
  (59.022) 
Obs 2,223 2,223 
Adj. R2 0.800 0.804 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
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Figure 1 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp on food consumption growth  
at different lagged food consumption levels 
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Figure 2 
Marginal effect of ΔTemp on total consumption growth 
at different lagged total consumption levels 
 
 
 
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
n
 L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
tio
n
13
.0
1
13
.3
7
13
.7
5
L1.Cons (lagged consumption level (ln))
Average Marginal Effects of ΔTemp with 95% CIs
 128 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A.1  
Instrumented FE regressions – Endogeneity tests 
 
 
 
 
Endogeneity tests: 
Regressor Test p-value 
L1.Food 0.074 0.786 
L1.Cons 0.423 0.515 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
 
Dependent variable: 
 
(1) 
∆Food 
 
(2) 
∆Cons 
   
   
L1.Food  -98.481*  
 (51.761)  
 
L1.Cons        -91.758*** 
  (29.374) 
 
∆Temp  2.846  2.607 
 (7.394) (4.352) 
 
∆Pre         2.440 -0.306 
 (6.178) (7.209) 
Observations 3092 3094 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304 0.342 
Vegetation time series Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes 
Notes: L1.Food is lagged household per a.e. (ln) food consumption, instrumented using lagged assets and education 
levels at t-1.  L1.Cons is lagged household per a.e. (ln) total consumption, instrumented using lagged assets and 
education levels at t-1.  ∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period 
between interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided by long-run 
(1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between average monthly 
growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long run (1980-2015) average monthly growing 
season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, expressed in mm Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are clustered at the household and wave levels .   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
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Table A.2 
Descriptive statistics – Alternative weather data 
 
     
 Mean Var sd Obs 
 
 
∆Temp 
 
 0.405 
 
 0.131 
 
0.363 
 
3170 
 
∆Pre -21.565 8585.501 92.658 4755 
 
Long-run average 
temperature 
 
23.948 4.362 2.089 4755 
 
Long-run average 
precipitation 
502.203 19198.690 138.559 4755 
 
Notes:     
∆Temp is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between interviews and long-run 
(1983-2015) average monthly growing season temperature divided by long-run (1983-2013) standard deviation, and expressed in 
degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference between total precipitation during the previous wettest quarter and long-run average (2001 - 
2013) total precipitation during the wettest quarter divided by average decadal (2001 - 2013) standard deviation, expressed in mm. 
Long-run average temperature is the average monthly growing season temperature over the period 1983-2015, expressed in degree 
Celsius. Long-run average precipitation represents long-run average (2001 - 2013) total precipitation during the wettest quarter. 
Data source is the CRUCY Version 3.23 by the University of East Anglia for temperature data, and the Tanzania LSMS-ISA NPS 
surveys for rainfall data. 
 
  
 130 
 
Table A.3 
Labour productivity channel – Endogeneity test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endogeneity test: 
Regressor Test p-value 
L1.ALP 7.611 0.0058 
  
                                                                        
 
Dependent variable: 
 
(1) 
∆ALP 
  
  
L1.ALP -227.889 
 (220.885) 
 
∆Temp 
 
-58.596 
 (92.139) 
 
∆Pre -15.059 
(71.783) 
  
Observations 2260 
Vegetation time series Yes 
Household controls Yes 
Notes: ∆ALP is agricultural labour productivity growth between t and t-1. L1.ALP is lagged (ln) 
agricultural labour productivity, instrumented using lagged assets and education levels at t-1.  ∆Temp 
is the difference between average monthly growing season temperature in the period between 
interviews and long-run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season temperature, divided by 
long-run (1980-2015) standard deviation, and expressed in degree Celsius. ∆Pre is the difference 
between average monthly growing season precipitation in the period between interviews and long 
run (1980-2015) average monthly growing season precipitation, divided by long-run (1980-2015) 
standard deviation, expressed in mm Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the 
household and wave levels .   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table A.4 
Descriptive statistics –Agricultural Wealth Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
                              Agricultural Wealth Index is from the FAO Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA) Team. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                              
Variable: Agricultural Wealth Index 
 
     
  Mean Var sd Obs 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
 0.066 
 0.097 
 0.018 
 0.228 
1.151 
1.054 
0.841 
1.878 
 
1.073 
1.027 
0.917 
1.370 
905 
981 
931 
836 
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Table A.5 
Descriptive statistics – Main source of income  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles.  
 
Variable: Main source of income is not farming 
(in at least two periods) - % of households 
 
     
 Yes 
 
24.61 
19.40 
20 
25.25 
33.75 
No 
 
75.39 
80.60 
80 
74.75 
66.25 
 
Whole sample 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.6 
Descriptive statistics – Growing degree days 
 
  
     
 Mean Var sd Obs 
 
 
Number of GDDs (8-34 °C) 
 
3905.047 
 
389495.400 
 
624.096 
 
4755 
 
Number of GDDs (34 + °C) 3.280 46.273 6.802 4755 
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Table A.7 
Descriptive statistics – Maize and paddy as a share of total crop production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              
                             Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
  
                                                                                                                     
Maize and paddy account for 50% or more of total crop 
production - % of households 
 
     
 Yes 
 
50.59 
58.44 
51.60 
47.81 
No 
 
49.41                                        
41.46 
48.40 
52.19 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.8 
Descriptive statistics – Average crop yield and quantity produced 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
                                                                         
                                      
Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
  
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 Mean quantity    
(kg) 
Mean crop yield 
(kg / ha) 
 
Obs 
 
q1 
q2 
q3
q4 
1268.625 
1452.362 
1479.123 
1762.087 
 
715.602 
1033.638 
1225.526 
1201.825 
876 
965 
903 
793 
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Table A.9 
Descriptive statistics – Irrigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
Use of irrigation in the previous long rainy season  
- % of households 
 
     
 Yes 
 
1.95 
3.30 
3.84 
6.05 
No 
 
98.05                               
96.70 
96.16 
93.95 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.10 
Descriptive statistics – Inorganic fertilizers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
                      
 
 
                             Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
Use of inorganic fertilizers in the previous long rainy season  
- % of households 
 
     
 Yes 
 
17.65 
19.10 
25.25 
23.46 
No 
 
82.35 
80.81 
74.75 
76.54 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.11 
Descriptive statistics – Use of improved maize seeds on at least one plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
                              Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                           
Variable: Use of improved maize seeds on at least one plot across 
waves - % of households 
 
     
  Yes 
 
34.16 
41.24                               
46.48 
53.46 
  No 
 
65.84 
58.76 
53.52 
46.54 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.12 
Descriptive statistics – Use of improved maize seeds on at least half plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
                             Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            
Variable: Use of improved maize seeds on at least half of the 
household plots across all waves - % of households 
 
     
 Yes 
 
8.77 
10.65                                
18.79 
22.08 
No 
 
91.23 
89.35 
81.21 
77.92 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.13 
Descriptive statistics – Use of improved paddy seeds on at least one plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
                              Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
Variable: Use of improved maize seeds on at least one plot across 
waves - % of households 
 
     
 Yes 
 
19.35 
24.76                                 
27.03 
27.15 
No 
 
80.65 
75.24 
72.97 
72.85 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.14 
Descriptive statistics – Use of improved paddy seeds on at least half plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     
                             Notes: q1, q2, q3, q4 are initial consumption quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
Variable: Use of improved paddy seeds on at least half of the 
household plots across all waves - % of households 
 
     
 Yes 
 
4.27 
6.27                                      
6.61 
16.49 
No 
 
95.73 
93.73 
93.39 
83.51 
 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
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Table A.15 
Descriptive statistics –Tropical Livestock Units per adult-equivalent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
Variable: TLU level p.a. 
 
     
 Mean Var sd Obs 
 
Whole sample 
q1 
q2 
q3 
q4 
0.436 
0.257 
0.424 
0.410 
0.680 
1.328 
0.337 
1.031 
1.152 
2.890 
1.152 
0.580 
1.016 
1.073 
1.700 
3653 
926 
963 
937 
827 
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Essay 3 
 
Household growth, weather shocks and resilience thresholds  
in rural Tanzania: a long-run assessment  
 
Abstract 
 
The study of the dynamics of household resilience, i.e. the ability to withstand shocks, is becoming 
more and more important in development economics. We contribute to this literature by exploring 
the relationship between household growth, weather shocks and resilience dynamics in rural 
Tanzania. By building a synthetic panel we are able to study a longitudinal dataset covering the time 
span 2000 – 2013 and make up for the lack of long micro panels which hamper the analysis of growth 
in developing countries. Our measure of resilience is an ad hoc FAO index which we show to be a 
factor of significant heterogeneity in the impacts of temperature shocks on growth. Our main 
contribution is the estimation of “resilience thresholds” above which households are immune to the 
negative effects of temperature shocks. The existence of resilience thresholds is a significant finding 
for policy-making and especially relevant for the crucial issue of adaptation to climate change in 
developing countries. 
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Introduction 
 
Development resilience is closely related to the idea of stochastic poverty traps, since it concerns the 
likelihood that adverse outcomes do not persist for an extended period in a dynamic setting (Barrett 
& Constas, 2014). Furthermore, it looks at poverty dynamics by explicitly considering both the impact 
of possible stressors and shocks and household capacity to cope with them.  
Consistently with the original nature of resilience as the ability to respond to ecological stress, our 
aim is to empirically test household resilience to food insecurity in the presence of observable weather 
shocks. To this end, inspired mainly by Dercon (2004) and the standard growth literature, we look at 
the relationship between household food consumption growth, the correlated likelihood of falling into 
poverty traps 1 due to a source of growth divergence represented by weather shocks and the protective 
role of resilience capacity.  
 
While household welfare will always be higher in a shock-free environment, the effect on household 
consumption is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, according to the precautionary saving 
literature (Caballero, 1990; Carroll & Kimball, 2001; Carroll & Samwick, 1998; Deaton, 1992) lower 
consumption levels are, on average and ceteris paribus, compatible with a higher consumption growth 
(Paxson, 1992). On the other hand, the literature on poverty traps (Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter, 
Little, Mogues, & Negatu, 2007; Carter & Lybbert, 2012; Zimmerman & Carter, 2003) highlights the 
opportunity of alternative coping strategies, such as voluntarily destabilizing consumption to asset-
smooth and consequently avoid the risk of falling into poverty traps.  
Looking at (food) consumption growth can provide useful insights on household welfare dynamics 
and ‘resilience’ traps, since we can both identify potential deviations from positive consumption 
growth paths of convergence in presence of shocks (weather shocks in our case) as well as recovery 
dynamics, growth divergence and multiple regimes of shocks due to resilience heterogeneity. 
 
Unfortunately, robust empirical evidence on such issues has been hampered so far by the lack of long 
micro panels, measurement error and attrition (Antman & McKenzie, 2007). Short panels, in fact, are 
unable to disentangle between short-term transition movements and the long-term analysis of shocks 
and recovery paths, including identification of thresholds and multiple equilibria (Carter & Barrett, 
2006). Because of the chronic scarcity of long panels of households in developing countries, but also 
due to the inherent inconsistency of the concept of “households” in a long-term perspective 
(household splits are characterized by short-term frequencies), the use of pseudo-panels can be 
                                                 
1 This means we explicitly focus on one out of the four dimensions of food security agreed by the international community: 
access. Hence, this empirical analysis is not able to provide insights on the availability, stability and utilization dimensions.   
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considered as a workable solution. Synthetic panels can create longer time span compared to genuine 
panels, minimize attrition and smooth individuals’ response errors (Deaton, 1985). 
By matching the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) – Integrated Survey on Agriculture 
(ISA) Tanzania National Panel Survey by the World Bank, which provides a three-wave                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
household longitudinal dataset covering the period 2008 – 20132 , and the National Household 
Surveys 2000 and 2007 by the Tanzanian Department of Statistics, we build up integrated pseudo-
panels for Tanzania covering the period 2000 - 2013.  
 
We then propose the following identification strategy: i) in a standard empirical stochastic micro-
growth model augmented with weather shocks and controlling for households and geographical 
heterogeneity, we test for the relevance of a set of household characteristics relevant to resilience to 
food insecurity, gathered into a measure of resilience developed by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the Resilience Capacity Index (from here on RCI), in determining a stable and 
positive food consumption growth;  ii) we look for potential  heterogeneity of impacts from 
temperature and precipitation shocks on household food consumption growth with respect to pre-
shock RCI  iii) we test for the presence of critical “resilience thresholds”, in order to check for 
bifurcation of impacts from weather shocks due to different resilience capacity regimes. 
 
The choice of Tanzania is not only driven by data availability.  
Tanzania is a poor Sub-Saharan African country, which exhibits high average temperatures and a 
large climatic diversity. It is constantly classified as a country under high risk from the impacts of 
climate change: temperatures in the country are predicted to rise 2–4 °C by 2100 (Rowhani, Lobell, 
Linderman & Ramankutty, 2011). Moreover, it is still a predominantly rural country where 
agriculture accounts for about half of gross production, employs about 80 percent of the labour force 
and is primarily rainfed  (Ahmed et al., 2011).  
Finally, several empirical works have documented a causal relationship between welfare dynamics 
and weather shocks in the country and particularly in rural areas (Ahmed et al., 2011; Arndt et al., 
2012; Bengtsson, 2010; Dercon, 2004; Hirvonen, 2016; Rowhani et al., 2011). 
  
The essay is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the literature on resilience to food security; 
Section 2 provides information on data, methodology for the estimation of the RCI, pseudo-panel 
creation and descriptive statistics; Section 3 illustrates the identification strategy and the empirical 
model; Section 4 reports the outcomes of the empirical analysis; Section 5 presents robustness checks; 
                                                 
2 The new NPS 2014-2015 wave, recently released (in August 2017) by the Word Bank, was not yet available when this 
work was undertaken. 
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Section 6 discusses and concludes. 
 
Section 1 
Resilience: review of the literature 
 
1.A. Resilience definition and measurement 
 
Measuring resilience - i.e., people’s ability to withstand shocks - has become an urgent task as climate 
change trends, ecosystem fragility and geo-political instability have led to increasingly unpredictable 
risks. The well-being of the world’s poor is now subject to a more challenging series of shocks and 
stressors (Constas, Frankenberger, & Hoddinott, 2014). The response to assist households in dealing 
with these shocks depends, in turn, on accurate identification and measurement of their resilience 
determinants. Definitions and measurement efforts aiming at assessing resilience in development, and 
specifically with reference to food insecurity, appeared much earlier than a solid theoretical 
framework has been advanced. 
Following the seminal paper from Pingali, Alinovi and Sutton (2005),  Alinovi et al. (2010) and 
Alinovi, Mane and Romano (2010) were among the first authors who tried to define and measure 
household resilience to food insecurity. In their framework, the household is the entry level of analysis 
because it is the decision-making unit where the most important decisions are made on how to manage 
risks, both ex ante and ex post, including those affecting food security. To measure resilience, these 
studies construct a resilience index as a latent variable (unobservable) through a two-stage factor 
analysis based on observables. 
Vaitla et al. (2012) define resilience as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community or an 
institution to withstand a shock or setback of some type and recover, or as a “bounce back, after a 
setback”. The authors present a livelihood change approach to measuring resilience focusing on how 
assets held by a household or other social unit are used in various livelihood strategies to achieve 
certain outcomes. 
Smith & Frankenberger (2017) define a household as resilient if “able to maintain its well-being even 
in the face of shocks and stressors” and identify the determinants of household resilience through 
three types of capacities - absorptive, adaptive and transformative. In such a framework, they 
investigate the relationship between food security, household resilience and the impact of the 2014 
flooding in Northern Bangladesh. By including in their fixed-effect regressions a continuous 
interaction between resilience capacity and shock exposure, they detect evidence that resilience 
mediates the relationship between food security and shocks and mitigated the negative impact of the 
flooding. 
FAO (2016) proposes RIMA, the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis, where resilience is 
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measured as a latent variable through structural equation models that include a host of relevant 
variables which act as proxies for the natural environment, social inclusion and well-being 
perception3.  
Alfani et al. (2015), after defining resilience as “the ability of countries, communities and households 
to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses - 
such as earthquakes, droughts or violent conflicts - without compromising their long-term prospects”, 
propose an empirical alternative to all previous approaches that depend on longitudinal data to 
estimate household resilience, which makes use of readily available cross-sectional data, but is 
weakened by the well-known issues of omitted variable bias and confounding risk. 
Cissé and Barrett (2015) instead, adopt a definition of resilience that was originally proposed by 
Barrett and Constas (2014): “Development resilience is the capacity over time of a person, household 
or other aggregate unit to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad 
shocks.” Consequently, they develop an innovative moment-based approach to measure resilience by 
taking into account stochastic and possibly nonlinear well-being dynamics. An additional important 
contribution of their work is the derivation of a decomposable resilience measure based on the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty measures, which makes possible the comparison of resilience 
capacities of various sub-populations of interest. 
In 2013, the Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (RMTWG), comprised of experts in 
resilience measurement, was established under the auspices of the Food Security Information 
Network4, in order “to secure consensus on a common analytical framework and guidelines for food 
and nutrition security resilience measurement, and to promote adoption of agreed principles and best 
practices”.  
Thanks to the work of the RMTWG, a sound consensus has been recently established around some 
key elements of resilience measurement. First, resilience is defined as the ability to respond to shocks 
as well as stressors, which can be analysed at different levels of aggregation (individuals, households, 
communities, organizations, systems or even entire states), and applied to both short-term and long-
term consequences of shocks and stressors. Second, resilience has to be indexed against an outcome, 
e.g. food security. Third, since resilience is a genuinely dynamic concept, resilience measurement 
necessarily requires a dynamic analytical framework, in order to capture all possible pathways to 
achieve resilience, by accounting for agents’ heterogeneity in gaining their own livelihoods in a risky 
environment.  
                                                 
3 See Section 2.2. 
4  The Food Security Information Network (FSIN) is a global initiative co-sponsored by FAO, WFP and IFPRI to 
strengthen food and nutrition security information systems for producing reliable and accurate data to guide analysis and 
decision-making. See more at http://www.fsincop.net/home/en/ . 
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In short, resilience measurement should be based on a theoretical framework focusing on the 
stochastic dynamics of individual and collective human well-being, especially on the avoidance of 
and escape from irreversible negative states over time (e.g. chronic poverty or food insecurity), and 
allowing for nonlinearities and multiple equilibria that can generate bifurcated welfare dynamics 
shocks, as recently proposed by Barrett and Constas (2014). 
Consistently, it is now largely accepted that an indicator which aims to capture resilience capacity 
should be: a) aggregative of the multiple dimensions of resilience; b) able to vary within a clear and 
determined range; c) field tested; d) able to detect changes over time; e) subject to tests of validity 
and reliability5.  
 
1.B. Resilience Thresholds 
 
The concept of resilience thresholds was first introduced in the early 1970s in seminal papers on 
ecology (Holling, 1973; May, 1977). Following Groffman et al. (2006), a threshold can be defined as 
the point at which there is an abrupt change in a quality, property or phenomenon or where small 
changes in a driver may produce large responses in a system.  
Thresholds are fundamental in order to evaluate alternate states, i.e. the phenomenon whereby a 
system can change from one status to another (Walker & Meyers, 2004). An alternate state may also 
be considered as “stable”, although this does not mean that it can be classified as good or bad. It is 
simply a steady state which, at a certain point, can be shifted as the result of a shock.  
A regime shift involving alternate stable states occurs when a threshold level is passed, resulting in a 
change of direction (the trajectory) of the system itself. In some cases, crossing the threshold brings 
about a sudden, large, and dramatic change in some (or many) of the indicators (or variables) that 
identify the system.  
While the concept of threshold is linked to the inner nature of resilience (Holling, 1973), there are no 
internationally accepted normative standards on how to define and identify thresholds.  
Nevertheless, resilience is particularly important when a system approaches a threshold that is critical 
for regime shifts (Barrett & Constas, 2014; Holling, 1973). 
The incorporation of the concept of thresholds and non-linear dynamics in development resilience 
analysis stems from the work of  Barrett  and Constas (2014) who, on the wake of the literature on 
poverty traps  and multiple equilibria (Barrett & Carter, 2013; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter et al., 
2007), consider the potential existence of thresholds when the expected path is not respected by the 
actual resilience capacity behaviour. In their example, two thresholds exist that separate three distinct 
                                                 
5 As emphasized by Hoddinott (2014)“proposed measure should be subjected to tests of validity and reliability; in the 
case of measures of resilience capacity, we are also interested in understanding their predictive power”. 
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regimes / stable states: humanitarian disaster; a chronic poverty zone where people will still be able 
to recover; a non-poor zone within which people are reasonably expected to recover from shocks. 
Well-being is intrinsically - and, some would argue, increasingly - stochastic, affected by a range of 
exogenous events. In nearly every resilience measurement approach these events tend to be 
summarized in the disturbance term of an estimating regression. If one is interested in identifying 
thresholds above which a household will not suffer long-term development consequences of its food 
security, there are basically two alternative strategies: find a unique resilience threshold, or break 
down resilience in its main components and seek thresholds for each of them. Resilience literature is 
inherently multi-dimensional and, indeed, the biggest added value of a resilience perspective is the 
reciprocal influence that resilience components have each other. In this respect, the first strategy, i.e. 
the identification of a single threshold with respect to a unique resilience indicator, is more faithful 
to the origins and aims of resilience analysis.  
Finally, a resilience threshold should be contextualized with respect to a specific shock, posing the 
concept of resilience thresholds as intrinsically relative.  
Unfortunately, empirical efforts to analyse the potential existence and nature of such thresholds have 
been hampered so far by a lack of readily available empirical data (Walker & Meyers, 2004), by the 
inherent complexity of nonlinear dynamics and by multiple factor controls that operate at diverse 
spatial and temporal scales (Groffman et al., 2006).  
As a consequence of these operative issues, most attempts have been limited to the investigation of 
exogenous thresholds unilaterally set up without any reference to real life or validate norms (Barrett 
& Constas, 2014; Upton, Cissé, & Barrett, 2016) whose internal (other than external) validity remains 
questionable.   
 
Section 2 
Data, RCI and Pseudo-panels 
 
This section illustrates the three operative steps which preceded the empirical analysis: data matching, 
estimation of the RCI and construction of the synthetic panels. 
 
2.1 Data 
 
Our household dataset consists of five surveys: two repeated cross-sections, namely the 2000-2001 
and 2007 Tanzania Household Budget Surveys (HBS) 6   by the Tanzanian National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS); and the 2008-2009, 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 waves of the National Panel Survey 
                                                 
6 These surveys can be found at: http://www.nbs.go.tz/ . 
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(NPS) by the World Bank, part of the World Bank collection named Living Standards Measurement 
Study (LSMS) – Integrated Survey on Agriculture (ISA)7.  Both collections include extensive data 
on household expenditure, which made possible the calculation of annual measures of household per 
capita food consumption, and on household assets and characteristics, but only the LSMS-ISA waves 
include specific questionnaires on agriculture. 
These household data have been cleaned, aggregated and integrated with weather data. 
Weather data include time series on precipitation and land surface temperature.  
Monthly time series (covering the period 1983 - 2016) of precipitation data (in millilitres) come from 
the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) (Funk et al., 2015). 
CHIRPS data have a very high spatial resolution of 0.05° latitude by 0.05° longitude.  
Monthly time series (for the period 1983 - 2015) temperature data are taken from the Centre for 
Climatic Research (CRU) at the University of East Anglia with a 0.5° latitude by 0.5° longitude 
spatial resolution.  
While the LSMS-ISA households are geo-referenced (although using a random offset of 5 KMs), 
HBS households are not, thus allowing only matching with weather data at the district level.  
Consistently, we aggregated both weather time series at the district-monthly level using geo-spatial 
software before merging them with household data8. 
We explicitly restrict our analysis to rural households, since we are interested in the impacts from 
weather shocks which primarily affect farming households.  
Our aggregated dataset consists of 16,190 original observations.  
Starting from this pooled dataset, the RCI was estimated for each household before the creation of 
pseudo-panels. 
 
2.2 The Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) 
  
Resilience capacity is a (i) multidimensional and (ii) unobservable construct.  
Therefore, a common approach in the literature is to look at resilience by (i) unpacking and estimating 
each pillar (or principle, as in Pingali, Alinovi and Sutton (2005), or capacity, as in  Béné, 
Frankenberger, and Nelson (2015) that contributes to resilience and (ii) by employing latent variable 
models to estimate a proxy indicator of the unobservable resilience capacity. 
                                                 
7The complete LSMS-ISA dataset collection is available at the following link: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTLSMS/0,,contentMDK:23617057~
pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3358997,00.html . 
8 Other than temperature and precipitation data, other biophysical variables, namely slope, elevation and length of the 
growing period, available from the FAO Database, were included in the dataset. The FAO Database is available at: 
http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/metadata.show?id=48025&currTab=simple. 
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Among the available statistical techniques for latent variables, namely Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), Factor Analysis (FA), Structural Equation Models (SEMs) and Multiple Indicator and 
Multiple Causes (MIMIC), FA allows for the reduction of a set of observed variables (used as proxy 
indicators for the latent variable), in a single variable, the component of interest. The data reduction 
mechanism relies on finding cross-correlations between the observed variables, identifying the 
number of (unobservable) factors reflected in the correlations, and predicting the latent outcome as a 
linear combination of underlying factors.  
On the contrary, PCA reduces the dimensionality of a data set by deriving a new set of variables – 
called principal components – that are uncorrelated, retain most of the sample information, and are 
ordered by the fraction of the total information that each component explains. However, PCA cannot 
be employed to create a latent variable that is linearly correlated with the underlying dimensions, as 
it does not consider linear relations during the estimation process. In addition, the components are 
calculated using the variance of the observable variables, and the total variance appears in the solution 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005). On top of this, the literature has widely recognized the inadequacy of 
such a method when using categorical variables (Kolenikov & Angeles, 2004).  
Conversely, SEMs assume that the set of measured variables is an imperfect measure of the latent 
variable of interest. SEMs use a factor analysis-type model to measure the latent variable via observed 
variables, while simultaneously using a regression-type model to identify relationships among the 
underlying variables (Bollen, 1989). Differently from SEMs, FA assumes that the residual errors (i.e. 
unique factors) are uncorrelated with each other and with the common (i.e. latent) variable. 
Among the SEMs, the MIMIC model allows including a measurement part of the estimation, as 
described below. 
 
Taking into account its multidimensional and unobservable nature, this work estimates an index of 
the resilience capacity at household level, the so-called Resilience Capacity Index (RCI), through a 
two-step procedure. In the first step, the pillars of resilience are estimated through Factor Analysis 
(FA) from observed variables (except in case of data constraints, see below). The procedure allows 
for the reduction of the set of variables, used as proxy indicators for the latent variable, in a single 
variable, the pillar of interest. The pillars of resilience considered in this study are: Access to Basic 
Services (ABS), Assets (AST), Social Safety Nets (SSN) and Adaptive Capacity (AC). This choice 
follows the FAO-Resilience Index and Measurement Analysis (RIMA-II) conceptual framework, that 
extensively explains the definition of the four pillars of resilience (FAO, 2016).      
All the observed variables used to estimate the pillars are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix along 
with summary statistics. The choice of the variables adopted for estimating each pillar is based on 
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literature review (FAO, 2016), data availability, context analysis and statistical properties of the 
variables. The factors considered for the estimation of each resilience pillar are only those able to 
explain at least 95 percent of the variables’ variance.9 The first-step results of the three FA employed 
for estimating the ABS, AST and AC pillars are reported in Tables A.2-A.4 in the Appendix. 
Conversely, due to data constraints, the SSN pillar was created by simply adding public and private 
transfers received by households for all waves, except for the HBS 2007 survey, for which data on 
transfers were not available and were replaced with a dummy capturing household participation in a 
saving / credit group.  
In the second step, a MIMIC model is estimated (Bollen & Davis, 2009). Specifically, a system of 
equations is constructed, specifying the relationships between an unobservable latent variable (RCI), 
a set of outcome indicators (food security indicators), and a set of attributes (four resilience pillars). 
The food security indicators employed in the MIMIC model are food expenditure and the Simpson 
index of dietary diversity. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the summary statistics of the food 
security indicators.  
The MIMIC model is made up of two components, namely the measurement equation (1) – reflecting 
that the observed indicators of food security are imperfect indicators of resilience capacity – and the 
structural equation (2), which correlates the estimated attributes to resilience capacity: 
 
[
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑐
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
] = [Λ1, Λ2] × [𝑅𝐶𝐼] + [𝜀1, 𝜀2] (1) 
[𝑅𝐶𝐼] = [𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4] × [
𝐴𝐵𝑆
𝐴𝑆𝑇
𝑆𝑆𝑁
𝐴𝐶
] + [𝜀3] .                         (2) 
 
Therefore, the RCI is jointly estimated by its causes, the pillars, and its indicators, the food security 
variables. This procedure ensures a proper link between the estimated resilience capacity and 
household food security.  
The MIMIC results present a good fit of the data, as shown in Table A.5 in the Appendix. All the 
pillar coefficients, except for Social Safety Nets, are positive and statistically significant.  
The RCI is not anchored to any scale of measurement. Therefore, a scale has been defined setting the 
coefficient of the food expenditure loading (Λ1) as equal to 1, meaning that one standard deviation 
increase in RCI implies an increase of one standard deviation in food expenditure. This also defines 
                                                 
9 When more than one factor explains the 95 percent of the variable variance, the resilience pillar is constructed as a 
weighted sum of the factors estimated by FA. The weights employed in the sum are represented by the percentages of 
variance explained by each factor.        
 153 
 
the unit of measurement for the other outcome indicator (Λ2) and for the variance of the two food 
security indicators.  
 
The use of FA in the first step and MIMIC in the second one is supported by the technical literature 
and a validation test. In fact, to obtain robust results, the RCI has been estimated by employing 
alternative techniques for both the pillar estimation - FA, both with the iterated principal-factor 
method (ipf) and the principal-component factor (pcf) - and the RCI estimation, namely employing 
the general form of the SEM instead of the MIMIC model in the second step.  
Using the general SEM means estimating the RCI by employing only Equation (2), without 
considering food security indicators. Therefore, a total of six models have been estimated by 
combining MIMIC or SEM, in the second step, with FA (ipf), FA (pcf) and PCA in the first one. 
A validation index allows to directly compare the goodness of fit achieved by the different models. 
The index is based on the model Chi-squared but takes also into account the degree of freedom as 
well as the number of observations. A smaller value of the index ensures a better fit of the model.  
By comparing the validation indexes10, it emerges that among the three MIMC models, the use of FA 
in the first-step ensures smaller value of the index, without major differences between FA (ipf) and 
FA (pcf). The smallest validation index is obtained by combining PCA in the first-step and SEM in 
the second-step. Finally, only minor differences are detected in the validation indexes of the MIMIC 
versus SEM models by FA type.  
In conclusion, as stated above, the use of MIMIC model versus a general SEM guarantees the 
consistency with the estimation of the RCI linked to household food security. Additionally, according 
to the literature and the validation test, the FA is the preferred technique for pillar estimation when 
combined in a second step with the MIMIC model. 
 
2.3 Pseudo-panels 
 
Since the seminal work of Deaton (1985), the pseudo-panel approach has been used in several 
empirical applications to estimate changes over time. It is essentially a hybrid between repeated cross-
sections and genuine panel data, but presents some additional advantages with respect to the latter: i) 
attrition and non-response problems are minimized, and individuals’ response errors smoothed 
(Verbeek, 2008); ii) larger sample dimension (N) and time span (T) can be created by combining 
different sources; iii) longer-term dynamics can be studied than is usually possible with the existing 
panels since repeated cross-sectional surveys are more common than genuine panels (especially in 
developing countries) (Antman & McKenzie, 2007).  
                                                 
10 Results are available upon request. 
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The main drawback is of course that the same individuals cannot be followed over time, so that 
individual welfare dynamics over time cannot be observed and are not available for constructing 
instruments or transforming a model to first-differences or in deviations from individual means 
(Verbeek, 2008).  
The fundamental assumption of the pseudo-panel framework is that the mean cohort behaviour 
reproduces the form of an individual behaviour in that specific cohort.  
A ‘cohort’ is defined as a group with fixed membership, individuals of which can be identified as 
they show up in the surveys (Deaton, 1985).  
Operationally, it means to group individuals sharing some common characteristics into cohorts, after 
which the averages within these cohorts are treated as observations in a pseudo panel (Verbeek, 2008). 
 
For the construction of our cohorts, we paid careful attention to the following recommendations 
underlined by the relevant literature:  i) cohorts can be more or less broadly defined, but on the basis 
of time-invariant variables that are observed for all individuals and should allow sufficient temporal 
and cross-sectional variation in the true cohort mean for parameter identification (Verbeek & Nijman, 
1992). Possible choices include variables like date of birth, race, gender, region etc. (Verbeek, 2008) 
which may also be interacted to increase the number of cohorts C. McKenzie (2004) stresses the 
importance of allowing for inter-cohort parameter heterogeneity; ii) each individual must be a 
member of exactly one cohort, which stays the same for all T; iii)  in constructing cohort samples, 
there is a trade-off between nc and C, that is between the accuracy of each cohort mean (nc) and the 
number of observations (C) of the pseudo-panel. A large nc minimizes measurement error but 
increases the efficiency loss. By skimming the literature on pseudo-panel applications, it may be 
argued that the size of nc is more important than the size of C. Hence, the challenge is to find a balance 
between these two dimensions, where the optimal choice would be the one that minimizes the 
heterogeneity within each cohort (internally homogeneous) but maximizes the heterogeneity among 
them. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) argue that with a sufficiently large cohort size (nc ≥  100) 
measurement error issues and the cohort nature of the data can safely be ignored, but this will come 
at the cost of reducing the number of cohorts C; iiii) according to Verbeek & Vella (2005), the fixed 
effects estimator based on the pseudo-panel of cohort averages may provide an attractive choice, even 
when a lagged dependent variable is included in the model. 
 
As already explained, our dataset consists of five surveys: two repeated cross-sections and a three-
wave panel. Aggregating these five waves in a pseudo-panel allows us to expand the timespan of our 
empirical analysis up to fourteen years, from 2000 to 2013, more than a decade of empirical 
observation. 
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Our baseline analysis is conducted on two different pseudo-panels (Versions 1 and 2) whose core 
characteristics are shown in Table A.6.  
In Version 1 we use, as group variables - i.e. variables interacted with each other to create cohorts - 
quintiles of long-run average temperature and year-of-birth of the household head quintiles.  
We employ long-run temperature quintiles as a proxy for climatic areas, while the use of year-of-
birth bands follows standard practice in pseudo-panel literature. Furthermore, they are meant as an 
exogenous factor to our resilience index and its four pillars.  
Similarly, the only difference in Version 2 is the use of long-run precipitation quintiles instead of 
long-run temperature quintiles as cohort variables. This because using a different proxy for climatic 
areas leads to different groupings of households into cohorts and consequently could drastically 
change the results of the empirical analysis. This alternative version is used to perform robustness 
checks (see Section 5). 
As reported in Table A.6, in both pseudo-panels, Versions 1 and 2, the number of cohorts C is 25 and 
the average number of observation per cohort, nc, is 648
11.  
 
Tables A.7 and A.8 shows descriptive statistics for, respectively, Version 1 and Version 2: food 
consumption growth is very high on average (more than 6 % in both versions), but this is likely due 
to the fact these synthetic panels are based on data coming from two separate sources (HBS and NPS).  
Overall, the standard deviation is quite high for all the reported variables, pointing to a good degree 
of between-cohort variation and heterogeneity in terms of growth paths, resilience capacity and 
climatic conditions.  
Although most variables exhibit similar distributions across the two pseudo-panels, please note that 
the mean of temperature shocks for Version 2 is almost three times higher than in Version 1, i.e. 
temperature shocks are, on average, three times stronger in the former than in the latter dataset. 
Precipitation shocks, instead, are almost identical.  
As will be shown below, the difference in the magnitude of temperature shocks between the two 
pseudo-panels will be important in explaining part of the empirical results. 
 
Section 3 
Identification strategy and empirical model 
 
Our benchmark identification strategy is derived from the empirical work of Dercon (2004), Carter 
et al. (2007), Jalan and Ravallion (2002, 2004). 
                                                 
11 Note also that our waves are different in terms of observations. HBS 2000 includes data on over 7000 households, HBS 
2007 on about 3000 households and the three NPS waves only approximately 2000 households. This implies that the 
average number of observations per cohort-wave differ across waves. 
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In particular, we build our model on the wake of the macro-literature (Solow, 1956) , and augment a 
standard empirical growth model, where cohort food consumption growth rates are conditional on 
lagged consumption levels, with a set of additional explanatory variables: 
 
∆ 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   [3] 
 
In Equation (3), the dependent variable is the annualised growth rate in real cohort monthly per capita 
food consumption12, and 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is lagged cohort monthly per capita consumption
13. 𝛽1 represents 
the convergence term: a negative sign of the coefficient 𝛽1 would indicate the presence of an ongoing 
convergence process, i.e. that poorest household tend to catch up over time with richer households.  
The use of consumption instead of income as a proxy for welfare is motivated by the setting: in rural 
Tanzania most households depend on self-employed agriculture and consequently measuring income 
is subject to large errors (Deaton, 1997; Hirvonen, 2016); in contexts such as this consumption has 
been viewed as providing a more reliable measure of welfare (Deaton & Grosh, 2000). 
We then amend the standard empirical growth model by including additional variables which allow 
us to explicitly look at the role of resilience capacity, weather shocks and their dynamic interactions. 
First, the role played by resilience capacity is identified by two distinct variables. 
𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1  captures the impact of household resilience at time t-1, i.e. pre-‘treatment’, on food 
consumption growth.  Hence, a positive sign of the coefficient  𝛽2 would indicate that, on average 
and ceteris paribus, being more resilient to food insecurity can boost household growth.  
We then include ∆𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡, which stands for the annualised between-wave change in the RCI
14. This 
variable is added for two reasons: i) being the RCI a catch-all index for a full set of relevant household 
characteristics and assets which are supposed to mimic the latent Tanzanian farmers’ resilience to 
food insecurity, its annualised change captures a wide range of time-varying variables, thus offsetting 
many potential sources of omitted variable bias; ii) the sign of its coefficient 𝛽3 can be informative 
about the importance of resilience dynamics, i.e. the evolution over time of household ability to 
withstand shocks, in determining the consumption growth trend. 
Second, the impacts of weather shocks.  
We test for possible deviations from the assumed convergence path of consumption growth by 
                                                 
12 Food consumption is measured as food expenditure. 
13 Given our fixed-effect setting, we could not directly include initial consumption levels since they are time-invariant. 
Hence the choice of including lagged consumption levels to assess potential convergence, which follows standard practice 
in this micro literature. 
14 Explicitly, it means: ∆𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡, = 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡  − 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1. 
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including temperature [𝛽
4
∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑑𝑡
] and precipitation [𝛽5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡] shocks, observed at the district level 
(hence the subscript d). As for the functional form of weather shocks, we followed Dercon (2004), 
i.e. our weather variables are calculated as the difference in logarithms between their values at t and 
t-1, both scaled by long-run means.15 This because we assume that level changes matter not only in 
an absolute sense but also, more importantly, in proportion to an area’s usual, long-run, variation 
(Dell, Jones, & Olken, 2014). The parameters associated to weather shocks test whether they can slow 
or derail the assumed convergence process in the average household growth path. We include both 
temperature and precipitation in our regressions, because climate literature (Auffhammer, Hsiang, 
Schlenker  and Sobel, 2013; Dell, Jones, & Olken, 2014) has warned against the risk of omitted 
variable bias and incorrect inference when dealing with the effects of weather regressors that are 
always highly correlated with each other, like temperature and precipitation usually are.  
Since this literature also recommends to always include all the available climatic and biophysical 
variables, we also add to our model other biophysical variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, which act as additional controls, 
namely elevation, slope and length of the growing period (LGP) for each household. 
Third, the dynamic relationship between resilience capacity and climatic shocks: we are interested in 
assessing whether there is heterogeneity in the impacts of weather shocks with respect to pre-shock 
resilience capacity. To test for this prediction, we augment the baseline specification in Equation (3) 
by including several interactions between lagged or initial RCI level and weather variables16.  
Finally, 𝜇𝑖  are cohort fixed effects,  𝜃𝑡 are wave fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are error terms clustered at the 
cohort level. 
 
This is the baseline specification to look for the aggregate impacts of the variables of interest on food 
consumption growth.  
As a second step of our analysis, we employ a fixed-effect panel threshold model in order to 
potentially detect a critical RCI threshold or tipping point that entails a change of regime of the 
impacts from temperature shocks, on the wake of the literature on poverty traps. 
In this way, we can test whether there is heterogeneity of impacts from temperature shocks with 
respect to the RCI, and if resilience to food insecurity plays a role in counterbalancing or eliminating 
altogether the assumed diverging effects entailed by weather shocks.  
In doing so, we follow the approach by Carter et al. (2007) and opt for the use of the Hansen (2000) 
threshold estimator, as implemented in a fixed-effect setting by Wang (2015).  
                                                 
15 Since we are working with synthetic panels, weather data were aggregated for each household in the original sample 
starting from their interview month and going backwards for the average total number of months between each survey. 
16 Additionally, we also include interactions between weather shocks and a dummy to control for heterogeneity of impacts 
for households living in hotter-than-average areas. See Section 4. 
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This model replicates Equation (3) but distinguishes two impact regimes conditional to a critical value 
of the RCI: 
 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = { 
𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4
𝑙∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 ≤ 𝜔
𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4
𝑢∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽5∆𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 > 𝜔
    (4) 
 
In Equation (4) the superscripts l and u on the coefficient 𝛽4 indicate, respectively, the lower and 
upper regime of temperature impacts, conditional on the RCI value at time t-1, i.e. the pre-shock 
period, in order to capture heterogeneity with respect to ex ante, and not ex post, household resilience 
capacity to food insecurity. 
 
Section 4 
Empirical outcomes and the estimation of “resilience thresholds” 
 
Table 1 shows the results of the baseline identification strategy set in Equation (3). 
First, some general remarks.  
Lagged consumption level has a negative and significant at the 1 percent level effect on growth. This 
points to the plausibility of the assumption of convergence among households, i.e. poorer households 
tend to have higher growth rates than richer households, leading to a catch-up growth process.  
Lagged RCI has a positive and strongly significant effect on growth: net of the convergence process, 
being more resilient to food insecurity enhances growth.  
Analogously, as one would expect given the high correlation with food consumption growth, the 
coefficient of ∆RCI is positive, large and strongly statistically significant, providing evidence that an 
increase in resilience capacity over time helps households to withstand shocks and stressors and 
boosts growth.  
Finally, the adjusted R-squared is extremely high, but this too was expected given the large set of 
covariates and fixed effects we chose to include. While this may raise concerns about 
overidentification, we reckon this is actually an advantage and not a drawback: there is almost no 
residual variation, so we are confident we can identify the impacts from weather shocks with a good 
degree of precision. 
Please also note that these general findings will hold in all the following regressions. 
 
Let us now turn to the impacts of weather shocks on food consumption growth.  
In Column (1) we only look at aggregate impacts. Both temperature and rainfall shocks have, on 
average and ceteris paribus, a negative but insignificant effect on the growth rate of food 
consumption.  
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However, these aggregate results could be hiding heterogeneity of impacts conditional on household 
resilience capacity, i.e. on their ability to withstand weather shocks. Following the path of Smith and 
Frankenberger (2017), our hypothesis is that given the occurrence of the same weather shock, its 
impact will be stronger for the least resilient household. 
In Column (2) we start investigating whether this is the case, by including two separate interactions 
of both temperature and precipitation shocks with a ‘Low average pre-shock’ RCI dummy, which 
takes value 1 for cohorts having an average pre-shock RCI below the 25th percentile. This dummy 
identifies cohorts who were on average the least resilient ones before shocks occurred.  Additionally, 
as a further control and also to check for potential heterogeneity with respect to different climatic 
areas (it may be impacts are stronger in hotter-than-average areas, due to intensification effects, or 
smaller, due to adaptation over time, as emphasized by Dell, Jones and Olken (2012)) we also include 
an interaction between weather shocks and a ‘hot’ dummy, which takes value 1 for cohorts living in 
areas with an above median long-run average temperature. The results show a sharp heterogeneity of 
impacts with respect to resilience capacity: temperature shocks now have a negative, larger and 
statistically significant effect for the least resilient cohorts, but negative, smaller and insignificant 
effect for the rest of cohorts. In particular, a one within-standard deviation increase in temperature 
shocks (0.018) entails a 0.63 % decrease in food consumption growth for cohorts with a low average 
pre-shock resilience capacity index. The pattern is analogous in hot areas: while there seems to be an 
intensifying effect due to living in hotter-than-average areas (even though they are always 
insignificant, impacts on average more than double in hot areas), only the least resilient cohorts are 
significantly affected by temperature shocks. Therefore, rather than heterogeneity with respect to 
climatic areas, we detect heterogeneity with respect to pre-shock resilience capacity. As for 
precipitation, there seems to be a negative and statistically significant impact for the most resilient 
households, and a positive and weakly impact of precipitation shocks in hot areas; however, 
precipitation shocks will prove to be highly sensitive to specification in the following regressions17 
so this result should be interpreted with extreme caution. 
In Columns (3) and (4) we explore different definitions of ‘least resilient cohorts and check whether 
heterogeneity of impacts from temperature shocks persists. 
In Column (3) the previous RCI interactions are now replaced by interactions between weather shocks 
and ‘Low pre-shock RCI’, a dummy taking value 1 for cohorts with a lagged RCI below the 25th 
percentile in a given wave. This dummy captures heterogeneity not with respect to average pre-shock 
RCI levels, but with respect to the RCI level before each shock. 
                                                 
17 Due to space reasons, in Table 1 as well as in Table 4 in Section 6 the total impacts of precipitation shocks for the least 
resilient households and for households living in hot areas are not reported. This because they are always either 
statistically insignificant or only weakly statistically significant. Consequently, our focus is on temperature shocks. 
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The findings detected in Column (2) still hold and are actually reinforced: the impacts of temperature 
shocks are larger and statistically significant at the 1 % level for the least resilient cohorts. A one 
within-standard deviation in temperature shocks entails a decrease of approximately 1 percentage 
point in food consumption growth for cohorts with a below the 25th percentile pre-shock RCI level, 
while the effect is positive and insignificant for the rest of cohorts. The pattern is again the same for 
cohorts in hot areas, but now there is no intensifying effect from living in hot areas but rather weak 
evidence of adaptation, represented by the positive and statistically significant at the 10 % level 
impact of the interaction between the ‘hot’ dummy and temperature shocks. 
It may be that, more than pre-shock conditions in resilience capacity, what matters is resilience 
capacity at the beginning of the study period. To explore this possibility, in Column (4) we change 
again our definition of ‘least resilient cohorts’ and interact weather shocks with a ‘Low initial RCI’ 
dummy, which takes value 1 for cohorts with an initial RCI below the 25th percentile. 
The previous results are confirmed: cohorts with a low initial RCI are the only ones to be negatively 
and significantly affected by temperature shocks: a one within-standard deviation now reduces the 
growth rate of food consumption by 0.74 %. The intensifying effect of living in hotter-than-average 
areas is now again evident and also statistically significant. 
Finally, in Column (5) we replace the interactions with dummies with interactions between 
temperature and precipitation shocks and the RCI at time t-1 (pre-shock). These continuous 
interactions can shed light on whether the negative impacts of shocks disappear as households become 
more resilient over time, i.e. they can provide empirical evidence on the dynamic relationship between 
resilience and weather shocks.  
While this regression confirms rainfall shocks are insignificant and so their relationship with 
resilience, for temperature shocks the causal relationship is supported: temperature shocks have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on cohort growth which gradually gets smaller and 
eventually disappears as cohorts get more resilient, thanks to the dampening effect resilience has on 
temperature shocks, indicated by the positive and statistically significant continuous interaction. 
 
Such sharp and persisting heterogeneity of temperature impacts with respect to resilience capacity is 
worth being investigated in further detail.  
It raises the hypothesis of “resilience thresholds” which entail a bifurcation of impacts from weather 
shocks on growth.  
The RCI dummies we included in the interactions only represent subjective classifications between 
who is more and who is less resilient to food insecurity. Indeed, any dummy would set an arbitrary 
threshold, imposed by us and not by the true distribution and nature of the data.  
To overcome this drawback and let the data speak for us, we use Equation (4) which implements the 
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fixed-effect panel threshold model as adapted by Wang (2015) from Hansen (2000). Thanks to the 
use of this estimator not only potential thresholds are data-driven and not arbitrarily chosen, but we 
can also test for the statistical significance of such thresholds by using the bootstrap procedure. 
Table 2 shows the empirical results. 
There is a bifurcation of impacts from temperature shocks: in the lower regime, i.e. below the 
threshold, the effect is large and strongly statistically significant. Above the threshold, in the upper 
regime, the impact is small and negligible. For cohorts below the threshold a one within-standard 
deviation increase in temperature shocks reduces growth by about 1.1 percentage points, while for 
cohorts above the threshold only by approximately 0.1 %. 
Table 3 shows the threshold value, confidence intervals and tests. Bifurcation of impacts occurs at a 
pre-shock RCI value of 54.609, far below the mean.  
This threshold is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as indicated by the bootstrap test.  
One may ask whether there is more than one resilience threshold. We investigated if multiple 
thresholds could be detected, but their significance was always rejected and the single threshold is by 
far the one which suits better the nature of the data. 
 
Section 5 
Robustness checks 
 
A pseudo-panel is made of cohort data and not composed by ‘true’ households whose growth 
dynamics are followed over time. Choices involving the creation of pseudo-panels are arbitrary, 
although we tried to stick to the usual prescriptions in the relevant literature. Therefore, one could be 
concerned that our results may be driven by the specific nature of this pseudo-panel and the cohort 
variables used. This is a valid point which we acknowledge.  
Consequently, we think it is important to show that our core findings are not altered when making 
different choices about the creation of the synthetic panel. This is why our robustness check is the 
repetition of the same analysis conducted above using a different pseudo-panel. As introduced in 
Section 2, we call this alternative longitudinal dataset Pseudo-Panel Version 2. 
The unique but relevant difference compared to our baseline version is that we substitute, as a cohort-
variable, long-run average precipitation quintiles to long-run average temperature quintiles.  
The core characteristics of Version 2 in terms of C and nc are exactly the same of Version 1, as shown 
in Table A.6.  
Tables 4-6 the outcomes of the empirical analysis conducted on Version 2. 
Table 4 replicates the same regressions of Table 1.  
The pattern of sharp and significant heterogeneity of temperature impacts on growth conditional on 
pre-shock resilience capacity is confirmed in all cases, although physiologically different in 
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magnitude. Temperature shocks slow the convergence process. There seems to be a stronger evidence 
that living in hot areas amplifies the negative impacts of temperature shocks on growth, and there is 
no evidence of adaptation, i.e. smaller impacts in hot areas, whatsoever. 
Conversely, precipitation shocks, again, are almost always insignificant and very sensitive to 
specification.  
Table 5 illustrates the results from the threshold model. 
Again, cohorts below the resilience thresholds are strongly and significantly affected by temperature 
shocks, whereas the effect for cohorts above the threshold is slightly positive and insignificant. A one 
within-standard deviation (0.023) in temperature shocks entails a decrease in the growth rate of food 
consumption of 0.37 % for households in the lower regime and an increase of 0.05 % for households 
in the upper regime. 
Table 6 shows threshold value, confidence intervals and effect tests. The value of the threshold is 
higher compared to Table 3: bifurcation in this panel occurs at a lagged RCI level of 60.796, and the 
threshold is significant at the 5 % level.  
Again, the hypothesis of multiple thresholds was rejected. 
 
While these results are qualitatively equivalent to those emerged using the baseline Version 1 pseudo-
panel dataset, one may ask why they do differ quantitatively, in particular with regard to the threshold 
value.  
Our answer is that the value of the RCI threshold is conditional on the magnitude of temperature 
shocks: on average and ceteris paribus, if temperature shocks are stronger households must be more 
resilient to be immune to the impacts of such shocks.  
In this Version 2, as stressed above (cf. Table A.8), temperature shocks are on average three times 
higher than in the baseline version, and we reckon this explains why the threshold value is higher in 
Pseudo-Panel Version 2 compared to Pseudo-Panel Version 1. 
 
Section 6 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
We are aware that there are several limitations to this empirical exercise which go beyond the precise 
quantification of thresholds. 
We do not claim our resilience thresholds are absolute thresholds for households living in the rural 
Tanzanian setting, let alone for other countries.  
While absolute thresholds would be the perfect tool for policymakers, since they would indicate what 
is the resilience level that households should be helped to reach in order to be immune from shocks, 
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this is a utopia: resilience thresholds are intrinsically relative, so some caveats are necessary.  
First, our resilience thresholds only apply to weather shocks and specifically to temperature shocks. 
Second, these thresholds are limited to the rural Tanzanian context, while in other countries or settings 
the picture could be completely different. Third, such thresholds are data-driven, and they may change 
significantly if using other datasets.  
Fourth, even though we take inspiration from the literature on poverty traps, we can only talk of 
resilience thresholds, not of resilience ‘traps’: households below the RCI threshold are not 
permanently trapped in a low equilibrium from which there is no escape; rather, their growth paths 
are negatively affected by temperature shocks and this slows down, but does not reverse, the growth 
convergence process. However, climatic shocks of exceptional magnitude (at least compared to the 
temperature shocks experienced in our sample) could hit households so hard to entail not just a 
slowdown, but even a reversal of the convergence process. 
Fifth, our RCI is only one of the possible ways of measuring resilience which is, as stressed in Section 
2, an inherently latent and unobservable variable. Therefore, the use of other empirical approaches to 
resilience may well lead to different conclusions. 
 
Still, despite the above remarks, we reckon the qualitative contribution is meaningful. 
Smith and Frankenberger (2017) found suggestive evidence that resilience capacity reduced the 
negative impact of floods on household food security in Northern Bangladesh.  
Here, instead, we show that resilience capacity can neutralize the diverging effect of temperature 
shocks on food consumption growth in rural Tanzania, and detect the existence of a critical resilience 
threshold. 
In this particular case, such threshold is embodied by a value of the RCI, our measure of resilience, 
comprised between 54.6 and 60.8. 
Going back to the original aggregate dataset, this means we find that between around 25 % and 47 % 
of households in our sample are below the resilience threshold and consequently vulnerable to 
temperature shocks. 
 
Extrapolating with respect to global warming, with the usual caution about external validity (Dell, 
Jones, & Olken, 2014), this conclusion is especially relevant in view of the impacts of climate change 
in developing countries in the 21st century, which we know will be disproportionately bigger in poorer 
and  hotter countries such as Tanzania (Tol, 2015).  
Being above the critical resilience threshold neutralizes the diverging effect by temperature shocks: 
the logical implication is that adaptation strategies and policy interventions in developing countries 
will need to focus on boosting household resilience, so to empower all households to eventually reach 
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the threshold and cope with the consequences of climate change. But resilience remains a multi-
dimensional concept: in this sense, while in this study we only estimated thresholds with respect to 
an aggregated measure of resilience, the identification of the main resilience determinants mediating 
the temperature-economic growth relationship, as well as the disaggregated exploration of different 
temperature regimes with respect to single drivers or dimensions of resilience, are necessary and 
complementary research avenues for the next future. 
 
More generally, despite the remarks made above about the very limited, if any, external validity of 
our resilience thresholds, many fundamental questions stem from this work: there may potentially be 
resilience thresholds for households not just with respect to weather shocks, but for any shock; not 
just in rural Tanzania, but in many developing countries.  
The pioneeristic work by Barrett and Constas (2014) laid the theoretical foundations for the 
hypothesis of non-linear paths, regime shifts and critical thresholds for development resilience, but 
empirical evidence on this crucial topic is still scant. 
Given the self-evident importance of such issues from a policy-making perspective, the dynamic 
relationship between development resilience and shocks should be considered a top priority by future 
research.  
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Table 1 
Impacts on food consumption growth – Pseudo-panel Version 1 
  
Dependent variable: 
∆Food 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
      
      
L1.Food    -51.948***    -44.487***    -46.986***    -46.577***    -51.423*** 
 (5.238) (4.702) (5.438) (6.006) (4.569) 
 
L1.RCI     3.776***     3.195***     3.098***     3.306***    3.658*** 
 (0.427) (0.370) (0.427) (0.468) (0.358) 
 
∆RCI     7.389***     7.418***     7.426***     7.366***    7.325*** 
 (0.101) (0.122) (0.112) (0.129) (0.106) 
 
∆Temp -12.998 -10.697 4.966 -13.141   -255.308** 
 (17.367) (14.247) (16.323) (15.812) (110.287) 
 
Low average pre-shock RCI x ∆Temp    -24.367**    
  (10.476)    
 
Hot x ∆Temp  -12.371      -1.879   -15.511** -9.262 
  (8.172) (7.035) (7.195) (7.260) 
 
∆Pre -1.959   -3.182**      -4.881**    -5.141*** 20.469 
 (1.494) (1.422) (1.933) (1.646) (25.403) 
 
Low average pre-shock RCI x ∆Pre  -0.999    
  (3.400)    
 
Hot x ∆Pre   3.976*  4.180*   4.511**   6.674** 
  (2.054) (2.218) (1.944) (2.596) 
      
Low pre-shock RCI x ∆Temp       -60.694***   
   (15.635) 
 
  
 
Low pre-shock RCI x ∆Pre   6.632   
 
 
Low pre-shock RCI 
 
  (3.110) 
 
0.112 
(0.285) 
 
  
 
Low initial RCI x ∆Temp        -27.988***  
    
 
(9.247) 
 
 
Low initial RCI x ∆Pre    -0.506  
    
 
(3.081) 
 
 
L1.RCI x ∆Temp       3.802** 
     (1.663) 
 
L1.RCI x ∆Pre     -0.404 
     (0.408) 
 
Constant      -63.728***      -51.077***      -56.872***      -52.344***      -62.922*** 
 (14.159) (10.358) (12.971) (12.784) (11.543) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 
Biophysical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Total temperature effect 
for cohorts with low average pre-shock RCI 
 
Total temperature effect 
for cohorts living in hot areas 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts with low 
average pre-shock RCI living in hot areas 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts 
with low pre-shock RCI 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts with low 
average pre-shock RCI living in hot areas 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts 
with low pre-shock RCI 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts with low 
average pre-shock RCI living in hot areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -35.064** 
(16.550) 
 
-23.068 
(17.946) 
 
  -47.435** 
(20.963) 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
3.087 
(19.995) 
 
    
 
 
      -55.728*** 
(16.864) 
 
     -57.608*** 
 (19.609) 
 
 
 
 
-28.653 
(19.477) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  -41.129** 
(18.034) 
 
  -56.641** 
(22.040) 
 
Notes: All specifications include cohort and time fixed effects. Biophysical controls include slope, elevation and length of the growing period. 
∆Food is food consumption growth rate, i.e. the average annual percentage change in (ln) cohort monthly per capita food consumption between t 
and t-1. L1.Food is lagged (ln) cohort monthly per capita food consumption. L1.RCI is the lagged Resilience Capacity Index, scaled from 1 to 
100. ∆RCI is the annualised change in the RCI Index between t and t-1. ∆Temp is the difference in logarithms of average temperature levels at 
and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. ∆Pre is the difference in logarithms of average total precipitation levels at t and t-1, both scaled by long-
run means. Low average pre-shock RCI is dummy with value 1 for cohorts having an average pre-shock RCI below the 25th percentile. Low pre-
shock RCI is a dummy taking value 1 for cohorts with a lagged RCI below the 25th percentile in a given wave. Low initial RCI is a dummy with 
value 1 for households with an initial RCI below the 25th percentile. Hot is a dummy taking value 1 for cohorts living an area with an above mean 
long-run average temperature. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2 
Threshold model – Pseudo-panel Version 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) 
Dependent variable: ∆Food 
  
L1.Food      -52.711*** 
 
(5.651) 
 
L1.RCI      3.777*** 
 
(0.445) 
 
∆RCI      7.363*** 
 
(0.099) 
 
∆Pre -3.075* 
 
(1.496) 
 
∆Temp_Lower regime     -61.361*** 
 
(20.920) 
 
∆Temp_Upper regime                   -5.661 
 
(16.505) 
 
Constant      -64.476*** 
 (14.319) 
Observations 100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994 
Biophysical controls Yes 
Notes: All specifications include cohort and time fixed effects. Biophysical controls include slope, elevation and 
length of the growing period. ∆Food is food consumption growth rate, i.e. the average annual percentage change 
in (ln) cohort monthly per capita food consumption between t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged (ln) cohort monthly per 
capita food consumption. L1.RCI is the lagged Resilience Capacity Index, scaled from 1 to 100. ∆RCI is the 
annualised change in the RCI Index between t and t-1. ∆Temp is the difference in logarithms of average 
temperature levels at and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. ∆Pre is the difference in logarithms of average total 
precipitation levels at t and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. Hot is a dummy taking value 1 for cohorts living 
an area with an above mean long-run average temperature. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 172 
 
Table 3 
Threshold tests and confidence intervals – Pseudo-panel Version 1 
 
 RCI Threshold* 
Model     Threshold     Lower    Upper 
RCI           54.609        53.130    55.139 
 
* The threshold value of RCI is at time t-1. 
 
Threshold effect test (bootstrap = 300):      
      
Threshold          RSS           MSE         Fstat    Prob      Crit10        Crit5        Crit1   
Single            13.5417       0.1411        21.08  0.0033   13.2478    15.5232   20.0510 
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Table 4 
Impacts on food consumption growth – Pseudo-panel Version 2 
  
Dependent variable: 
∆Food 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
      
      
L1.Food     -42.068***    -45.379***     -47.292***    -42.862***    -46.258*** 
 (4.448) (3.917) (4.360) (3.481) (3.957) 
 
L1.RCI     2.996***     3.293***     3.394***     3.033***     3.258*** 
 (0.352) (0.308) (0.337) (0.269) (0.290) 
 
∆RCI     7.146***     7.266***     7.230***     7.208***     7.212*** 
 (0.129) (0.145) (0.131) (0.118) (0.127) 
 
∆Temp -5.067 -7.918 -6.398 -5.666   -185.110** 
 (4.619) (5.566) (7.760) (4.323) (70.249) 
Low average pre-shock RCI x ∆Temp  -7.593    
  (9.612)    
 
Hot x ∆Temp  -12.772 -12.212   -18.023**   -16.717** 
  (7.541) (7.708) (6.488) (7.552) 
 
∆Pre -1.944 0.691 1.387 0.402 -42.163 
 (2.519) (2.942) (2.686) (2.514) (34.675) 
 
Low average pre-shock RCI x ∆Pre  -4.326    
  (4.911)    
 
Hot x ∆Pre    -6.972**   -6.954**  -6.859**   -6.502** 
  (2.918) (3.061) (2.845) (2.735) 
      
Low pre-shock RCI x ∆Temp   -11.755   
   (8.460)   
 
Low pre-shock RCI x ∆Pre   -4.829   
 
 
Low pre-shock RCI 
 
  (5.190) 
 
0.382 
(0.371) 
 
  
 
Low initial RCI x ∆Temp       -19.087***  
    
 
(5.819)  
Low initial RCI x ∆Pre    -1.262  
    
 
(3.499)  
L1.RCI x ∆Temp        2.938** 
     (1.180) 
 
L1.RCI x ∆Pre     0.692 
     (0.556) 
 
Constant    -53.564***     -65.786***    -65.701***    -58.154***    -61.601*** 
 (12.066) (10.825) (11.398) (10.096) (9.386) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Biophysical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Total temperature effect 
for cohorts with low average pre-shock RCI 
 
Total temperature effect 
for cohorts living in hot areas 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts with low 
average pre-shock RCI living in hot areas 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts 
with low pre-shock RCI 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts with low 
average pre-shock RCI living in hot areas 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts 
with low pre-shock RCI 
 
Total temperature effect for cohorts with low 
average pre-shock RCI living in hot areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -15.511* 
(9.033) 
 
  -20.690** 
(7.879) 
 
  -28.283** 
(9.964) 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
   -18.610** 
(8.831) 
 
    
 
 
       -18.153*** 
(6.413) 
 
      -30.364*** 
 (9.138) 
 
 
 
 
     -23.689*** 
(7.328) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      -24.753*** 
(6.689) 
 
     -42.776*** 
(9.341) 
 
Notes: All specifications include cohort and time fixed effects. Biophysical controls include slope, elevation and length of the growing period. 
∆Food is food consumption growth rate, i.e. the average annual percentage change in (ln) cohort monthly per capita food consumption between 
t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged (ln) cohort monthly per capita food consumption. L1.RCI is the lagged Resilience Capacity Index, scaled from 1 to 
100. ∆RCI is the annualised change in the RCI Index between t and t-1. ∆Temp is the difference in logarithms of average temperature levels at 
and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. ∆Pre is the difference in logarithms of average total precipitation levels at t and t-1, both scaled by long-
run means.  Low average pre-shock RCI is dummy with value 1 for cohorts having an average pre-shock RCI below the 25th percentile.  Low 
pre-shock RCI is a dummy taking value 1 for cohorts with a lagged RCI below the 25th percentile in a given wave. Low initial RCI is a dummy 
with value 1 for households with an initial RCI below the 25th percentile. Hot is a dummy taking value 1 for cohorts living an area with an above 
mean long-run average temperature. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5 
Threshold model – Pseudo-panel Version 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) 
Dependent variable: ∆Food 
  
L1.Food      -45.248*** 
 
(4.568) 
 
L1.RCI      3.211*** 
 
(0.360) 
 
∆RCI      7.134*** 
 
(0.113) 
 
∆Pre -1.822 
 
(2.261) 
 
∆Temp_Lower regime     -16.094*** 
 
(4.811) 
 
∆Temp_Upper regime 2.288 
 
(5.901) 
 
Constant      -60.330*** 
 (12.500) 
Observations 100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.997 
Biophysical controls Yes 
Notes: All specifications include cohort and time fixed effects. Biophysical controls include slope, elevation and 
length of the growing period. ∆Food is food consumption growth rate, i.e. the average annual percentage change 
in (ln) cohort monthly per capita food consumption between t and t-1. L1.Food is lagged (ln) cohort monthly per 
capita food consumption. L1.RCI is the lagged Resilience Capacity Index, scaled from 1 to 100. ∆RCI is the 
annualised change in the RCI Index between t and t-1. ∆Temp is the difference in logarithms of average 
temperature levels at and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. ∆Pre is the difference in logarithms of average total 
precipitation levels at t and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. Hot is a dummy taking value 1 for cohorts living 
an area with an above mean long-run average temperature. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the cohort level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6 
Threshold tests and confidence intervals – Pseudo-panel Version 2 
 
 RCI Threshold* 
Model     Threshold     Lower    Upper 
RCI           60.796        60.379    60.835 
 
* The threshold value of RCI is at time t-1. 
 
Threshold effect test (bootstrap = 300):      
      
Threshold        RSS          MSE         Fstat   Prob      Crit10        Crit5        Crit1   
Single            16.528       0.1722       15.78 0.0267    11.6289    13.7316   19.6328 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 177 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A.1 
RCI Variables - Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 Mean Var sd Obs 
 
 
Dwelling Index 
 
-0.150 
 
0.459 
 
0.677 
 
16190 
 
Distance from hospital (inverse) 0.764 5.656 2.378 16190 
 
Distance from primary school (inverse) 17.627 264.651 16.268 16190 
 
Wealth Index 0.008 0.427 0.653 16190 
 
Agricultural Wealth Index 0.151 1.508 1.228 16190 
 
Tropical Livestock Units (per capita) 0.296 1.436 1.198 16190 
 
Land owned (per capita) 0.424 1.533 1.238 16190 
 
Public Transfers (per capita) 1.163 294.673 17.166 16190 
 
Private transfers (per capita) 12.186 2017.016 44.911 16190 
 
Participation in a saving group 0.044 0.042 0.204 10254 
 
Average years of education 4.724 8.730 2.955 16190 
 
Dependency ratio (inverse) 2.056 0.878 0.937 16190 
 
Farming is not the main source of income 
 
Monthly per capita food expenditure (usd) 
 
Simpson Index 
 
0.268 
 
28.671 
 
0.605 
0.196 
 
588.273 
 
0.026 
0.443 
 
24.254 
 
0.161 
16190 
 
16190 
 
16190 
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Table A.2 
Pillar factor loadings for ABS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
Variable 
 
Factor 1 
 
Factor 2 
 
Uniqueness 
 
 
Dwelling Index 
 
0.154 
 
0.101 
 
0.966 
 
Distance from hospital (inverse) 0.276 0.009 0.924 
 
Distance from primary school (inverse) 0.216 -0.084 0.946 
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Table A.3 
Pillar factor loadings for AST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
Variable 
 
Factor 1 
 
Factor 2 
 
Factor 3 
 
 
Uniqueness 
 
Wealth Index 
 
0.708 
 
-0.148 
 
0.053 
 
 
0.475 
 
Agricultural Wealth Index 0.764 -0.025 -0.044 
 
0.413 
Tropical Livestock Units (per capita) 
 
Land owned (per capita) 
 
0.322 
 
0.133 
0.276 
 
0.261 
-0.042 
 
0.070 
0.818 
 
0.909 
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Table A.4 
Pillar factor loadings for AC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
Variable 
 
Factor 1 
 
Factor 2 
 
Uniqueness 
 
 
Average years of education 
 
0.403 
 
0.144 
 
0.817 
 
Dependency ratio (inverse) -0.122 0.228 0.933 
 
Farming is not the main source of income 0.463 -0.066 0.782 
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Table A.5 
MIMIC results  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABS  0.048 
 (22.13)** 
 
AST  0.021 
 (5.24)** 
 
SSN 0.002 
 (16.94) 
 
AC 0.071 
 (22.77)** 
 
Food_expenditure_usd (log) 1 
 -- 
 
Simpson Index   0.105 
 (21.59)** 
 
N   16,190 
Chi2 
Prob > Chi2 
CFI 
TLI 
RMSEA 
RCI 
St.dev. 
Min 
Max 
58.106 
0.000 
0.988 
0.965 
0.034 
61.292 
10.057 
0 
100 
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Table A.6  
Characteristics of the pseudo-panels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Version 
  
 
Variables used for cohort 
construction 
 
 
Number of cohorts 
(C) 
 
 
Average N of observations 
per cohort (nc) 
 
1 
 
Long-run average temperature 
quintiles*Year-of-birth of the 
household head quintiles 
 
25 
 
 
647.6 
 
 
2 
 
Long-run average precipitation 
quintiles*Year-of-birth of the 
household head quintiles 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
647.6 
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Table A.7 
Descriptive statistics – Pseudo-panel Version 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
 Mean Var sd Obs 
 
 
Food consumption level 
 
32.855 
 
88.180 
 
9.390 
 
125 
 
∆Food 6.019 28.349 5.324 100 
 
RCI 63.378 17.644 4.201 125 
 
∆RCI 0.789 0.576 0.759 100 
 
Temperature 23.197 3.430 1.852 125 
 
Precipitation 60.088 26.546 5.152 125 
 
Long-run temperature 23.054 3.446 1.856 125 
 
Long-run precipitation 60.348 13.046 3.612 125 
 
∆Temp 0.002 0.000 0.018 100 
 
∆Pre 0.033 0.004 0.064 100 
 
Notes: 
Food consumption is cohort monthly per capita food consumption expressed in dollars at 2010 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). ∆Food is the annualised food consumption growth rate between t 
and t-1, i.e. the average annual percentage change in (ln) cohort per capita food consumption. RCI 
is the Resilience Capacity Index, scaled from 1 to 100.  ∆RCI is the annualised change in the RCI 
Index between t and t-1. Temperature is average monthly temperature in the years between t and t-
1, expressed in degree Celsius. Precipitation is average monthly precipitation in the years between 
t and t-1, expressed in mm. ∆Temp is the difference in logarithms of average temperature levels at 
and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. ∆Pre is the difference in logarithms of average precipitation 
levels at t and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. Long-run temperature is average monthly 
temperature during the period 1981-2014. Long-run precipitation is average monthly precipitation 
during the period 1983-2016. 
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Table A.8 
Descriptive statistics – Pseudo-panel Version 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
 Mean Var sd Obs 
 
 
Food consumption level 
 
33.162 
 
82.441 
 
9.080 
 
125 
 
∆Food 6.691 60.786 7.797 100 
 
RCI 63.496 16.392 4.049 125 
 
∆RCI 0.887 1.222 1.106 100 
 
Temperature 23.256 0.980 0.990 125 
 
Precipitation 60.141 114.408 10.696 125 
 
Long-run temperature 23.108 0.776 0.881 125 
 
Long-run precipitation 60.470 88.037 9.383 125 
 
∆Temp 0.006 0.001 0.024 100 
 
∆Pre 0.032 0.005 0.071 100 
 
Notes: 
Food consumption is cohort monthly per capita food consumption expressed in dollars at 2010 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). ∆Food is the annualised food consumption growth rate between t 
and t-1, i.e. the average annual percentage change in (ln) cohort per capita food consumption. RCI 
is the Resilience Capacity Index, scaled from 1 to 100. ∆RCI is the annualised change in the RCI 
Index between t and t-1. Temperature is average monthly temperature in the years between t and t-
1, expressed in degree Celsius. Precipitation is average monthly precipitation in the years between 
t and t-1, expressed in mm. ∆Temp is the difference in logarithms of average temperature levels at 
and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. ∆Pre is the difference in logarithms of average precipitation 
levels at t and t-1, both scaled by long-run means. Long-run temperature is average monthly 
temperature during the period 1981-2014. Long-run precipitation is average monthly precipitation 
during the period 1983-2016. 
